Assessing market discipline in UK credit institutions : subordinated debt holders as signallers of bank risk by Hamalainen, Paul
Loughborough University
Institutional Repository
Assessing market discipline
in UK credit institutions:
subordinated debt holders as
signallers of bank risk
This item was submitted to Loughborough University's Institutional Repository
by the/an author.
Additional Information:
• A Doctoral Thesis. Submitted in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
for the award of Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University.
Metadata Record: https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/8057
Publisher: c© Paul Hamalainen
Please cite the published version.
 
 
 
This item is held in Loughborough University’s Institutional Repository 
(https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) and was harvested from the British Library’s 
EThOS service (http://www.ethos.bl.uk/). It is made available under the 
following Creative Commons Licence conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
Assessing market discipline in UK credit institutions: 
Subordinated debt holders as signallers of bank risk 
By 
Paul Hamalainen Bsc, ACA 
A Doctoral Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of 
Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University 
February 2007 
© by Paul Hamalainen, 2007 
... regulations may, no doubt, be considered as 
in some respects a violation of natural 
liberty. But those exertions of the natural liberty of a few individuals, which might 
endanger the security of the whole society, are, and ought to be, restrained by-the laws 
of all governments, of the most free, as well as of the most despotical. The obligation 
of building party walls, in order to prevent the communication of fire, is a violation of 
natural liberty, exactly of the same kind with the regulations of the banking trade... 
Adam Smith (1986 c. 1776), The Wealth of Nations. 
Abstract 
The thesis examines subordinated debt holder market discipline in UK credit 
institutions during the period 1995 to 2002. The topic is relevant as current research is 
questioning the role and effectiveness of rules-based bank regulatory oversight, and 
favouring, instead, incentive-compatible regulatory design and market discipline. In 
particular, the literature proposes using signals from subordinated debt holders to 
constrain bank risk-taking. In addition, this market oversight may provide information 
signals to regulatory agencies that are useful in improving bank regulatory design. 
The thesis researches two prominent issues related to subordinated debt holder market 
discipline and, therefore, contributes to the debate in introducing incentive-compatible 
polices in bank regulatory design. First, testing the risk sensitivity of UK credit 
institution subordinated debt spreads assesses whether investors are signalling bank- 
risk in market prices. The UK evidence supports the theoretical literature in claiming 
that eliminating too-big-to-fail policies can encourage effective incentive-based 
mechanisms. Secondly, the research examines the appropriateness of introducing a 
mandatory subordinated debt policy in the UK. The empirical analysis raises a 
number of themes, many of which are in stark contrast to US and other European 
banks' subordinated debt characteristics. The conclusion is that the regular issuance of 
subordinated debt should be the overriding policy tool to signal and constrain bank 
risk-taking (i. e. direct discipline). Extending the policy to include indirect market 
discipline through a standardised mandatory subordinated debt requirement would 
impose substantial costs and should not be implemented. 
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Chapter 1- Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the motivation for the research and identify 
the underlying themes that bind the thesis. In turn, the key research objectives and 
questions are raised and their contribution to the relevant academic literature 
highlighted. In addition, the research methodology that is considered most appropriate 
to answer the research questions is outlined. 
Motivation for the research 
The research is motivated by an interest in the debates on bank regulatory design that 
were prominent at the time of commencing this study. Increasingly, the role and 
effectiveness of rules-based bank regulatory oversight are being questioned, 
favouring, instead, incentive-compatible regulatory design and market discipline. 
Proposals from the United States Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (2000) and 
the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (1999 and 2000), along with 
significant commentary and research by the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (1999 and 2000), have served to highlight the concept of market 
discipline as a solution to current bank regulatory design. Furthermore, the New Basel 
Capital Accord ("the Basel II Accord") is adopting market discipline as one of its 
three "pillars". A particularly prominent suggestion in the literature is to incentivise 
credit institution subordinated debt (SND) holders and use their market signals in 
pressurising banks to constrain risk-taking to acceptable levels. In addition, this 
private-sector oversight may provide information signals to regulatory agencies that 
are useful in improving bank regulatory discipline. The potential contribution of SND 
holders to the market discipline debate forms the key research objective of this study. 
The thesis researches two prominent and topical issues related to SND holder market 
discipline in the UK context. 
Research themes and research questions 
SND investors, as uninsured liability holders, who are amongst the first to lose value 
in the event of bank failure, are seen as being likely to be sensitive to bank condition 
and, therefore, conduct suitable monitoring. It is argued that the incentive of SND 
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holders to monitor and limit bank-risk taking is more aligned with the regulatory 
agencies needs than that of other bank stakeholders. Therefore, they are a suitable 
instrument of market discipline. As the literature review in chapter two identifies, two 
phases must be satisfied for effective market discipline; a recognition phase, where 
investors recognise and signal changes in bank risk through a credit institution's 
access to finance and/or debt prices; and a control phase, where credit institutions 
respond to market signals. The first theme of this study, and the overarching one, is 
that it focuses on the signalling aspect of SND holders, in other words the recognition 
phase. Therefore, the first research question, `Are yield spreads on UK credit 
institution SND sensitive to credit institution risk? ' directly investigates whether SND 
investors signal bank condition in market prices. The theoretical literature identifies 
potential barriers that may limit SND holders' incentives and abilities in signalling 
bank risk-taking. These are examined as part of this research question. In this way, the 
thesis identifies whether UK SND holders signal bank risk-taking and whether there 
are impediments in the UK to incentive-compatible regulatory polices such as market 
discipline. 
The academic literature proposes a particular SND market discipline policy that may 
constrain bank risk-taking and enhance bank regulatory efficiency. This is a 
Mandatory Subordinated Debt Policy (MSNDP), where credit institutions would be 
compelled to issue qualifying mandatory SND. The theory is that the mandatory 
nature of a MSNDP would encourage these SND investors to signal bank risk-taking 
and at the same time provide information to other interested market participants, 
including regulatory agencies. The second theme of the study is to research the 
characteristics and issuance activity of UK credit institution-issued SND and apply 
the MSNDP proposals to the UK evidence. Therefore, the second research question, 
`Is UK credit institution-issued SND compatible with mandatory subordinated debt 
policy proposals? ' examines the appropriateness of a particular incentive-compatible 
regulatory policy in the UK context. In this way, the second research question, like 
the first, identifies the signalling potential of mandatory SND holders and whether 
there are impediments in the UK to this particular incentive-compatible regulatory 
policy. Therefore, both research questions contribute to the debate on introducing 
incentive-compatible policies in bank regulatory design. 
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A secondary objective of the research is to overcome some of the methodological 
failings of previous SND market discipline studies. Methodological contributions of 
the thesis to the market discipline literature include focusing on one European 
country, a bank-level approach in examining MSNDP proposals and applying data 
triangulation techniques to multiple secondary data sources. These should enhance the 
validity of the conclusions concerning the debate on SND market discipline. 
Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapters two and three form the literature review 
chapters. The conceptual framework in chapter two synthesises the theoretical market 
discipline literature and provides structure in examining current policy suggestions, 
including how market discipline can enhance bank regulatory designs. Chapter three 
critiques the existing empirical market discipline research. The analysis conducted in 
this chapter acts as a precursor to specifying the model used to answer the first 
research question. Chapter four collates the research literature discussed in the two 
literature chapters to explain the research objectives of the study and present the 
research questions, research model and research hypotheses associated with the 
research objectives. The chapter also explains why research on market discipline in 
the UK context is of value to the academic community. In chapter five, the thesis 
research design is presented including why, in the field of market discipline, a 
positivist theoretical perspective and deductive research process is deemed most 
appropriate in deriving credible and reliable research findings. Descriptive and 
inferential statistics are justified as appropriate methods to answer the thesis research 
questions. Chapters six and seven form the empirical testing phase of the research, 
with each chapter associated with one of the research questions discussed earlier in 
this introduction. Chapter eight synthesises the key findings on SND market discipline 
in the UK from the empirical chapters, and relates them to the higher level themes 
within the literature on incentive-compatible regulatory policies in bank regulatory 
design. In this way the contributions of this thesis to the market discipline literature 
are highlighted. 
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Chapter 2 -- Market discipline: A theoretical literature review 
Introduction 
Given the background to the debates in enhancing incentive-compatible regulatory 
designs identified in chapter one, the primary aim of this chapter is to contextualise 
the issues surrounding market discipline and raise awareness of the current key 
themes within incentive-based bank regulatory design. 
Accordingly, the chapter reviews the relevant academic literature and structures the 
theory underlying market discipline. This analysis is facilitated and enhanced by the 
use of economic concepts, such as information asymmetry, incentive structures, 
signalling and moral hazard. This leads to the creation of a conceptual theoretical 
framework of market discipline, which, as will be explained, is a beneficial tool for 
understanding the conditions necessary for effective market discipline and for 
assessing the efficacy of empirical research in this area. 
A central theme of the chapter is to explain how recent regulatory developments are 
closely aligned with the theoretical constructs of the market discipline framework. 
Application of the framework to topical market discipline issues also highlights the 
necessary conditions for ensuring effective market discipline. As such, the chapter 
examines the suitability of the theoretical framework to the current debate on 
contemporary market discipline and future bank regulatory policy design including 
the many calls for a MSNDP. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows: Section one explains and defines market 
discipline, and the costs and benefits to the financial system in adopting a market 
discipline-based regulatory policy. A review of the literature is undertaken in section 
two and a market discipline framework is proposed. Section three applies the 
framework to current, banking regulatory policy issues. It complements the themes of 
the previous sections by explaining how a well-constructed and implemented market 
discipline policy, that of mandatory SND, could enhance modem regulatory policy. 
The analysis of market discipline empirical evidence highlights the degree to which 
market-based solutions can be credibly incorporated in bank regulatory design. 
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Finally, assessing the Basel II Accord with reference to the framework illustrates the 
need to enhance incentive mechanisms. Section four concludes by explaining some of 
the potential benefits of the theoretical framework in understanding issues relating to 
market discipline and bank regulatory design. 
Section 1- What is market discipline? 
This section explains and defines the concept of market discipline used in this thesis 
study and supports the growing calls for enhanced incentive mechanisms in bank 
regulatory design by explaining the costs and benefits to the financial system in 
adopting a market discipline policy. 
The field of market discipline is fundamental to the public policy debate over reform 
of bank regulatory design and explains the prominence of this subject in the academic 
literature on finance. As the US Department of the Treasury (1991) states "In virtually 
all of the discussions of financial system reform, a key topic is whether and how 
increased market discipline can substitute for regulatory discipline to redress some of 
the moral hazard and efficiency problems in banking. " Recent proposals from the 
United States Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (2000) and the European 
Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (1999 and 2000), as well as significant 
research by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1999 and 2000) 
and commentary by other notable parties [Financial Services Authority (FSA), 2000a; 
and Meyer, 1999], have raised the profile of market discipline (in particular, 
mandatory SND market discipline) as a suitable regulatory policy. Alternative 
approaches to bank regulation are the prescriptive, rules-based capital adequacy 
provisions of the Basel Committee, financial laissez-faire (free banking) [Dowd, 
1996] and the "pre-commitment approach" [Kupiec and O'Brien, 1997]. 
The seminal work by Lane (1993) describes market discipline as: "financial markets 
providing signals that lead borrowers (i. e. banks) to behave in a manner consistent 
with their solvency. " Accordingly, market discipline can be signalled by all three 
classes of bank stakeholder: depositors, debt-holders and equity-holders. Excessive 
risk-taking by deposit-taking institutions provides a classic example of the market 
disciplinary process. Faced by increasing costs and greater uncertainty, depositors can 
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either demand a higher return (price effect) or withdraw their deposits (quantity 
effect) [Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Martinez Peria and Schmuckler, 1999; 
and Berger, 1991]. The threat of action, therefore, imposes discipline by signalling to 
deposit-taking institutions the riskiness of their activities. Similarly, debt-holders can 
demand a higher yield on bank debt, thereby increasing the cost of funds for riskier 
institutions. Likewise, equity-holders can sell their shares, thereby putting downward 
pressure on share prices and placing management under increased scrutiny. Lane's 
(1993) description forms the definition of market discipline used throughout this 
thesis. 
Potential Social Benefits 
Berger (1991) identified a number of potential social benefits attributable to enhanced 
market discipline. These benefits, which have been redefined over time, are as 
follows: First, by punishing bank risk-taking, increased market discipline may reduce 
the moral hazard incentives that government guarantees (for example, deposit 
insurance schemes) create for banks [Martinez Peria and Schmuckler, 1999]. 
Therefore, if market discipline is effective, bank decisions regarding the pricing of 
loans and the allocation of other portfolio funds might reflect more accurately 
society's risk preferences. Goodhart et al. (1998) capture the essence of this point 
when they stated that regulation for systemic reasons is necessary "when the social 
costs of the failure of a financial institution (particularly banks) exceed the private 
cost and such potential social costs are not incorporated into the decision making of 
the firm. " 
Secondly, market discipline may pressurise banks to improve their efficiency (through 
a change in management or bank mergers) or to exit the financial industry [Berger, 
1991]. Thirdly, the social cost of supervising banks may be lowered if regulators 
placed greater emphasis on market forces that can tell "good" from "bad" banks. This 
benefit derives from the fact that the market is a large, anonymous, multiple-entity 
group and a constant overseer of bank activity. As such, the market is less susceptible 
to forbearance and may, therefore, react more quickly than regulators to increases in 
bank risk-taking and thereby reduce systemic risk [Martinez Peria and Schmuckler, 
1999]. 
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Fourthly, private sector oversight may provide information to regulatory agencies that 
is useful in improving regulatory discipline and in prompting regulatory agency 
action. A disadvantage with an inflexible, rules-based regulatory system is that the 
rules are not sufficiently related to the actual risks of banking firms [Berger, 1991]. 
Therefore, it is difficult for the authorities to "fine tune" the costs or penalties 
imposed on banks for increasing risk [Lang and Robertson, 2002]. Conversely, market 
price information typically incorporates a ratio style scale that may alleviate this 
problem, by providing an incentive for rational market investors, who are at risk from 
bank failure, to accurately price risk into financial securities. This suggests that, rather 
than depending exclusively on regulatory action, banking authorities can also increase 
their reliance on market discipline to oversee banks. For example, the secondary 
market prices of uninsured liabilities or a bank's inability to issue new uninsured debt 
may provide information that regulators can use in setting up early warning systems 
for bank examinations, pricing deposit insurance, or setting capital requirements 
[Berger, 1991]. 1 In this respect, market information can be used to allocate scarce 
supervisory resources more efficiently. Additionally, the public nature of market 
information creates an incentive for the regulatory authorities to act swiftly (i. e. 
restrict regulatory forbearance). In other words, they cannot claim to have been 
unaware of bank risk-taking. 
Fifthly, informed market investors who conduct regular market disciplinary action, 
could reduce the regulatory burden imposed on financial institutions. For example, 
proposals by the Financial Services Authority (2001) to create wholesale-only 
deposit-taking banks presuppose that a certain class of "wholesale depositors should 
be capable of making their own informed assessments of the firms they deal with and, 
therefore, be in less need of the FSA's protection. " This should allow the FSA to 
reduce the regulatory controls over these banks and enable it to meet its regulatory 
objectives by concentrating resources on those banks that are in more need of 
protection. Equally, the regulatory authorities may utilise market discipline to adopt 
more stringent regulatory control. Wall (1989) and Evanoff (1991), for example, 
suggest market discipline mechanisms which act as triggers for bank closure, leading 
to prompter action by the authorities and, thereby, fewer claims on the deposit 
insurance fund. 
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Finally, market discipline can complement supervisory discipline by shifting the 
burden of proof from the regulatory authorities, who need to show that a bank is 
unsafe, to bank management, who need to demonstrate to the market that their bank is 
not excessively risky [Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1999]. 2 
Apart from the desirable corporate governance effect, this could have a positive 
impact on the market's perception of the regulatory authorities' role in the financial 
sector. 
Potential Social Costs 
The existence of asymmetric information in the banking industry and the lack of 
secondary markets in bank loans [Goodhart et al., 1998], suggest that greater 
emphasis on market discipline may increase the probability of bank runs and knock- 
on effects within the financial system [Diamond and Dybvig, 1983]. Furthermore, 
because an important objective of market discipline is to reduce excessive risk-taking 
by banks, this could conflict with the regulatory authorities' objective of maintaining 
the supply of bank credit [Calomiris, 1999]. 
Similarly, with deposit insurance schemes, regulatory authorities face a dilemma in 
ensuring adequate consumer protection whilst simultaneously limiting the moral 
hazard behaviour that can be generated by safety nets. Enhancing market discipline in 
the financial sector may, however, undermine the adequacy of such "safe havens" for 
small, unsophisticated investors [Berger, 1991]. 
The costs to the banking industry of implementing specific conditions, necessary for 
the effective conduct of market discipline, may also prove excessive. Market 
discipline proposals for the mandatory issue of SND by banks may, for example, not 
be problematic for large banks, but they could prove unwieldy and over-burdensome 
if imposed on smaller ones [Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1999; 
and US Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, 2000]. 3 Equally, an inappropriately 
constructed market discipline policy may force banks to lever themselves above the 
unconstrained optimum and crowd out the governance role of other private bank- 
stakeholders, in particular equity-holders. 
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A further criticism of MSNDP proposals concerns its suitability for developing 
economies [Calomiris, 1999]. 4 In particular, banks operating in economies with 
poorly developed debt markets may experience difficulties in attracting sufficient 
buyers for its debt. Equally, the price signalling mechanism of market discipline will 
be hampered by the large spread and liquidity risk "noise characteristics" of 
underdeveloped financial markets. An insufficient stock of debt market investors 
raises the potential for "insiders" to purchase SND, thus enhancing price manipulation 
possibilities. Once again, this may insulate banks from the risk-pricing mechanism of 
market discipline. 5 
The informational output from market discipline policies may also have undesirable 
outcomes, which hamper the effectiveness of the regulatory regime. For example, a 
regulatory policy that utilises market prices as a signalling mechanism may result in 
misguided regulatory actions if the signals are false [US Shadow Financial Regulatory 
Committee, 2000]. Davies (2001) raises a scenario where investors rely 
predominantly on what is perceived to be an especially important informational 
measure. In the bank supervisory environment, this is likely to be a regulatory 
authority-derived calculation. As a result, investors may "piggy-back" on this measure 
and thereby provide no additional source of discipline. In fact, under these 
circumstances, rather than market discipline providing a stabilising effect, this "herd"- 
like behaviour may create destabilising influences within the financial system. 
The cost-benefit analysis indicates that there is scope for an enhanced role for market 
discipline in bank regulatory design and that regulatory authorities have a number of 
options in terms of its implementation. Equally, the analysis emphasises that the 
success of a market discipline policy depends on its structure. For example, a well- 
structured market discipline policy could enhance the mechanisms of corporate 
governance. 6 
9 
Section 2-A market discipline theoretical framework 
This section reviews the theoretical literature underpinning market discipline and 
synthesises and structures the key themes underlying market discipline. This leads to 
the creation of a theoretical framework of market discipline, which, as will be 
explained, is a beneficial tool for understanding the conditions necessary for effective 
market discipline and for assessing the efficacy of empirical research in this area. 
Accordingly, the key themes of the theoretical framework will recur on numerous 
occasions throughout the thesis. 
Market discipline: a two-stage process of recognition and control 
Flannery and Sorescu (1996) discuss the extent to which market investors can 
recognise and control the risks of banking firms, which suggests that market 
discipline must satisfy a two-stage process. Support for a two-stage market discipline 
process has been explicitly advocated by Bliss and Flannery (2001). They suggest that 
market discipline is comprised of two distinct components, which they term 
"monitoring" and "influence". These concepts naturally align with the processes of 
recognition and control and, for the purposes of this paper, they will be referred to as 
the recognition phase and the control phase. 7 
The recognition phase - Morgan and Stiroh (2000) suggest that effective market 
discipline requires that investors must first consider themselves at risk in the event of 
default, and second, that they can effectively observe bank risk. 8 This implies that the 
recognition phase is made up of two sub-phases, which are crucial to the role of 
market discipline in bank regulatory design. Furthermore, how these two sub-phases 
co-integrate has implications for the conclusions drawn from market discipline 
testing. Proposals that enhance bank transparency should improve market investors' 
ability to recognise changes in bank condition. Similarly, SND market discipline 
policies must incorporate incentive structures that enable market investors to 
recognise that they are at risk. This is important because it is only when the investor is 
in a position to recognise changes in risk that he can take action to monitor the 
situation. 
10 
The control phase - This phase also has two sub-phases. The first is a natural 
extension of investor behaviour from the recognition phase, and the second relates to 
subsequent borrower behaviour. If investors consider themselves at increased risk as a 
result of bank risk-taking and can observe that risk (the recognition phase) it is 
reasonable to assume that they will react through either price or quantity effects. This 
is how investors attempt to control risks. However, whether they can truly control risk 
depends on whether borrowers react to these signals and "behave in a manner 
consistent with their solvency" [Lane, 1993]. Billet, Garfinkel and O'Neal (1998) 
found that banks reacted to adverse market signals by shifting into less-disciplinary 
(i. e. government) funding sources when problems arose. Figure 2-1 illustrates the 
recognition and control phases and places them within a context. 
Most papers on market discipline regulatory oversight, however, do not make any 
reference to a two-stage process, typically focusing on the recognition phase and the 
signalling aspects of investors. As such, they ignore the controlling element of 
borrower reaction and, arguably, omit an important aspect of effective market 
discipline. Similarly, pure regulatory agency discipline also needs to successfully 
incorporate the two-stage process, otherwise free-marketers would be right to 
question the role of regulatory agencies in the financial marketplace. 9 
There are three discernible reasons for highlighting the existence of the two phases in 
the market discipline process. First, it provides an holistic structure to critically 
analyse empirical research on market discipline, and thereby helps to formulate future 
market discipline research strategies. Market discipline testing has typically examined 
either one phase or the other, raising question marks over the adequacy of prior 
empirical research in truly examining the concept of market discipline. 
However, recognising that effective market discipline requires the successful 
interaction of phases and sub-phases can make it difficult to identify the causes of 
failed empirical tests. For example, the two recognition sub-phases can make it 
difficult to determine, from purely recognition phase market discipline tests, whether 
investors have a perception that they will be bailed out or that they cannot identify 
changes in bank condition. This, in turn, has implications for policymakers in 
identifying and resolving market imperfections in the current regulatory framework. 
11 
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Secondly, the role of market discipline in bank regulation can cover a spectrum of 
possibilities, ranging from an independent overseer of risk that controls bank risks, to 
a signalling mechanism that provides bank regulators with additional information to 
determine future regulatory strategy. For example, such information might be used as 
a signal to conduct more frequent examinations of institutions whose market measures 
of risk have increased. What is considered to be the most suitable role for market 
discipline in the regulatory environment will ultimately determine whether research 
should focus purely on the recognition phase (providing signals to bank regulators) or 
on both phases, which will also incorporate market discipline as a strict controlling 
mechanism. This issue is examined further in section three. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the recognition of different constructs within 
the market discipline arena helps to formulate a theoretical framework for market 
discipline. This framework can serve as a foundation block, illustrating the many 
intertwined issues surrounding market discipline and providing a clear structure with 
which to analyse them. Furthermore, the theoretical framework provides a mechanism 
to understand, more fully, recent announcements concerning market discipline. 
A theoretical framework for bank market discipline 
The theoretical framework is derived from the relevant literature and incorporates 
detailed conditions and issues that relate to each of the two phases of market 
discipline already identified. In constructing the theoretical framework, a useful 
starting point is the work of Lane (1993), who outlined four conditions necessary for 
the effective implementation of market discipline. The four conditions are as follows: 
" capital markets must be open; 
" there must be public disclosure of bank capital structure and risk exposures; 
" market participants must not believe that the borrower would be bailed out in the 
case of an actual or impending default; 
" borrowers must respond to market signals. 
Capital markets must be open - Unrestricted, efficient capital markets are required so 
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that the market's ability to discriminate between prudent and imprudent credit 
institutions and, therefore, provide appropriate market signals, is not distorted. 
Public disclosure of bank capital structure and risk exposures - Lane's (1993) 
second requirement for effective market discipline is that investors must be able to 
obtain relevant information about a borrower's outstanding debts. Recent structural 
changes in the banking industry (i. e. consolidation, convergence and globalisation), 
together with unprecedented levels of financial innovation, have led to agency 
problems for private sector monitors of bank risk [Morgan, 2002]. 10 Those demanding 
enhanced bank transparency are therefore right in requesting more disclosure than 
simply outstanding debts [Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2001 a; and 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2000]. 11 The Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (1998), for example, suggests that sufficient public disclosure of 
bank information is essential for enabling users of that information to make an 
accurate assessment of a bank's financial condition, risk profile, etc. 
The benefit of enhanced public disclosure, or "information transparency", is that it 
should allow market discipline to work earlier and more efficiently, thereby 
strengthening the incentives for banks to behave in a prudent and efficient manner. As 
such, it can provide a strong incentive for bank management to improve risk 
management practices and internal controls. Furthermore, enhanced bank 
transparency, achieved through regular and timely flows of high-quality, discretionary 
disclosures, could enable a sound and well managed bank to discriminate itself from 
less secure credit institutions and thus obtain a competitive advantage (i. e. better 
market terms and an enhanced reputation). However, the FSA (2000b) recognises 
that, in practice, such incentives are unlikely to be sufficient to entice additional 
voluntary disclosure by banks. In particular, "market participants and consumers alike 
may find it difficult to interpret information from firms which do publish information 
unless a . sufficient number 
of similar firms also make comparative disclosures. This 
would be particularly true if other firms responded by making selective and partial 
disclosures to present themselves in the most favourable light possible. " Creating a 
disclosure regime that promotes the "right information" in terms of it being both 
sufficient and comparable is therefore extremely important. 
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With regard to information disclosure, two conditions are necessary; that users of 
information have the right information and at the right time [Berger, 1991]. The first 
condition, i. e. right information, is concerned with the reliability and quality of 
information. This is necessary in order to avoid the possibility of a credit institution 
concealing the truth from the market and the regulators. The use of external auditors 
and supervisory bank examinations provides a degree of security against this problem. 
However, from a wider regulatory perspective, it is in the interests of all market 
participants that information disclosure is reliable. Otherwise, there is the possibility 
of contagion effects, as debt-servicing difficulties experienced by one borrower are 
perceived as signalling impending problems for similar borrowers [Lane, 1993]. 
Berger's right information condition and Lane's good information requirement also 
suggest that information should be in a form that is relevant for investor needs and in 
sufficient quantity to enable investors to conduct meaningful comparative analysis 
across different credit institutions. 
The need for timely information about the ex ante risk-taking behaviour of banks is 
equally important, because without it, a bank will have no external check on its 
gambling behaviour and this could lead to moral hazard problems. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in its Basel II Accord has identified the 
importance of these two information conditions. 12 As part of the consultation on 
enhancing bank disclosures, a working group defined transparency of bank 
information as: "public disclosure of reliable and timely information" [Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 1998]. The Basel II Accord proposals expand on 
these generic terms by stressing the need for sufficient, comparable, accurate and 
relevant market disclosures as facilitators of enhanced bank transparency [Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 1998,2000 and 2001a]. In fact, pillar three of the 
new Basel II Accord facilitates an appropriate public disclosure regime, setting out 
detailed requirements in each of these areas of disclosure. 13 However, although it is 
desirable when creating a bank disclosure regime to meet both the right information 
and right time conditions, trade-offs between the two may be necessary. For example, 
there is a clear trade-off between accuracy and timeliness of information. 14 
14 
The conditions of open capital markets and reliable and timely information can, 
therefore, be justifiably incorporated into the recognition phase. Without these two 
conditions investors would be unable to determine accurately and on a timely basis 
whether the risk-taking activities of credit institutions had changed, and they would 
not, therefore, be capable of signalling their responses through open capital markets. 
Figure 2-2 expands the market discipline theoretical framework shown in figure 2-1 to 
include the conditions necessary for effective market discipline, within the constraints 
of the different phases, and highlights the importance of open markets and suitable 
information conditions in the recognition phase. It is appropriate that these two 
conditions attach to the same sub-phase because they are inextricably linked. Unlike 
the previous two conditions, the next condition to be discussed, that of a "no bailout 
perception", is attached to the other recognition sub-phase. 
Market participants must not believe that the borrower would be bailed out in the 
case of an actual or impending default - Lane (1993) believed that the failure of this 
condition was the most important reason in explaining the failure of market discipline. 
However, as previously indicated, it is often difficult to determine from the results of 
market discipline testing what causes an unsuccessful outcome. Furthermore, the 
current focus by international regulatory agencies on enhanced information disclosure 
emphasises the importance of the information condition. 
With regard to effective market discipline, the importance of a no bailout policy is 
self-explanatory. If market participants believe that they will be saved in the event of 
borrower default, then market prices and quantities will not respond to bank risk 
changes. This will undermine market discipline and increase borrower and lender 
moral hazard behaviour. As such, it represents a case of government oversight 
displacing private efforts to evaluate and control fines [Prowse, 1997]. 
The difficulty for the regulatory authorities in successfully achieving a policy of no- 
bailout is one of credibility [Lane, 1993]. It is not sufficient for the regulatory 
authorities to promise not to carry out a bailout. Market participants must also believe 
that the promise will be kept, otherwise there will be an expectations gap. Therefore, 
in order to retain policy credibility, the authorities must create incentives that signal to 
market participants that no expectations gap exists. 15 Equally, it is important for the 
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regulatory authorities to ensure that there are no disincentives that may damage policy 
credibility. 
A common credibility issue is that of the "too-big-to-fail" (TBTF) perception. Under 
such circumstances, regardless of what the authorities announce, market investors 
believe that a bailout will take place and price bank securities accordingly. Whether 
regulatory agencies can dispel this perception is extremely hard to evaluate. 16 
However, it is clear that the possible existence of such bailout policies [Carrington, 
1984] can prove extremely damaging to government and market sector regulatory 
solutions, and encourage moral hazard behaviour. O'Hara and Shaw (1990) 
documented the private value of a TBTF policy as an average 1.3% abnormal return 
to the common equity of the banks specifically identified as TBTF. Flannery and 
Sorescu (1996), similarly, provide evidence: "indicating that bank investors clearly 
impounded the value of conjectural government guarantees into debenture prices. As 
the strength of these guarantees changed over time, debenture prices came to reflect 
the specific risks of individual issuing banks. " 
At the root of the credibility and expectations gap problem is time inconsistency. A 
policy of no bailout, whether formally announced or documented in less direct terms 
(such as the FSA's statement that "consumers must recognise their own responsibility 
for their financial decisions"), may be appropriate ex ante. However, once a bank has 
failed, there are political, social and financial pressures to provide bailouts because 
they compensate individuals for losses resulting from circumstances beyond their 
knowledge or control, and may prevent systemic consequences [Lane, 1993]. As a 
result, promises of no bailouts in the future are not sufficiently credible to extinguish 
investors' safety perceptions, thus increasing the possibility for moral hazard 
behaviour by both investors and borrowers. 17 
The other form of investor bailout is the existence of deposit insurance schemes. Hall 
(1987) explains that the objectives of deposit insurance schemes mirror the regulatory 
authorities' goals of preventing systemic risk and protecting consumers. However, the 
moral hazard behavioural problems associated with deposit insurance schemes 
[Garcia, 1999] can have an impact on the effectiveness of market discipline. The two 
specific moral hazards of deposit insurance schemes that are regularly cited are, that 
16 
investors will deposit money with the deposit-taking institution paying the highest 
return knowing that they will get all or substantially all of their money back if the 
institution fails; and that the deposit-taking institution will take on riskier investments 
knowing depositors' funds are protected if the institution's excessive risk-taking fails. 
Under such circumstances, investors do not adequately assess and price bank 
condition when making deposits. As a result, deposit insurance may be attracting 
additional deposits to riskier institutions. Moreover, riskier institutions are more likely 
to experience larger loan loss difficulties and will, therefore, need to attract additional 
deposits to cover liquidity problems. In both scenarios, by charging higher deposit 
rates a risky credit institution can attract these funds. This enables riskier credit 
institutions to continue excessive risk-taking when effective investor market 
discipline should be signalling prudent behaviour. This has implications for market 
discipline research because moral hazard issues may be creating noise in empirical 
data relating to depositor market discipline. For example, a rise in deposit rates does 
not necessarily mean that investors are appropriately pricing bank risk exposures and 
conducting effective market discipline. If investors understood a bank's true risk 
exposures they would probably react by reducing or withdrawing their investments. In 
fact, the sticky nature of bank deposit interest rates and the banks' ability to be price 
setters in this market suggests that the quantity effect, if it exists, is a better signal of 
depositor discipline. 
With regard to the moral hazard behaviour of credit institutions, they can pursue 
riskier strategies in the form of additional asset portfolio risk or through reductions in 
capital and liquid reserves. Calomiris (1997) and Kane (1989) identified that at 
comparatively low levels of capital, financial institutions are more likely to ignore 
"market" safeguards of shareholder restraint and management caution and pursue 
riskier strategies. The impact of deposit insurance would, therefore, be to raise 
instability in the financial marketplace, thereby encouraging credit institutions to take 
excessive risks despite suitable market oversight. 
Although deposit insurance schemes appear to be creating an environment that is 
inconsistent with the objectives of such schemes, there are options within the 
characteristics of deposit insurance schemes that can limit moral hazard. These can 
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stimulate the market's role in pricing bank conditions and in restoring incentives for 
prudent bank behaviour. Through the introduction of co-insurance and limiting 
protection to "widows and orphans", the regulatory authorities can create incentives 
for investors to take responsibility for their investments. Similarly, the use of risk- 
related deposit insurance premiums can restrain banks' risk-taking [Hall, 2001b]. As 
Lane (1993) stresses, "minimising the moral hazard problem associated with a safety 
net can be viewed as a problem of setting the net at the right level. There are some 
individuals whose protection may be regarded as socially unavoidable or ethically 
desirable (therefore necessitating some degree of consumer protection), while there 
are others who could withstand the associated losses, and, if unprotected, could 
perform a valuable monitoring function. It is important to demarcate these groups and 
design rules for intervention accordingly. " This policy trade-off illustrates the 
influence of the political economy on regulatory design. In order to be desirable, 
policy proposals must, therefore, be both economically and politically credible 
[Calomiris, 1999]. 
Lane's safety net quote illustrates an important potential solution (especially if the 
regulatory authorities wish to make use of market discipline signalling) and 
introduces an additional requirement within the "no bailout must be anticipated" 
condition. Berger (1991) discusses the need for a right participants condition, "where 
the market participants who have the relevant information about bank risk should be 
in a position to act and have the incentive to act. " If information is in the hands of 
insured depositors as discussed above, moral hazard issues suggest that these 
investors have little or no incentive to act. Conversely, uninsured investors, such as 
SND holders and equity holders, have every incentive to restrict excessive bank risk- 
taking in pursuit of suitable risk-adjusted returns. The fundamental incentive is that, 
being uninsured investors, they are forced to consider themselves at risk. 18 The 
creation of a set of market investors that have the right incentives to act and thus 
provide appropriate market discipline signalling has gained momentum recently, with 
proposals that centre on the creation of mandatory SND holders (see section three). 
Borrowers must respond to market signals - Flannery (1998) emphasises that 
effective corporate governance requires reliable mechanisms by which to reverse or 
control undesirable changes in firm condition. This places effective market discipline 
18 
in the control phase of the theoretical framework, because a rational credit institution, 
faced with increasing market costs and investor withdrawal, would take appropriate 
action. Lane (1993) limits his consideration to borrowers, i. e. banks, reducing 
liabilities in response to private sector signalling. However, in today's multi-faceted 
banking industry, borrowers can undertake an array of steps to reduce risk exposures 
and improve capital structure. This raises a question as to whether market investors 
are able to observe a bank's response. If they cannot, market discipline is deemed to 
have failed, as investors will overreact, penalising a bank that is behaving in a manner 
consistent with its solvency. The answer to this problem lies with the second of 
Lane's conditions, i. e. providing suitable public disclosure requirements. 
In order to induce appropriate borrower responses, modem regulatory theory 
proposes, as it does for the recognition phase, that suitable incentive structures must 
be created. In the control phase, these structures aim to ensure that the responsibility 
for the prudent management of banks lies firmly with bank management. The key 
driver behind such structures is that bank stakeholders, investors and / or the 
regulatory authorities must have the ability to impose conditions that restrict, 
terminate or control bank activities. Mayes (2000) provides an illuminating example 
from the New Zealand market discipline model: "Directors are liable to stiff fines and 
periods of imprisonment for false or misleading statements and have unlimited 
personal civil liability for losses incurred by others as a result of these statements. " 
Another frequently suggested option is some form of "Prompt Corrective Action" 
(PCA) [Jones and King, 1995]. This enables the swift implementation of measures to 
reduce bank risk-taking, as well as preventing regulatory forbearance. Section three 
describes a number of control mechanisms that have been proposed under mandatory 
SND regulatory designs. 
The Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (1997) and Bliss (2001) emphasise the 
importance of good corporate governance structures for effective market discipline at 
the control phase. As Bliss (2001) states: "The central focus of this literature 
[corporate governance] ... 
is on the manager as the decision-making agent in the firm 
and on the manager's incentives. " From a market discipline perspective, a strong 
corporate governance environment should ensure that bank management have the 
right "incentive contract" to operate the bank in a responsible fashion and do so 
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within a well-controlled and accountable organisational structure, thus limiting the 
potential for excessive risk- taking behaviour or reacting adversely to investor 
concerns. 
However, Lane (1993) suggests a number of reasons why borrowers may not respond 
to market signals, which have implications for previous empirical research on market 
discipline. In the first instance, borrowers may have no intention of repaying 
investors, therefore a rising cost of funds signal is immaterial in eliciting a response 
from the borrower. Equally, the same behavioural logic applies to borrowers who 
believe they will become insolvent. They have nothing to lose by borrowing, even at a 
higher interest rate, because they do not expect to survive. The availability of 
subsidised (deposit-insured) funds and the moral hazard issues of insured depositors 
only serve to enhance the supply of funds to such credit institutions. Calomiris (1997) 
and Kane (1989) illustrate that a similar "beyond care mentality" existed in the 
gambling policies of Savings and Loan (S&L) institutions during the S&L crisis in the 
USA. Lane (1993) concluded: "market discipline does not work through interest rate 
spreads if borrowers are near insolvency; it can only work by excluding insolvent 
borrowers from the market. " Benston et al. (1986) intimate a similar point: 
"Interviews with funding officers suggest that when an institution begins to 
experience funding problems, it attempts to limit the visible spread that appears in the 
market. The institution will keep borrowing as long as the spread remains within a 
narrow range. If the range diverges beyond self-imposed limits, the institution 
becomes concerned that an adverse signal will be sent to the market, and it responds 
by shifting funding to other markets with less visible rates .... The Implication 
is that 
the visible spread would have been much larger if the institution attempted to borrow 
in quantities as large as those borrowed before the problems appeared. " This suggests 
that there is a limit to price signalling and that perhaps only investor quantity effects, 
such as deposit withdrawal and debt selling, make borrowers accept defeat and 
withdraw from the market. Many market discipline studies have investigated whether 
investors price bank risk during periods of severe market turbulence (for example, 
Avery, Belton and Goldberg, 1988; and Hannan and Hanweck, 1988). Lane's quote 
provides an insight into their findings, but it also endorses the methodology and 
findings of studies that have explored price and quantity effects [Park, 1995; and Park 
and Peristiani, 1998]. 
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Section 3- The dynamics of the market discipline theoretical 
framework 
This section applies the market discipline theoretical framework to three topical 
market discipline issues. As part of the process of making regulatory policy more 
reflective of the risks incurred by individual credit institutions the academic 
community has discussed proposals for market discipline via a mandatory SND 
requirement. This section will, therefore, analyse how SND holders, in contrast to 
other bank stakeholders, are better placed to satisfy the right participants condition of 
the market discipline theoretical framework. 
Secondly, the adequacy of the Basel II Accord's enhanced role for market discipline 
in bank regulatory design is briefly assessed with reference to the market discipline 
framework. Both this and the issue of mandatory SND highlight the need to create 
bank regulatory policies that satisfy both phases of the market discipline framework. 
Finally, the chapter explains to what extent market-based solutions can be credibly 
incorporated into bank regulatory design. 
Issue 1: Stakeholders as the source of market discipline in banking 
For regulatory policy purposes, one of the most important market discipline issues is 
determining which financial instruments are likely to provide the best vehicle for 
discipline at the least cost [Berger, 1991]. 
Depositors and market discipline - Garten (1986) argues that, in theory, bank 
depositors appear particularly well positioned to impose market discipline on bank 
management. Bank deposits form an essential ongoing source of funds, which 
suggests that market discipline could be constantly imposed. In addition, the 
regulatory authorities' concerns over actual and possible bank runs suggest that 
depositors do react to changes in bank risk. However, proponents of market discipline 
expect depositors to react to increases in bank risk by either demanding a risk 
premium or withdrawing their money. In practice, as previously discussed, the 
strength of depositor discipline is affected by the moral hazard behaviour associated 
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with explicit government guarantees, i. e. deposit insurance schemes, implicit 
government guarantees (TBTF exemptions), and asymmetric information problems. 
However, the elimination of deposit insurance increases the possibility of bank runs. 
Therefore, if the consequence of bank risk-taking is bank run-induced failure, market 
discipline could result in fewer, rather than safer banks. Unlike bank failure, bank 
runs may discourage ongoing bank risk monitoring [Garten, 1986] and, therefore, 
would not be an acceptable means of market discipline. 19 Conversely, the ex ante 
threat of bank runs may encourage bank management to constrain bank risk-taking, 
thereby reducing the potential for bank runs. 
Incentives to create true "investor-depositors" which exercise market discipline centre 
on deposit insurance scheme characteristics. However, as previously discussed, 
determining the appropriate level of risk to impose on depositors and simultaneously 
inducing sufficient market discipline is extremely difficult. As Evanoff (1993) 
highlights, the problem with using depositors as a source of market discipline is that 
this "razor's edge" problem is unavoidable. 
There is, however, a group of "investor-depositors" that does satisfy Garten's (1986) 
conditions for depositor market discipline; these are holders of certificates of deposit 
(CDs), also known as negotiable CDs. As the minimum denomination for CDs issued 
in the UK is £100,000, they easily exceed the current UK deposit protection scheme 
limit of £35,000 and, therefore, their owners are predominantly uninsured. Moreover, 
unlike other deposits, CDs can be liquidated in a secondary market. Therefore, prices 
may be used by regulators to reveal private sector assessment of bank risk. 
However, CDs exhibit characteristics that make it questionable as to whether they are 
the most appropriate instrument for signalling market discipline. Using Berger's 
(1991) criteria for judging the market discipline potential of different financial 
instruments, CD holders are viewed as relatively senior creditors. Therefore, the "no 
bailout" condition may be less important for this class of holders, suggesting that the 
primary and secondary market prices of bank CDs may not be sufficiently sensitive to 
bank condition. Furthermore, although London CDs can be issued for maturities of up 
to five years, the maturities of CDs are typically between one and three months 
[Blake, 2000]. These short-term maturities and the ability to sell in a liquid secondary 
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market enable holders to "run" from bank risk prior to failure. This problem is 
compounded by the typical reluctance of the regulatory authorities to close ailing 
banks. Consequently, even if a three-month CD holder retains his investment until 
maturity, he may escape any significant costs associated with failure. If holders of 
CDs can escape the significant costs of bank failure, it follows that they do not have 
an incentive to accurately price bank risk for market discipline purposes. 
Equity-holders and market discipline - All banks issue equity, in part to satisfy 
capital adequacy regulations. This equity is traded on liquid secondary markets and 
provides the regulatory authorities with prices that reveal the market's assessment of 
bank risk and condition. Furthermore, equities are typically the first to lose value in 
the event of bank failure. This makes equity-holders sensitive to bank risk and, 
therefore, potentially reliable monitors of bank condition. Unlike depositors, however, 
they cannot directly cause a run on a bank [Horvitz, 1983]. Rather, their reaction to 
bank risk-taking is to sell stock in the secondary markets. However, equity-holders' 
actions are influenced by a risk / return profile that tends to be skewed. For example, 
equity-holders stand to share in all of the gains received from the bank's investments. 
On the downside, however, the equity-holders' liability is limited to the extent of their 
investment. These moral hazard problems make equity an unsuitable market 
discipline instrument [Evanoff, 1993] because holders have an incentive to select high 
risk-taking banks. Under such circumstances, the costs of additional risk-taking may 
be borne by the deposit insurance scheme when the bank fails. This tendency becomes 
particularly acute when the market value of the bank has declined to a point 
approaching insolvency [Evanoff, 1993]. For example, such behaviour was 
particularly evident in the US during the Savings and Loan crisis of the 1980's [Barth, 
1991]. Moreover, it is uncertain whether enhanced bank transparency would deter this 
action [Horvitz, 1983]. Therefore, equity investors' incentives to monitor and limit 
bank risk-taking are quite different from those of the regulatory authorities. As such, 
it means that equity is not a suitable instrument for market discipline purposes. 
Debt-holders and market discipline - Like deposits, bank debt can take a number of 
forms, with the appropriate class of bank debt-holders for market discipline purposes 
being determined by the right participants condition. Investors in secured bank debt 
have a charge over the assets of the bank (a form of insurance), and therefore do not 
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have the same risk perceptions as junior, i. e. unsecured, liability holders. As SND is 
not insured and is amongst the first to lose value in the event of bank failure, holders 
are likely to be sensitive to bank condition [Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, 1999]; this encourages them to conduct suitable monitoring. In 
addition, the relatively long maturity of SND limits the investor's ability to avoid 
sharing in the cost of failure. Although these losses are limited to the size of their 
investment, like depositors, debt-holders do not share in the up-side gains of equity- 
holders. 20 Therefore, they have a natural aversion to banks that seek increased profits 
through greater risk-taking. Furthermore, they typically hold investments in excess of 
consumer protection scheme limits, making debt-holder market discipline free of 
Evanoffs "razor's edge" problem. From a regulator's perspective, SND provides the 
same cushioning effect to the deposit insurance scheme as equity, but without the 
risk-taking incentive of equity-holders. Thus, the incentive of SND holders to monitor 
and limit bank risk-taking is accordingly more aligned with those of regulators (and 
hence taxpayers). This implies that they would exert a greater restraint on bank 
management [Hall, 2001 a] and, as such, is a suitable instrument of market discipline. 
Mandatory subordinated debt market discipline proposals 
A suitably-structured SND regulatory policy can significantly alter the incentive 
structure of debt-holders, banks, the regulatory authorities, and the disciplinary 
influence to which banks are subject [Evanoff, 1993]. In addition to the right 
participants condition in the recognition phase, proposals should also provide bank 
management with incentives to respond to market signals, i. e. the control phase. The 
proceeding analysis explains how the generic conditions explicit in most SND 
policies relate to the market discipline framework phases. 
To ensure the recognition phase criteria are met, several important SND policy 
requirements are frequently suggested, which align with the right participants 
condition. The no bailout clause means that bank debt contract provisions must let 
SND holders know that they will not be protected under any circumstances [US 
Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, 2000]. Equally, the maturity characteristic 
of SND would have to be long enough to tie the debt-holders to the bank, thereby 
ensuring that the risk of bank failure is adequately priced into securities. A literature 
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review of SND proposals indicates a range of maturities from at least 1 to up to 5 
years (see table 2-1). Finally, a requirement to stagger debt issuance would mean that 
debt matures gradually, leaving a significant portion of SND holders constantly 
exposed to the costs of failure. This is important, because individual bank 
stakeholders may react differently to changes in bank condition. In order for the 
recognition phase to be successful, investors must in aggregate signal an identifiable 
reaction. Otherwise, the market may transmit conflicting signals, which banks are 
unable to interpret. 
To ensure investors genuinely have an incentive to monitor and react to changes in 
bank risk, proposals also include restrictions as to the amount of debt held by insiders 
[Wall, 1989; and Calomiris, 1997]. A requirement that has not previously been 
suggested could be that debt is issued in sufficiently large, minimum denominations, 
thus ensuring that investors have an incentive to monitor bank risk. By restricting 
SND to wealthy investors, the regulatory authorities can create a policy that is more 
politically credible. 21 In practice, as with other financial instruments, a large, 
minimum denomination clause would probably be implemented to control the costs of 
mandatory SND issuance. 
In tackling the control phase, SND proposals suggest solutions that encourage 
borrowers to respond to market signals. Banks currently issue SND as part of tier two 
regulatory capital. SND proposals extend the requirement, making the issue of 
subordinated liabilities mandatory, thereby raising the profile of this instrument for 
disciplinary purposes. Three key issues arise in creating a mandatory SND instrument 
for control purposes: i) the minimum percentage of bank capital that must be in the 
form of SND; ii) its maturity characteristics; and iii) its issue frequency. First, a 
minimum percentage of bank capital requirement (typical proposals range from 1-5% 
of risk-weighted assets (RWA)) provides a sufficiently large cushion to protect any 
deposit insurance scheme (and therefore taxpayers). It also creates a significant class 
of prominent and potentially powerful bank investors. Secondly, the maturity of SND 
would have to be sufficiently short, requiring the bank to go to the market regularly 
and roll over the debt. This clearly gives rise to a trade-off with the maturity 
requirement for investor lock-in, as discussed in the recognition phase criteria. 
Thirdly, maturities would have to be staggered to require banks to approach the 
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market frequently. 
The aim of these recognition and control phase requirements would be to create a 
sizeable class of financially-sophisticated and uninsured investors with the incentive 
to constantly monitor and impose both direct and indirect discipline on banks. 22 In 
both cases, knowing SND investors have the incentive to monitor and accurately price 
bank risk, the informational signals transmitted to regulators will also be improved, 
thereby enhancing their disciplinary options. As a result, these requirements would 
place banks under constant public scrutiny and therefore encourage bank management 
to impose internal controls limiting excessive risk-taking. 
To enhance incentives limiting bank risk-taking, some MSNDP proponents have 
proposed additional control phase conditions. Generally, these permit investors and 
the regulatory authorities to react to direct and indirect discipline price signals by 
prompting some form of corrective action. Common suggestions are: i) debt 
covenants, which, for example, progressively impose stricter sanctions as bank 
performance (as measured by direct and indirect discipline) deteriorates [Evanoff, 
1993; Keehn, 1989; and Calomiris, 1997]; ii) direct and indirect discipline signals 
triggering insolvency procedures (for example, a bank's inability to issue new SND 
would, at a predetermined point, be taken as a signal that the bank was considered 
insolvent by the market [Evanoff, 1993]); and iii) puttable debt arrangements [Wall, 
1989; and Cooper and Fraser, 1988], under which investors could exercise their "put" 
option at any time. Typically, debt-holders would exercise this option whenever a 
bank's solvency was in doubt. The bank would then have a set number of days to 
reissue replacement debt; if it could not, it would be taken over by the regulatory 
authorities. A problem with the sudden and significant corrective actions of 
suggestions ii) and iii), however, is that debt-holders, like depositors, could initiate a 
panic run on the bank. 23 Furthermore, conflicts of interest in institutional structures 
[Short and Keasey, 1997] may lead to delays in initiating action. Corrective action 
through a structure of progressively stricter sanctions, as suggested in i) above, which 
are implemented at a far earlier stage than impending insolvency, should encourage 
investors and the regulatory authorities to conduct proactive governance and 
management to take swift remedial action. 24 
26 
In the light of the above discussion on MSNDP proposals and investor discipline 
types, the market discipline framework can be modified to accurately reflect condition 
priorities. These discussions have highlighted that Lane's (1993)'no bailout condition 
is insufficient, on its own, to create an investor type whose risks align with the 
regulatory authorities (for example, equity-holders). In fact, two additional criteria, 
i. e. investor and financial instrument characteristics, must be included in the market 
discipline framework. Moreover, the no bailout concept is effectively a sub-condition 
of Berger's right participants criteria; therefore the latter should become the 
necessary condition for the recognition sub-phase - "investors consider themselves at 
risk in the event of default". The no bailout concept joins the two new criteria as 
issues that must be considered when formulating suitable right participants to monitor 
and signal market discipline. Figure 2-3 is an amended market discipline framework 
incorporating these changes. As a result, the final framework is more general in 
structure than its predecessor, but for that very reason is more encompassing in 
nature. 
Issue 2: The market discipline proposals of the Basel 11 Accord 
The market discipline framework illustrated above suggests that three sub-phases 
must be satisfied in order to effect suitable market discipline. The international 
regulatory authorities' proposals to incorporate market discipline in the Basel II 
Accord purely focus on enhanced bank disclosure as a facilitator of effective market 
discipline [Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2001a; 2000; and 1998]. The 
need to create right participants, such as mandatory SND holders, who will consider 
themselves at risk and so value this information, is overlooked. Equally, the Basel II 
Accord ignores the control phase incentive structures necessary to ensure that 
borrowers respond to market signals and that regulatory forbearance is avoided. 
Incentive-based regulatory policies that could enhance the control phase include risk- 
based deposit insurance schemes and linking PCA to market information, such as 
those in MSNDP proposals discussed above. 
Issue 3: Market versus regulatory authority assessments of banks 
The cost benefit analysis in section one illustrated the potential for market discipline 
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to assist the regulatory authorities in meeting its goals. However, it must be stressed 
that if some bank funds remain insured and systemic risk is a possibility, market 
discipline is unlikely to be a substitute for supervisory oversight. The existence of 
insured funds means that supervisory oversight is necessary to ensure that banks do 
not take excessive ex ante risk. "Free Marketers" could rightly argue that this is a 
classic case of intervention creating the very problems it was intending to prevent 
[Dowd, 1996]. Nevertheless, the arguments for some degree of consumer protection 
are equally compelling [Llewellyn, 1999]. 
In the modem-day financial marketplace, prescriptive regulations and the associated 
regulatory authority style of monitoring and enforcement are increasingly perceived 
as inefficient, ineffective and incentive-perverse. International financial institutions 
have become too complex and innovative to be effectively regulated on the basis of 
rigid formal rules. Therefore, exclusive reliance on supervisory oversight is also 
considered insufficient in regulating today's rapidly-changing financial marketplace 
[Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2000]. Thus, the FSA (2000b) 
state: "It (market discipline) does have the potential when effective to reduce the need 
for more intrusive regulatory intervention. " The Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (2000) and the FSA (2000a) also suggest that greater reliance on 
private sector oversight can be consistent with the regulatory authorities' goals of 
limiting moral hazard and systemic risk. 
This section utilises the market discipline framework phases to offer an insight into 
the roles that both the regulatory authorities and the market can competently play 
within a comprehensive but complementary regulatory framework. 
Flannery (1998) conducts a review of the literature on the identification and control of 
risk in credit institutions by market monitors compared to the regulatory authorities. 
His analysis concentrates on the accuracy / timeliness and effectiveness of regulatory 
versus market assessment of bank risk. The accuracy and timeliness issues are 
associated with the recognition phase in the market discipline framework, and the 
effectiveness issue is similarly linked with the control phase. 
Most empirical research on market discipline has concentrated on the accuracy issue 
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and has investigated whether market prices react to changes in bank condition. The 
extensive literature on this facet will be critiqued in chapter three. In contrast, 
relatively little research has been conducted on the other two issues of timeliness and 
effectiveness. With regard to the timeliness debate, Evanoff and Wall (2001 a) find that 
SND spreads have some leading properties over capital adequacy measures in 
predicting bank condition. However, there are also concerns that care must be taken in 
interpreting information from bond spreads as they reflect many dimensions of risk, 
such that it may be difficult to disentangle the credit risk from other factors [Feldman 
and Levonian, 2001]. In addition, DeYoung et al. (2001) and Berger and Davies 
(1998) observe that bank examinations do provide new information that market prices 
do not immediately reflect. However, Berger et al. (2000) conclude that supervisory 
assessments are generally less predictive of future changes in performance than equity 
or bond market indicators, except when these assessments derive from a recent on-site 
inspection. In addition, Cole and Gunther (1998) found that the persistence of private 
information in bank examination ratings is exhausted within six months. These 
findings concur with Flannery's (1998), summary that: "market assessments have at 
least a plausible chance of providing timely, accurate information that supplements 
the supervisory agencies' traditional ways of gathering and assessing bank quality. " 
With regard to the effectiveness debate, this section develops on Flannery's work, by 
analysing further literature on the control phase and discussing new issues on the 
potential role of market discipline. A review of the empirical research in this area (see 
table 2-2) reveals that the monopoly power of the bank regulator enables it to impose 
conditions on banks conducting excessive risk-taking, whereas the efficacy of the 
market in restraining such risk-taking is less precise. For example, Bliss and Flannery 
(2001) did not find "strong evidence that equity or (especially) bond investors 
regularly influence managerial actions. " Furthermore, bank regulators can force 
management to reveal information and are therefore more likely to uncover "bad" 
private information [DeYoung et al., 2001], which they can react to by imposing 
additional controls. 
Corporate governance literature argues that investors are well placed to influence or 
control borrower behaviour in the primary market for funds. Crabbe and Post (1994) 
and Billet, Garfinkel and O'Neal (1998) examine market control from this 
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Table 2-2: Literature review of regulatory authority and market-based control phase 
testing 
Result consistent 
Reference with the concept Methodology and conclusions 
of effective 
market discipline 
Re ulator driven control 
Swindle (1995)  This study uses the capital adequacy component of the CAMEL 
rating system to assess whether regulators influenced inadequately 
capitalised banks to improve their capital position. By regressing the 
percentage change in a bank's capital ratio against the lag of their 
CAMEL capital rating, the study found that banks with poor capital 
scores tended to raise equity in subsequent quarters. 
Ediz, Michael and Perraudin  They examine whether UK bank capital requirements (trigger and 
(1998) target ratios) influence bank behaviour. They found that banks 
increase their Risk Asset Ratio (RAR) by %z% per quarter when their 
capital approaches the regulatory minimum (trigger ratio). In 
addition banks raise their RAR by 1/3% per quarter following an 
increase in their trigger ratio by the regulatory authorities. 
Furthermore, banks appear to achieve adjustments in their capital 
ratios through increasing their capital base. 
Market driven control 
Crabbe and Post (1994)  They examined the funding responses of bank holding companies to 
downgrades in commercial paper (CP) issued. A rating downgrade 
would cause a bank to reduce its stock of outstanding commercial 
paper and contract its balance sheet. 
x They also examined the Certificates of Deposit funding responses of 
banks to downgrades in CP. This did not change significantly in the 
period around a downgrade, suggesting that deposit insurance may 
have removed market discipline from this market. 
Billet, Garfinkel and O'Neal x They examined the impact of bond rating changes on bank holding 
(1998) companies' funding composition. Downgraded banks would shift 
out of large, uninsured deposits into insured, retail balances during 
the quarter of the downgrade and the subsequent quarter. This 
suggests that the regulatory structure may undermine the 
effectiveness of market discipline in deterring bank risk-taking. 
Covitz, Hancock and Kwast /x They examined subordinated debt issuance decisions between 1986 
(2001 and 2004) and 1997 and found that direct market discipline tends to exert itself 
during periods of banking distress or when bond markets are in 
turmoil. 
Calomiris and Powell (2001) They investigated whether the introduction of a market discipline 
policy (that of mandatory subordinated debt) could influence 
subsequent bank action. They compared the degree of compliance 
by banks to the policy requirements with measures of bank risk. 
They found that banks that achieved the highest degree of 
compliance were relatively strong and found it easy to issue 
subordinated debt. This demonstrates the usefulness of market 
discipline as a tool for influencing bank behaviour and in 
distinguishing between different classes of bank. 
Bliss and Flannery (2001) x They examined whether bank holding companies' security price 
changes reliably influence subsequent managerial actions. 
There was no strong evidence that equity and (in particular) bond 
investors regularly influence managerial behaviour. 
Source: Flannery (1998), Author. 
Table 2-2 
perspective. Although their evidence is promising, the results suggest that market 
sector governance is "crowded out" by regulatory authority mechanisms [Prowse, 
1997]. 
As discussed previously, proposals to enhance market discipline through policy 
instruments that require regular calls on the primary market and whose investors form 
a substantial but uninsured component of a banks capital base may provide a market- 
based governance solution. Covitz, Hancock and Kwast (2001) and Calomiris and 
Powell (2001) illustrate that a MSNDP has the potential to influence bank behaviour 
and provide the regulatory authorities with additional information on bank strength. 
Overall, a review of the empirical evidence suggests that no exclusive role exists for 
market discipline in bank regulatory design because the market is not necessarily 
recognising or disseminating information quicker than specialist bank monitors, nor 
are they as effective in controlling bank risk taking. Certainly, current evidence is 
insufficient to expect regulatory agencies to credibly relinquish all of their obligations 
to the market. However, the above debate clearly suggests that further research into 
primary, market discipline signalling and the potential role of subordinate debt 
holders in controlling bank risk-taking is necessary. 
Modern regulatory theory stresses the need to consider the cost-benefit concepts of 
efficiency and effectiveness in designing regulatory policies [Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 1997]. In an ideal world, the choice of an appropriate capital 25 
adequacy assessment regime would depend upon full cost-benefit analyses of the 
competing approaches. These would comprise pure laissez-faire at the one extreme 
and at the other, the prescriptive rules applied under the current Basel Capital Accord. 
The "pre-commitment approach", a greater use of internal models (as proposed in the 
latest Basel Committee reform programme) and the mandatory SND proposal would 
be sandwiched somewhere in between these polar regimes [Hall, 2001c, vol. 2]. The 
regime judged most likely to deliver the highest net social benefits would then be 
adopted. However, the human and political capital invested in "Basel II" means that 
we will be stuck, at least for the foreseeable future, with a refined version of the latest 
Basel Committee proposals [Hall, 2001 a], irrespective of the relative merits of the 
competing approaches. Abstracting from political reality does, however, facilitate a 
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useful comparison of the remaining alternatives. The general consensus is that pure 
laissez-faire would be a highly risky option to pursue given the continuing doubts 
surrounding the operation of a free market and its ability to discipline market 
participants. Moreover, the architects of the "pre-commitment" approach have yet to 
devise an appropriate penalty structure that induces incentive-compatible behaviour 
by all banks, including those close to insolvency. Accordingly, it is not surprising to 
see the depth of support for the mandatory SND proposal, despite the potential 
problems associated with its adoption. This support has gained momentum because of 
the unease surrounding the impending introduction of the Basel Committee's reform 
package. In the opinion of many commentators, net social benefits would be increased 
under an appropriately-structured mandatory SND requirement that is incorporated in 
the Basel framework [European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, 2000]. 
Therefore, as Hall (2001 c) states: "there is sufficient evidence to suggest that 
supervisors are wise to incorporate a greater element of market discipline within the 
overall (regulatory) policy mix if concerns for efficiency and cost-effectiveness are to 
be given due consideration in the promulgation of policy. " As market oversight 
primarily appears to have a role at the recognition phase, the relevant policy issue is 
concerned with creating market investors that provide suitable market information to 
complement regulatory agency procedures for recognising and controlling bank risk- 
taking. 
Direct and indirect market discipline information could provide the regulatory 
authorities with an additional source of accurate, timely evidence on bank condition 
and risk-taking. From a regulatory efficiency and effectiveness perspective, this 
additional evidence could enable regulators to "fine tune" the costs imposed on banks 
for increasing risk. Enhancing the role of market signals could also increase pressure 
on the regulatory authorities to act quickly and at the same time provide them with a 
justification that corrective measures are necessary. As Lang and Robertson (2002) 
note: "While bank regulators have fairly broad authority to invoke sanctions, they 
generally prefer to do so in response to a clear violation of an objective rule or 
standard rather than because of a subjective assessment that bank risk has increased. " 
As previously discussed, several MSNDP proposals create structures that may assist 
the regulatory authorities in their decision-making process and restrict regulatory 
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forbearance. Equally, the public nature of market discipline information eliminates ex 
post "plausible deniability" for supervisors [Calomiris and Powell, 2001]. If the 
regulatory authorities are seen to be acting more responsively to both market and 
internal information, this will raise the credibility of specialised bank monitors in the 
regulatory framework. 
Section 4- Conclusions 
This chapter has highlighted the importance of incorporating market discipline 
policies in future bank regulatory design and has introduced a two-phase framework 
for examining and implementing market discipline. The efficiency and effectiveness 
of bank regulation is enhanced through incentives to promote investor responsibility 
and proactivity, limit excessive bank risk-taking and encourage responsive regulatory 
action. To create these incentives certain conditions must be met, which are explained 
in the market discipline framework. Application of the framework to topical market 
discipline issues emphasises the fundamental nature of these conditions for effective 
market discipline - see, for example, the similarity between Berger's information 
criteria [Berger, 1991] and those underlying the recent proposals by the Basel 
Committee for enhancing bank transparency [Basel Committee for Banking 
Supervision, 2001a]. Also, an examination of MSNDP, with reference to the 
theoretical framework constructs, emphasises the core similarities between them. 
Additionally, applying the theoretical framework provides direction and structure for 
the future incorporation of market discipline in bank regulatory design. The right 
participants condition helps to explain the many calls made by eminent academics to 
enhance market discipline through a MSNDP. The need for further market discipline 
reforms in the Basel II Accord is also argued. Finally, the two-stage framework 
provides a useful foundation from which to analyse empirical research on market 
discipline. For example, the credibility of market discipline as a potential regulatory 
policy can be investigated, thus providing additional evidence as to the extent to 
which market discipline should be incorporated in bank regulatory design. The brief 
evidence reviewed in this chapter suggests that by creating suitable market investors, 
market information appears to have a role at the recognition phase in enhancing 
regulatory authority supervision. As a result, the framework provides a 
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comprehensive and concise tool with which to synthesise the theoretical literature on 
market discipline. The themes within this conceptual framework will be revisited on 
numerous occasions throughout the thesis. The next chapter critically examines the 
extensive empirical literature on market discipline with a particular focus on studies at 
the recognition phase. 
1 This is termed indirect market discipline. Complementing this, direct market discipline is exerted by 
investors when a bank's cost of issuing a financial instrument increases, or its ability to issue debt 
deteriorates with an increase in its risk profile. 
2 As Mayes (2000) states, in the context of the market discipline regulatory design that was 
implemented in New Zealand, "the principal feature of the new system is that it puts the responsibility 
for the prudent management of banks firmly on the directors and management of the banks 
themselves. " 
3 As a result, some proposals suggest that small banks should be exempted. This should not conflict 
with the regulatory authorities' goals, because smaller banks are less likely to be a source of systemic 
risk. As Briault (2000) states in the context of risk-based supervision: "the allocation of the FSA's 
resources will be determined by the results of the analysis of the risks posed by individual firms. The 
need for such risk-based resource allocation is highlighted by the observation that the 1 percent of 
regulated firms in the highest impact category have a 64 percent share of the financial services market. " 
Furthermore, as long as disclosure requirements are homogenous, the risks at smaller, generally less 
complex banks are easier to discern. This in turn means that a special class of bank stakeholders for 
smaller banks is unnecessary. As an alternative, Calomiris (1999) suggests that smaller banks maintain 
market disciplinary liabilities in a more suitable form, uninsured time deposits. The maturity and 
issuance characteristics of these deposits would be similar to the SND issued by large banks. 
4 Whether this is truly a criticism of such proposals is arguable. As Goodhart et al. (1998) discuss, the 
less developed and fragile nature of financial institutions in developing countries suggests that financial 
regulation should focus relatively more on externally imposed rules, as less reliance can be placed on 
internal and market-based measures. Emerging financial systems face particular market development 
issues, on top of the need to create a suitable regulatory regime. Thus, it is reasonable to expect and 
arguably preferable, that regulatory design in developing economies differs from their developed 
economy counterparts during transitional periods. Only once established debt markets exist to facilitate 
SND market discipline, should such a policy be considered. 
5 Calomiris (1999) offers a potential solution to the underdeveloped debt market problem. He creates a 
simple debt requirement rule that regulatory authorities can easily observe, thereby bypassing the need 
for indirect market discipline through market pricing. 
6 Institutional investors are at their most powerful when the onus is on company management to 
negotiate with them for new funds [Short and Keasey, 1997]. A MSNDP would necessitate regular 
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calls on the debt market for funds, providing debt investors with a significant governance mechanism 
that is, by its nature, infrequently applied by providers of equity finance. 
The first phase requires that investors conduct successful monitoring of bank risk. In other words, 
investors must recognise that they are at risk in the event of bank default and recognise that changes in 
bank condition and risk have occurred. Thus, recognition emphasises the importance of valid 
identification and accurate information processing, in contrast to monitoring (which describes the 
process of checking), without signifying whether such monitoring was conducted successfully or not. 
This distinction in terminology emphasises how any regulatory policy should meet its objectives 
effectively. For example, it is widely acknowledged that an important role for the regulatory authorities 
is to monitor the behaviour of financial firms on behalf of customers. However, a fundamental reason 
why there has been a shift in thinking towards incentive-based regulatory policies, such as SND market 
discipline, is a question mark over the effectiveness of regulatory authority oversight. As Llewellyn 
(2000) states: "some analysts (e. g. Calomiris (1997)) are sceptical about the power of official 
supervisory agencies to identify the risk characteristics of banks compared with the power and 
incentives of markets. " 
The terms used to describe the second phase - influence and control - both signify an ability to have an 
effect on another person or thing. The difference between the two undoubtedly lies in the strength of 
the effect. Thus, in order to succinctly describe the essential characteristic of the second phase (create 
behavioural incentives that force banks to conduct their business in a sound manner), either term 
appears appropriate. 
8 Successful market discipline also requires investors to process this information correctly [Crockett, 
2002] otherwise inaccurate signals are transmitted to banks. Institutional investor performance targets, 
e. g. top quartile of peer group, may create "herding" investment behaviour, which induce a collective 
bias in both processing bank disclosures and subsequent investor signalling. 
9 Academic papers analysing regulatory agency oversight have not specifically identified the two 
phases when explaining their research, but their focus on one phase or the other is clearly evident. 
Volumes of academic literature have considered the control phase in regulatory agency policies and its 
impact on bank risk-taking, by assessing the characteristic of borrower reaction. For example, Hellman 
et al. (2000) and Park (1997) examine the impact of the Basel Capital Adequacy framework and 
deposit insurance on bank risk-taking. Dahl et al. (1995) and Swindle (1995) investigate the impact of 
US bank examinations on banks' financial statements and subsequent capital generation. On the other 
hand, articles such as Hall (2001 a) focus exclusively on the recognition phase. These examine the 
suitability of government agency regulations in providing adequate capital / risk assessments for 
regulatory authority decision-making. 
10 Interviews with market participants, conducted by a Federal Reserve Board study group, examined 
the impact of recent structural changes in banking and new financial instruments [Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, 2000]. Interviewees acknowledged that banks now engage in complex 
activities and that risks can be obscured, suggesting that there was scope for improving 
bank 
disclosure. Morgan (2002) found that the agency problems associated with banks trading assets creates 
34 
additional uncertainty for both rating agencies and investors, forcing banks to pay higher spreads on 
bank-issued debt. 
II Banks, as information specialists [Calomiris, 1999], rely on a certain amount of "informational 
opaqueness" to provide added-value services [Bruni and Paterno, 1995]. As a result, improvements in 
bank disclosure are of concern to banks, as they may compromise their commercially-sensitive 
informational advantage. Thus, it is important to state that information transparency does not mean that 
banks are forced to provide public access to profitable, proprietary information, i. e. complete 
information symmetry. The Basel Committee has recognised the importance of striking the right 
balance between the need for meaningful disclosure to allow for the effective operation of market 
discipline and the protection of bank proprietary information. Thus, transparency boundaries will exist 
that preserve banks' role in the financial system, in much the same way that the regulatory authorities 
want to preserve the commercial sensitivity of their regulatory judgements and requirements. The 
question then arises, "What is a sufficient level of information to enable meaningful assessments of 
bank condition? " This issue emphasises a problem with regulations based on rules, i. e. setting 
appropriate levels to create sufficient incentives. 
12 The proposals are concerned with basing the Basel II Accord around three complementary elements, 
or "pillars", one of which promotes enhanced bank transparency. This pillar concerns market discipline 
and recognises that market discipline has the potential to reinforce capital regulation and other 
supervisory efforts to promote safety and soundness in banks [Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, 2000]. 
13 To ensure that future information disclosure is sufficiently comprehensive and relevant, the Basel II 
Accord covers a number of informational areas. For example, it is no use creating public disclosure 
about the nature, components and features of a bank's capital position without augmenting it with 
meaningful disclosure of risk exposures and risk assessment. Equally, a structure to disclosure 
requirements ensures that all banks are presenting a similar, if not exactly the same, style of 
information to the market, thereby facilitating comparability. Furthermore, with regard to accuracy, the 
Basel II Accord states that it is a supervisory agency's role to evaluate a bank's disclosure regime, 
taking appropriate action where necessary to remedy any material departures [Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2001 a]. Finally, concerning timeliness, the Basel Committee recommends that 
bank disclosures should be made either quarterly, semi-annually or annually, depending on the 
importance and nature of the information. 
14 Equally, a desire to achieve comparability may lead to disclosure preparation costs being excessive 
for smaller institutions. Reflecting this trade-off between comparability and the costs associated with 
disclosure, the Basel Committee proposed streamlined pillar 3 disclosures [Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2001b], which significantly reduce the amount of disclosure compared to the 
document published in January 2001 [Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2001 a]. As a result, 
the committee believes that all of the revised pillar 3 disclosures should be classed as requirements for 
all banks. The streamlined disclosures were subsequently confirmed in Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2006). 
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15 The UK regulatory authorities' credibility approach is discussed in FSA (2000a): "When banking 
supervision was the responsibility of the Bank of England, senior officials stated publicly on several 
occasions that they were neither working in nor working towards a zero failure regime. However, the 
transfer of responsibility for day-to-day banking supervision to the FSA provides an opportunity both 
to reformulate this objective more clearly and to ensure that supervisory practice is in all cases properly 
aligned with this objective. " 
16 It is worth remembering that no-one can rely on being bailed out under the TBTF doctrine. In the 
UK, the regulatory authorities emphasise "constructive ambiguity", whilst in the US, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) severely constrains the likelihood of TBTF 
provisions being exercised in practice [Kaufman, 1997]. 
17 Evanoff and Wall (2001b) propose that SND holders be explicitly excluded from the class of 
liabilities that may be covered under the TBTF exemption, thereby preventing any time inconsistency 
problems. 
18 However, it is insufficient to consider groups of similarly-classed investors as necessarily having the 
same risk perception. Berger (1991) notes that "if the holders of subordinated debt which is about to be 
rolled over receive new information about bank risk, market discipline may work effectively through 
debt repricing. However, if the new information about bank risk is instead in the hands of the holders 
of subordinated debt with a long current maturity, market discipline may not work well, because such 
long-term creditors may have an incentive to conceal "bad" information to reduce the bank's cost of 
borrowing and protect their positions. " 
19 As Garten (1986) states: "depositor discipline must be severe enough to be felt by bank management 
but not so severe that there is no opportunity to respond to depositors' concerns. " This is consistent 
with Lane's (1993) assertion that "if market discipline depends on market exclusion it is not an 
acceptable mechanism of control. " 
20 It is important to note that the interests of SND holders can become aligned with those of 
shareholders as the bank approaches insolvency. That is, at some point, a debtor with a junior claim 
will prefer the bank to increase its risk structure. This would not be in accordance with the regulatory 
authorities' goals. Therefore, SND holders are best thought of as providing "supervisor-compatible" 
market discipline only when banks are going concerns [Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, 1999]. However, well-structured SND regulatory policies should reduce the probability of 
banks approaching insolvency [Evanoff, 1993]. 
21 In times of financial stress, it will be easier for governments to refrain from bailing out SND holders 
for political reasons. For example, the financial difficulties at Lloyds of London in the 1990's and the 
lack of public sympathy for the "names" that suffered severe financial losses is a case in point. 
22 Regular, large issues of bank debt would subject credit institutions to frequent monitoring and direct 
discipline signalling, and updated bank disclosures. From an indirect perspective, regular, mandatory 
debt issuance creates a liquid, deep and stable stock of securities in the secondary market, enhancing 
the quality of indirect discipline price information. 
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23 The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1999) provide a suitable warning about any 
such SND policy: "Although subordinated debt-holders cannot run, market discipline provided by 
subordinated debt may encourage "deposit runs" with potential systemic risk implications. For 
example, if uninsured creditors witness a dramatic decrease in the secondary market price of a bank's 
debt, then they may withdraw their funds. Such actions would increase the liquidity pressure on the 
banking organisation and could bring about or hasten bank insolvency. " Conversely, a slide in bank 
debt yields and the possible knock-on effects should motivate bank management to remedy and 
alleviate market concerns as quickly as possible. 
24 Using market information in a structure similar to the PCA measures of the FDICIA may be 
appropriate for both market participants and the regulatory authorities. As the US Shadow Financial 
Regulatory Committee (2000) suggest, these PCA measures have "helped to restore a measure of 
market discipline to banking in the United States, by making it more difficult to bail out uninsured 
depositors and by instituting specific requirements for enforcing violations of bank capital 
requirements. " Aggarwal and Jacques (2000) provide empirical evidence that "prompt corrective action 
had a significant impact both in terms of raising capital ratios and reducing credit risk for banks. " For 
further details on FDICIA see Kaufman (1997 and 2002). 
25 The importance of a cost-benefit analysis has been recognised by the FSA (1997) where it stated 
that: "It will be a prime objective of the FSA to be cost effective, both in terms of the FSA's own 
activities and their effect on practitioners and consumers". 
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Chapter 3- Market discipline empirical studies literature 
review 
Introduction 
Chapter three extends the market discipline analysis of Chapter two, by providing a 
critique of the previous empirical research on market discipline. As this chapter 
identifies, numerous studies have tested for the existence of market discipline in the 
three investor types: shareholders, depositors and, most importantly for this study, 
debt holders. Therefore, at this juncture, it is important to understand the degree of 
market discipline exhibited by all investor types. This in turn could question the 
theoretical preference for certain classes of bank liability as instruments of market 
discipline. 
The chapter will examine two particular aspects of previous empirical research on 
market discipline: whether the three classes of bank stakeholders have the potential to 
provide suitable market discipline behaviour; and whether the empirical research 
results are valid in light of the research techniques applied. Conditions attached to the 
market discipline theoretical framework presented in chapter two, such as Right 
Participants, will assist in analysing both of these aspects. The chapter will critically 
analyse the methodological approaches previously adopted in market discipline 
research, including the assumptions that have underpinned model construction and the 
methods of analysis used. This will highlight uncertainty over whether market 
discipline really exists or not, especially in the case of debt holders. However, 
consideration is given to the fact that this uncertainty may be due to model limitations 
and the use of specific variables, rather than a reflection of reality. In turn, this 
assessment will provide a springboard from which to develop the market discipline 
model proposed in this study and so justify the market discipline research strategy 
adopted in this thesis, details of which are discussed in the subsequent chapters on 
model formation and research methodology. 
The chapter is set out as explained below. Section one asks the question, `Do 
stakeholders exhibit market discipline? ' by analysing the previous empirical research 
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by each class of stakeholder; the market discipline framework assists by providing 
some concepts around which issues are presented. For example, TBTF policies are 
often portrayed as creating structural impediments to effective market discipline by 
restricting the right participants condition. Over time, the regulatory authorities have 
attempted to remove some of these structural impediments. Therefore, these structural 
changes provide some of the sub-sections around which to frame the analysis. Other 
sub-sections are determined by the nature of the different types of studies that have 
been carried out. Section two will assess the models underpinning previous empirical 
studies, concentrating primarily on the focus of this thesis, SND holders. Key themes 
are presented and critically assessed. This assessment provides foundation to the 
nature of the model proposed by this thesis as well as justification for the market 
discipline research testing strategy adopted in this thesis. The detail of the model 
proposed in this thesis will be discussed in chapter four on model formation and 
methodology. Section three of chapter three concludes on the empirical evidence of 
market discipline by each key bank investor. 
Section 1- Do bank stakeholders exhibit market discipline? 
Introduction 
This section analyses in detail prior empirical research on market discipline testing, to 
examine whether the theory that certain bank stakeholders provide suitable market 
discipline behaviour is valid. As a result, studies on the three types of bank 
stakeholder will be examined separately with the conclusion providing comparative 
findings. Tables 3-la, 3-2a and 3-3a provide summary information on all market 
discipline empirical research reviewed. Tables 3-lb, 3-2b and 3-3b complement the 
summary tables by presenting the same studies but highlighting the key explanatory 
variables used and their significance, or otherwise, in explaining market discipline. 
The section shows that all three classes of bank stakeholder appear to exhibit market 
discipline behaviour to some degree. However, the section does temper this 
conclusion by arguing that some studies report the existence of market discipline even 
when the evidence may be less than wholly compelling. The evidence does not 
suggest that SND is a preferable financial instrument for market discipline to 
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uninsured deposits or equity. However, issuance decision models do provide some 
strong evidence in support of a MSNDP. 
Aspects of market discipline 
Recognition phase and control phase 
The market discipline framework presented in chapter two argues that there are two 
phases to market discipline; the recognition phase and the control phase. Chapter two 
illustrates that by far the most common aspect under investigation in market discipline 
testing is the recognition phase, with very few studies having investigated the control 
phase aspect of market discipline. ' As a result, this chapter will concentrate on studies 
that investigate market discipline testing at the recognition phase, i. e. do bank 
stakeholders set differential prices on the stock and debt instruments issued and traded 
by banks or withdraw their investment in response to deterioration in banks' risk 
profile. A focus on the accuracy/timeliness of the market assessment aspect of market 
discipline is contemporaneously important, because currently proposed market 
disciplinary policies, such as MSNDP, highlight the use of market information by the 
supervisory authorities to initiate regulatory action. This thesis does not totally ignore 
the controlling potential of market discipline policies. Chapter six analyses the SND 
issuance activity of UK credit institutions. An aspect of this analysis is whether a 
MSNDP may force institutions to issue SND at unfavourable times. This in itself can 
provide information to other market participants. As a result, chapter three does 
include a discussion on SND issuance decision models, which can have both 
recognition phase and control phase facets to them. 
Price effect and quantity effect 
In analysing empirical research on recognition phase market discipline, it is worth 
highlighting that two general forms of potential market discipline exist in the banking 
industry, which may be applied by all three classes of bank stakeholder. Discipline 
could be exercised through a price effect whereby the prices of bank liabilities reflect 
bank riskiness. Additionally, stakeholders could exercise discipline through a "supply 
of funds" [Eisenbeis and Gilbert, 1985] approach or quantity effect. Here, investment 
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withdrawals or the reduced availability of funds provide signals to bank management. 
The nature of capital markets and instruments means that the price effect may be 
tested for all three classes of bank stakeholder. As this chapter illustrates, this form of 
empirical evidence dominates market discipline testing, whereas quantity effect 
models have solely examined uninsured depositor behaviour. 
Empirical evidence of uninsured depositor market discipline 
Early Studies 
Early studies examined market discipline of uninsured depositors by regressing rates 
on large uninsured CDs to contemporaneous measures of bank risk (such as bank size, 
variability of earnings and solvency) and security characteristics (such as maturity of 
issue) to see if perceived default risk increases the cost of uninsured CDs. Crane 
(1976) showed that the CD market was unable to isolate individual banking risks on 
the basis of differing performance and bank condition characteristics. In contrast to 
Crane (1976), studies by Baer and Brewer (1986), Hannan and Hanweck (1988), 
Cargill (1989) and James (1990) all show that CD rates are sensitive to measures 
reflecting bank condition. However, it is interesting to note that three of these studies 
used a fairly crude measure of the dependent variable, namely the interest paid on CDs 
in each quarter divided by the value of outstanding CDs, in other words the average 
CDs cost per quarter. The problems with such a variable are twofold: first, it fails to 
account for differences in maturity, and secondly, the dependent variable is likely to 
incorporate the cost on CDs issued in previous quarters as well as newly issued CDs. 
As a result the contemporaneous linkage between CDs rates and the explanatory 
accounting variables is lost. All of the papers recognise these limitations and attempt 
to overcome them by incorporating the weighted average maturity of CDs outstanding 
and the Treasury bill rate as independent variables into the model. Hannan and 
Hanweck (1988) applied an alternative methodology. They tested each CD maturity 
separately and therefore the dependent variable could be the actual CD rate charged. 
Quantity-effect approach 
A major shift in the approach to test market discipline of uninsured depositors came 
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with Park (1995) suggesting that it may be more accurate to look at the quantity 
signals that depositors provide rather than purely the price signals. In this case, the 
dependent variable represents a depositor's decision to withdraw their savings, with a 
set of independent variables continuing to represent the depositor's information set of 
credit institution risk upon which they base their decisions. Subsequently, virtually all 
empirical studies have tested the quantity-effect signalling of uninsured depositors, 
either along with price effect models [Park, 1995; Park and Peristiani, 1998; Barajas 
and Steiner, 2000; Jordan, 2000; Maechler and McDill, 2003; Hall et al., 2003; and 
Eksi, 2003] or without [Goldberg and Hudgins, 1996; Birchler and Maechler, 2001; 
and Martinez Peria and Schmuckler, 2001]. 
The findings of these studies have consistently found that failed institutions exhibit 
declining proportions of uninsured debt prior to failure [Goldberg and Hudgins, 1996; 
and Jordan, 2000]. 2 However, both of these studies and, that of Billett, Garfinkel and 
O'Neal (1998) show that riskier banks try to offset falling uninsured deposits by 
raising insured deposits. Jordan (2000) shows that failed banks increased their insured 
deposits by offering higher interest rates for insured deposits compared to 
competitors. So, it can be argued that depositors do raise signals about bank condition 
by withdrawing uninsured deposits and/or requiring higher deposit interest rates. 
However, the existence of insured deposits undermines the potential effectiveness of 
uninsured depositor market discipline to appropriately alter bank behaviour. 
Analysing data samples where US banks have not failed predominantly shows that 
riskier institutions attract smaller amounts of uninsured deposits and pay higher 
interest rates to attract uninsured deposits [Park, 1995; Park and Peristiani, 1998; and 
Maechler and McDill, 2003]. Although banks react by attempting to raise deposit 
rates, Maechler and McDill (2003) indicate that depositors are able to differentiate 
bank quality such that weak institutions may not necessarily be able to stop a deposit 
drain by raising uninsured deposit rates. 
Similar evidence of strong depositor signalling has been found outside the US. 
Martin Peria and Schmuckler (2001) studied the banking systems of Argentina, Chile 
and Mexico and found that even small insured depositors exert discipline by 
42 
withdrawing deposits from weak banks. Mondschean and Opiela (1999) examined the 
behaviour of Polish depositors and found that they require a price for risk-taking, 
although they are less responsive at well-capitalised banks. Similarly, Barajas and 
Steiner (2000) found that Columbian depositors prefer banks with stronger 
fundamentals. Birchler and Maechler (2001) investigated the level of uninsured 
deposits in Swiss banks and found that depositors adjust their holdings of uninsured 
deposits in response to changes in bank risk characteristics. This effect was stronger 
for Regional banks compared to Cantonal banks, with the most likely explanation 
being the relatively strong Cantonal bank state guarantees. 3 However, they also found 
that institutional changes in the deposit insurance scheme had not altered depositor 
behaviour. One of the institutional changes resulted in more deposits being insured, 
whereas the other institutional change resulted in fewer deposits being insured. 
Finally, Eksi (2003) examines depositor behaviour in the UK and Turkey with quite 
mixed findings. UK depositors are not found to be responsive to bank fundamentals, 
whereas Turkish depositors signal some quantity effects to riskier banks and failed 
banks are required to pay an interest premium to obtain customer deposits. A concern 
when interpreting the findings of Eksi (2003) is that, in contrast to all the other 
studies, which use uninsured deposits as the dependent variable, her study uses 
growth of customer deposits which can also incorporate insured deposits. 
It is surprising that the quantity-effect approach had not been attempted earlier as 
market discipline literature from the mid 1980s had stated that market discipline could 
be enacted through a quantity effect. One potential reason could be that the theoretical 
literature at the time suggested that market discipline exercised through the price 
mechanism in equity and debt markets is more efficient than quantity-based discipline 
exercised through deposit runs due to the existence of deposit insurance. Deposit runs 
are argued as an extreme form of market discipline because it does not distinguish 
between healthy and risky banks; it is an ex post punishment rather than a deterrent. It 
appears as if the literature at the time was not distinguishing between direct market 
discipline and indirect market discipline. For, even if withdrawals by uninsured 
depositors from risky banks does not prevent credit institutions from shifting to 
insured funds (a failure of direct depositor discipline), the market discipline 
framework suggests that depositor withdrawals could be at least a signal to the 
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supervisory authorities that depositors are dissatisfied with the condition of that bank 
(and so prompt indirect supervisory discipline). Reform of deposit insurance schemes 
to incorporate a greater use of co-insurance and risk-based premiums could act as 
mechanisms to enhance direct depositor signalling. 4 
The impact of banking regulatory developments on depositor discipline 
The resolution of failed credit institutions during the 1980s US banking crisis 
highlighted significant inequalities in the treatment of uninsured depositors at large 
banks compared to those at small banks. In practice, most large US bank failures were 
handled by purchase-and-assumption (P&A) transactions and the uninsured depositors 
were protected. In contrast, the deposit payoff method was generally used for smaller 
bank failures, and here uninsured depositors were not protected. 5 For example, from 
1986 to 1991,199 banks (representing 19% of all bank failures) were resolved 
through means that did not protect uninsured depositors. The average assets of these 
banks amounted to only $57 million whereas the average assets of those banks 
resolved using the P&A method was $180 million [FDIC, 1997]. Theoretically, this 
protection of uninsured depositors is argued as clearly having an impact on the 
incentives for depositors to monitor and evaluate bank risk. 
The introduction of FDICIA in 1991 had a significant effect on the FDIC's resolution 
practices with one aim clearly to improve depositor discipline. This Act mandated that 
the FDIC pursue least-cost resolutions except when a bank's failure would pose a 
widespread, systemic risk to other parts of the financial system. This meant that the 
protection of uninsured depositors was highly unlikely and the Act rapidly resulted in 
a change in bidding behaviour by potential acquirers of failed banks' assets. On 
average, 82% of all failing banks between 1992 and 1995 were resolved in a manner 
that did not provide full protection to uninsured depositors, compared with the 19% 
between 1986 and 1991 [FDIC, 1997; and Benston and Kaufman, 1998]. 
The shift in regulatory treatment of uninsured depositors has led to some studies 
assessing the risk sensitivity of uninsured depositors post-FDICIA [Jordan, 2000; Hall 
et al., 2002; Maechler and McDill, 2003; and Hall et al., 2003]. Jordan (2000) clearly 
shows that the passage of FDICIA caused Jumbo CD holders to become even more 
44 
responsive to bank failures. Maechler and McDill (2003) show that depositors react to 
increases in bank risk by voting with their feet. However, they use only one panel 
regression to cover the whole sample period 1987 to 2000, thereby not taking into 
consideration potential structural shifts. Hall et al. (2002) analyse the strength of 
depositor sensitivity to bank risk for time periods either side of the introduction of 
FDICIA. They find that depositors are sensitive to the probability of failure both 
before and after FDICIA. However, the size of the coefficients was small and the 
coefficients were not statistically different across the two sample periods. The same 
authors produce a further paper in 2003 covering a later time period post-FDICIA than 
the 2002 paper. They find little evidence of depositor discipline. They ascribe the less 
than convincing evidence of market discipline post-FDICIA to its coincidence with a 
period of unprecedented economic boom. In the 1990s, bank profitability ratios soared 
to near record highs and failure rates plummeted to near record lows. As a 
consequence, banks were able to build up high levels of capital, thereby reducing 
uninsured depositors' incentives to monitor measures of bank risk. This may explain 
why recent depositor discipline studies are not conclusively reporting any substantial 
improvement in discipline compared to the pre-FDICIA regime. 
Lagged exogenous variables -A caveat to uninsured depositor studies 
More recent uninsured depositor studies have a unique characteristic (in contrast to 
equity and SND studies) that has not been readily recognised in the literature, but 
which has implications for the conclusiveness of their market discipline findings. 
Apart from the two studies by Hall et al. (2002 and 2003), every uninsured depositor 
study since the year 2000 has lagged the bank risk variables by one year. This applies 
to both quantity-based and price-based studies and it appears to have become accepted 
practice in this literature. Admittedly, some allowance must be made for a delay in the 
public release of financial information on bank condition. Nevertheless, although 
these studies generally provide evidence of depositor sensitivity to increasing bank 
risks, it is hard to argue that the response is contemporaneous. Clearly, for effective 
market discipline there should be timeliness in investors' responsiveness. One could 
rightly question, therefore, whether these studies are providing evidence of market 
discipline behaviour. Further, if the market hopes to provide suitable signals of 
increasing bank risk to the supervisory authorities then market discipline studies 
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should be examining more contemporaneous relationships. 
In conclusion, uninsured depositor studies appear to indicate that this class of investor 
is able to recognise riskier credit institutions by withdrawing uninsured deposits and 
forcing them to pay higher deposit rates. However, there are two approaches to 
analysing uninsured depositor market discipline and the strength of their findings 
differs. The evidence is that quantity-effect models are consistent in recognising 
market discipline behaviour by uninsured depositors. In contrast, price-effect studies 
are less conclusive. The section provides a caveat to the strength of the uninsured 
depositor findings by highlighting that more recent studies have lagged the variables 
representing bank risk by one year. Therefore, the desired contemporaneous 
relationship between risk and return could be argued as loose. 
Although the evidence generally shows that uninsured depositors recognise increases 
in bank risk, there are doubts as to whether credit institutions respond to these signals 
with appropriate behaviour to reduce bank risks. This appears to be due to the 
existence of deposit insurance providing banks with a cheap source of funding. 
Equally, some studies show that deposit insurance is deterring some depositors from 
monitoring bank risk-taking. 
Despite the protection afforded to uninsured depositors in the 1980s bank runs did 
occur and the empirical evidence frequently showed that uninsured investors were 
sensitive to bank risks (see table 3-la). This apparent anomaly with what is expected 
theoretically could be explained for two reasons. First, investors' costs (including 
opportunity costs) in the event of bank failure may remain sufficiently high to cause 
withdrawals and secondly, the runs were typically occurring at institutions that were 
insolvent or virtually so. The introduction of FDICIA and its expected enhancement in 
depositor discipline is not readily apparent from empirical studies. This could be due 
to the passage of FDICIA coinciding with a period of unprecedented profitability for 
banks, whereas in contrast, the pre-FDICIA period was one of financial distress. It 
could be argued that volatile market conditions would be more likely to induce more 
responsive investor behaviour. 
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Empirical evidence of equity holder market discipline 
The literature on market discipline by equity investors can be split into two types of 
studies. First, there are predictive studies; these test whether equity investors were 
able to predict bank failures, a rating downgrade or some other sign of bank difficulty, 
and how far in advance, by analysing the stock prices of failed/downgraded banks in 
relation to the wider market. Secondly, there are more standard recognition phase 
studies, which analyse the sensitivity of bank equities to changes in bank risk. Table 
3-2a presents all the equity market studies. As there have been so many predictive as 
well as sensitivity studies they have been grouped accordingly in this table. However, 
Table 3-2b solely concentrates on the second group of studies as they are analogous to 
the research methodology adopted in this thesis. Therefore, the type of independent 
variables used and their significance can be identified so as to assist in determining 
the thesis model variables. 
Predictive studies 
All of the predictive studies follow a similar Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
methodology. An event date is identified; this is typically a rating downgrade or a 
supervisory bank examination date. Using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
model, the daily or weekly returns on an index of non-failed banks stocks are 
compared to the returns on the bank under investigation to determine abnormal equity 
returns for the bank under investigation. These are calculated for a period prior to the 
event (typically up to 2 years beforehand) and accumulated to derive CARs. CARs 
may also be calculated for a period around and after the event date. The CARs are 
statistically analysed to determine if the returns on the individual bank provide 
evidence of investors being able to distinguish unsound from sound banks prior to a 
credit rating or bank examination downgrade or some other negative event. 
6 
Table 3-2a illustrates that the findings are rather mixed as to whether equity returns 
provide signals that market investors recognise individual bank problems. Pettway 
(1980), Pettway and Sinkey (1980), Shick and Sherman (1980) and Bremer and 
Pettway (2002) provide evidence that equity returns confirmed that investors were 
able to predict bank rating or supervisory examination downgrades (in some cases up 
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to 38 weeks beforehand). In contrast, Simons and Cross (1991) and Randall (1989) 
concluded that investors did not anticipate signs of bank difficulty or examination 
downgrades. Fraser and Richards (1985) and Swary (1986) show that the market 
reacted to the release of negative bank-specific news, but that they were unable to 
anticipate it. 
Sensitivity of bank equities to bank condition 
In contrast to predictive studies, this subset of equity market discipline studies look at 
the contemporaneous responsiveness of equity holders to accounting measures of 
bank risk and market announcements that signal changes in bank risk. As a result, 
these studies include bank risk independent variables in their models, whereas 
predictive models solely contain equity returns as variables (whether at the individual 
bank, bank index or market portfolio levels). 
The sensitivity studies appear to take two forms. First, some papers regress equity 
returns or betas on a number of general accounting measures of bank risk [Beighley, 
Boyd and Jacobs, 1975; Pettway, 1976a; Shome, Smith and Heggestad, 1986; and 
Brewer and Lee, 1986]. Alternatively, papers will focus on a specific market event. 
They regress equity returns on bank risk variables that are focused on that particular 
event [Cornell and Shapiro, 1986; Smirlock and Kaufold, 1987; Musumeci and 
Sinkey, 1990; James, 1990; Schweitzer, Szewczyk and Varma (1992); and Billett, 
Garfinkel and O'Neal, 1998]. For example, James (1990) analyses the returns on bank 
holding company (BHC) equities as a function of the change in the market value of 
loans to lesser developed countries (LDCs). 
The general bank risk approach appears to be more common with earlier papers. The 
findings are in support of contemporaneous responsiveness. Bank size, capital 
adequacy and earnings per share appear to be particularly significant variables. The 
only paper that does not report equity holder responsiveness is Pettway (1976a). 
However, there are some multicollinearity issues with the variables used, which even 
the paper identifies, but does not adjust for. The only concern with this subset of 
studies is that there are very few of them to provide a substantial body of evidence in 
favour of equity market discipline. 
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All six papers that focus on specific market events support the hypothesis that equity 
investors respond to market events that raise bank risk. Additionally, Smirlock and 
Kaufold (1987) and Musumeci and Sinkey (1990) report that the equity adjustment is 
in proportion to the bank's exposure to that specific risk. James (1990) and Billett, 
Garfinkel and O'Neal (1998) also evidence investor responsiveness, but indicate that 
market imperfections (in the form of deposit insurance) dampen the proportionality of 
equity returns. 
In conclusion, the literature provides broad support for the hypothesis that bank equity 
holders respond rationally to specific market announcements. As residual claimants, 
market revaluations occur rapidly and appear to exhibit rational inferences about the 
implications of the announcements for other firms [Cornell and Shapiro, 1986; 
Musumeci and Sinkey, 1990; Smirlock and Kaufold, 1987]. The prompt incorporation 
of relevant market disclosures is a positive implication for equity market discipline. In 
line with the market discipline framework, appropriate additional disclosure 
requirements, as requested by the New Basel II Accord [Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2006] should assist equity investors in forming even more accurate 
assessments of bank risk. 
The studies that regress equity returns on a suite of bank-specific risk measures also 
indicate market discipline behaviour. Although, in comparison to uninsured deposits 
and SND, there have been very few studies of this type. Predictive studies, however, 
provide mixed evidence of equity investors' predictive qualities, but once information 
is disclosed, again they rationally incorporate it in bank values. This may be due to the 
argument that credit institutions' assets are opaque and therefore difficult to value 
(Morgan, 2002). His paper highlights particular difficulties in understanding the true 
risk characteristics of a bank's loan portfolio, and how banks' trading assets can adjust 
rapidly to market movements. As Randall (1989) states: "the outside analyst can do 
little to evaluate (asset quality) except by using indicators of deterioration such as 
nonperforming assets, loan loss provisions and loan charge-offs, and these do not 
usually become of concern until substantial damage has been done. " Again, it appears 
that the residual claimant characteristic of equity investors makes them sensitive to 
49 
bank-specific risk, but that an improvement in disclosure requirements would only 
serve to enhance their responsiveness. 
Empirical evidence of subordinated debt holder market discipline 
In testing for the existence of recognition phase market discipline of SND holders, 
most studies have adopted a cross-section or panel data regression approach, founded 
on the model of Fisher (1959), where the risk premium demanded by the market is 
regressed on a number of variables signifying bank default risk and specific 
characteristics of the debt issue. 
Early studies - mixed evidence 
The three earliest studies [Pettway, 1976a; Beighley, 1977; and Fraser and 
McCormack, 1978] examined a similar period around the early to mid 1970s and as a 
result of the failure of Franklin Bank in 1974 they reflected a particularly turbulent 
time for banks. 7 All three studies looked at primary SND spreads, but only one model 
[Beighley, 1977] identified signs of debt holders responding to bank risk indicators. It 
appears that the key distinguishing feature between this model and the other two is 
that Beighley carried out a cross sectional approach with different regressions for each 
year, whereas the others performed panel data models. The Franklin Bank failure 
appears to have caused structural shifts in the market which Beighley was able to 
capture (for example, loan losses became a significant variable in 1974). 8 In contrast, 
the other models were smoothing out any structural shifts and as a result were not 
capturing any potential market discipline signals. 9 
Avery, Belton and Goldberg (1988) provided the first study to analyse secondary 
market spreads for signs of debt holder market discipline. They investigated the period 
1983-1984 and found little evidence, but, as section two discusses, this could be due 
primarily to the highly smoothed dependent and independent variables that they use. 
1° 
Gorton and Santomero (1990) use the same data as Avery, Belton and Goldberg 
(1988) but argue that SND spreads should not be a linear function of bank risk. Using 
Black and Cox's (1976) contingent claim model for debt they regress the volatility of 
a bank's return on assets to measures of bank risk. Like the study before them, they 
50 
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find no relationship between accounting measures of bank risk and spreads. However, 
this could again be due to the poorly-measured variables taken from Avery, Belton 
and Goldberg (1988). 
The impact of the regulatory environment on SND discipline 
A criticism of Flannery and Sorescu (1996) 
Flannery and Sorescu (1996) are a seminal work in the field of SND market discipline 
testing. They cover the period from 1983 to 1991. The basis for this period is to 
investigate if market discipline improved as US regulatory authority treatment of 
failed banks' SND became harsher. They utilise both linear and non-linear approaches 
and do so both in a cross-sectional and panel data fashion. Also, they introduce a new 
technique to capture non-linearity by scaling certain bank risk variables with others 
and inserting this variable in a linear regression. Their findings provide compelling 
evidence that investors clearly impounded the value of conjectural government 
guarantees into SND prices and as the strength of these guarantees changed over the 
sample time period, SND prices came to reflect the specific risks of individual 
institutions. These findings are consistent across the different model specifications 
and they have been widely cited elsewhere as evidence that reducing government bail- 
outs of investors improves market discipline. 
A closer look at the fmdings of this paper, however, suggests that they may not be 
simply capturing the impact of changes in regulatory authority guarantees, but also the 
influence of different market periods. The mid to late 1980s and early 1990s is 
characterised by a period of severe banking turbulence in the US. 1501 banks failed 
between 1983 and 1992 at a cost of US$33 billion to the deposit insurance fund 
[White, 2002]. This easily represented the largest number of bank failures since the 
financial trauma of the 1929-1933 period. " The largest losses were incurred in each 
of the five years from 1988 to 1992, at a total cost of US$26 billion. The Flannery and 
Sorescu paper shows that bond spreads were significantly higher in 1990 and 1991, 
compared to the previous years, and this was coupled with significant variability in 
spreads between banks. Further, credit agency data presented in the paper shows that 
mean credit ratings were gradually deteriorating over the sample period and 
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experiencing greater variability across banks. Additionally, Flannery and Sorescu 
discuss how cross sectional variation in risk premiums in 1983 and 1984 may have 
been too limited to permit strong statistical inferences, but they still proceed to make 
clear conclusions about market discipline from this period. 12 
So, it is quite possible that Flannery and Sorescu were capturing a period at the end of 
the 1980s when investors were closely monitoring banks because of unprecedented 
market turbulence and not simply because of changes in government guarantees. The 
influence of other effects, apart from government guarantees, is apparent in some 
contradictory findings in Flannery and Sorescu's study. The yearly cross-sectional 
approach shows that bank size became a significant negative influence on spreads 
over the sample period. Flannery and Sorescu admit that this "may reflect a market 
perception that large banks remain TBTF. "13 An alternative perception may be that 
during turbulent market periods investors may prefer the better liquidity of large bank 
SND. Further, they re-run the regressions with a TBTF variable and find that it is 
significant in the periods 1985-1987 and 1991. Finally, when they omit nine extreme 
spreads (over 10 percent) from the 1990-1991 time-periods they admit that it reduces 
the significance of their market discipline tests. 
Questions must also be raised about whether SND investors truly believed that 
conjectural guarantees of their claims on failed bank assets changed over the period 
1983-1991. An analysis of large bank failures between 1982 and 1993 indicates that 
the regulatory authorities had always attempted to ensure that investors holding 
subordinated liability claims and equity claims were penalised in the event of bank 
failure. The overwhelming method of resolving bank failures was the P&A method, 
which resulted in complete losses for bondholders and shareholders. Looking more 
specifically at large bank failures, the Penn Square failure in 1982 resulted in all 
uninsured depositors and other creditors losing money. 14 The literature widely cites 
the failure of Continental Illinois Bank in 1984 as evidence of a TBTF policy for large 
banks. However, in reality, equity holders lost all their investment in the holding 
company. The SND holders did not lose their investment, but this is as a result of 
circumstances unique to Continental Illinois and was in no part intentional by the 
regulatory authorities. 15 
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Subsequent large bank failures continued to highlight the regulatory authorities' desire 
to penalise subordinated and equity claimants, but each bank failure had specific 
characteristics which could make it difficult to ensure that subordinated investors and 
shareholders lost all of their money and ensure that the resolution was swiftly 
finalised. 16 A lack of legislative support meant that bank shareholders and 
bondholders attempted to manipulate liquidations and so bank failures would be 
followed by lawsuits against the liquidator (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
(FDIC)). 17 In response to difficulties experienced in swiftly resolving certain bank 
failures, new legislation was passed that provided the FDIC with more resolution 
alternatives. In particular, the passage of the Competitive Equality Banking Act 
(CEBA) in 1987 authorised the FDIC to create Bridge Banks and the passage of the 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) in 1989 
authorised the use of Cross Guarantee Provisions. 
Bridge banks enable the FDIC to pass all insured depositors to a bridge bank and 
leave subordinated liabilities and equity claimants in the receivership bank. Further, 
the holding company of the bank in receivership cannot pursue claims against the 
bridge bank. These two points mean that the FDIC does not have to negotiate with a 
holding company's shareholders and bondholders to complete a bank resolution. The 
resolution of MCorp banks in 1989 illustrated the necessity for further legislative 
tightening to support the Bridge Bank policy. The Cross Guarantee Authority of 
FIRREA enables the FDIC to recover part of its cost of liquidating a troubled bank by 
assessing those costs against the solvent banking institutions in the same holding 
company. As a result, the FDIC can force these solvent banks into receivership and 
transfer their deposits to bridge banks. The benefits are, firstly that the FDIC can 
retrieve value from the solvent banks and, therefore, reduce the overall cost to the 
deposit insurance fund and, secondly, that the solvent banks can be removed from the 
holding company clutches. The latter reduces bondholder and shareholder claimants' 
ability to stall bank liquidations and maximise their security recovery values. 
Therefore, the preceding analysis indicates that the regulatory authorities always 
attempted to put bondholders and shareholders at risk in the event of bank failure. It 
was the lack of legislative support which ensured that these claimants could stall 
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resolution procedures and pursue litigation to attempt to maximise security recovery 
values. 
Further evidence to suggest that subordinated investors did not perceive the regulatory 
authorities as guaranteeing their claims is provided by investor actions preceding, or 
following, the announcement of a bank failure. For example, commenting on the 
failure of First City Bancorp in 1988, the then chairman of the FDIC, L. William 
Seidman said: "Most of First City's bonds had been dumped as its troubles became 
public, and they had been purchased for a few cents on the dollar by Wall Street 
arbitrageurs" [Seidman, 1993]. Even uninsured depositors have exhibited actions 
which contradicted explicit guarantees made by the FDIC. In the Continental Illinois 
Case of 1984 (the largest bank ever to require FDIC assistance), the FDIC issued an 
explicit guarantee that all depositors (insured and uninsured) would be protected. 
Despite this, deposits continued to flow out of the bank, worsening its liquidity 
problem. Further, when First Republicbank Corp (the second largest bank ever to 
require FDIC assistance) disclosed large losses in 1988, significant deposits flowed 
out of the bank creating a liquidity crisis. Therefore, it is difficult to argue that the 
explicit protection of all depositors in the Continental Illinois case reassured all First 
Republicbank depositors. Again, the FDIC issued a statement guaranteeing all 
depositors' funds. Despite these two cases, when MCorp (the third largest bank at the 
time ever to require FDIC assistance) announced its intention in 1989 to file for 
bankruptcy again significant deposit withdrawals followed. 18 With explicit statements 
of protection not setting a precedent for depositors it is hard to argue that the absence 
of explicit statements and actions of protection by the FDIC enabled bondholders and 
shareholders to assume that they would be protected. 19 
Notwithstanding questions over whether Flannery and Sorescu can truly claim that 
market discipline improved due to changes in conjectural guarantees, the paper did 
highlight the existence of market discipline in SND markets. This was 
contemporaneously important, because at the time a policy debate was raging as to 
how market information may enhance regulatory authority discipline. Chapter two 
highlights how the public policy failings of the 1980s and early 1990s and the 
increasing complexity of banks was highlighting the limitations of pure regulatory 
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authority monitoring. The debate identified SND as the most appropriate market 
instrument to complement regulatory authorities' interests. However, until Flannery 
and Sorescu's paper, there was the unusual situation that several empirical studies 
were clearly showing that uninsured depositors reflected bank-specific risk in large 
CD rates, but SND investors were not (see section two). These findings were puzzling 
given that uninsured bank depositors were more likely to be bailed out, especially in 
the case of large bank failures, than SND investors. The right participants condition 
of the market discipline theoretical framework was being violated. Flannery and 
Sorescu's conclusion, whether wholly accurate or not, that the regulatory authorities 
had been hampering effective SND market discipline, reignited this focus on SND 
market discipline. As the following paragraphs testify, this focus has continued ever 
since. 
Other US studies 
Studies following Flannery and Sorescu (1996) have regularly revisited the theme of 
analysing the impact of regulatory changes on the ability of market participants to 
recognise changes in bank risk [Jagtiani, Kaufman and Lemieux, 2002; and Covitz, 
Hancock and Kwast, 2004]. This focus was heightened by the introduction of the 
FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA) in 1991. Further, there was the introduction of the 
Depositor Protection Act of 1993, which ensured that all bank-issued bonds were 
subordinate to claims of the FDIC and uninsured domestic depositors. 
These acts, which clearly stated the pecking order for repayment, provided the 
impetus for Jagtiani, Kaufman and Lemieux (2002) to further the work of Flannery 
and Sorescu (1996). They analysed SND market discipline from 1992 to 1997 and 
clearly found that both bank and BHC bonds are priced by the secondary market in 
relation to their underlying credit risk, particularly for less well capitalised issuers. A 
disappointment with their study is that they do not perform individual year cross- 
sectional regressions to see if there were any structural shifts over the sample period. 
Covitz, Hancock and Kwast (2004) study the period from 1985 to 2002 and provide 
evidence that SND investors have always been able to differentiate among the risks 
taken by major US banking organisations. Equally, Evanoff and Jagtiani (2004) cover 
the period from 1987 to 2000 with similar findings. However, like Jagtiani, Kaufman 
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and Lemieux (2002) they only use a panel data model for the whole sample period. 
With significant changes in the regulatory environment over the sample period they 
maybe overlooking periods of structural change. 
Non-US evidence 
Continuing the theme of the impact of, and changes in, the regulatory environment on 
the ability of market participants to recognise changes in bank risk, Sironi (2003) and 
Pop (2004) have analysed the European context, and Imai (2005) the Japanese 
context. Sironi (2003) analyses the sensitivity of SND primary market spreads to 
market (i. e. credit agency ratings) and accounting measures of bank risk between 1991 
and 2000 in 14 European countries. He finds that SND investors appear to rationally 
discriminate between the different stand-alone risks of European banks. Second, the 
risk sensitivity of SND spreads has been increasing over time, suggesting that implicit 
guarantees such as TBTF policies that were present in the first half of the 1990s 
became weaker or vanished during the second part of the decade. However, limited 
evidence is presented to adequately support a shift in the regulatory authorities' 
policies towards banks and, therefore, the conclusions made. Sironi's findings do 
make it clear, however, that state-owned European banks benefit from a significant 
government subsidy in the form of lower SND funding costs. Therefore, the existence 
of state-owned credit institutions and their implicit state support means that the 
market is not pricing the true stand-alone risk profile of these credit institutions and so 
market discipline is being impaired. 
Pop (2004) adds to Sironi's work by looking at secondary market spreads in the same 
14 European countries between 1995 and 2002 and generally derives similar findings. 
In contrast to Sironi, however, he does not find any evidence to support the view that 
TBTF guarantees became weaker or vanished during the second part of the decade. 
Sironi (2003) and Pop (2004) represent two of only three studies of European SND 
markets and are analysed in finer detail in section two of this chapter and section one 
of chapter four. 20 Imai (2005) is the sole study to examine SND market discipline in 
Japan. He found that market signals of bank risk improved markedly after 1997 when 
regulatory authority policy towards failed banks made it clear that SND holders would 
suffer losses. 
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SND market discipline in a clearer regulatory environment 
Recent studies have solely examined the post-FDICIA regime in the United States 
[Jagtiani, Kaufman and Lemieux, (2002); Morgan and Stiroh (2001); and Krishnan, 
Ritchken and Thomson, (2005)]. The methodology is similar to previously discussed 
studies, with yield spread levels regressed on measures of bank risk. All three papers 
report evidence of investor responsiveness. The paper by Krishnan, Ritchken and 
Thomson (2005) furthers the methodological approach by arguing that market 
discipline research should also consider whether changes in credit spreads can be 
explained by changes in bank specific risk variables. They report that firm-specific 
risk variables are jointly significant in explaining credit spread levels. 21 Changes in 
firm-specific risk do not jointly explain changes in spreads for the whole sample, but 
they do when the sub-sample is banks only, or when the sub-sample is low credit 
rating firms only, or the sub-sample is large banks only. However, despite these 
findings, the authors argue that firm-specific influences on credit spreads are 
overwhelmed by shocks due to movements in market-based independent variables, 
such as GDP and the return on equities. As a result, they conclude: "the "signal-to- 
noise ratio" is too small for bank supervisors to accurately estimate changes in bank 
risks (through credit spread levels and changes in credit spreads) with confidence. " 
The authors do temper their conclusion by making it clear that the sample period of 
their study, 1994-1999, represents a quiet period with few banking failures, strong 
bank growth and profitability. Therefore, SND investors may not be as responsive as 
they would be in a turbulent market. Hall et al. (2003), who study the period 1997- 
2003, make a similar argument for the lack of responsiveness by uninsured depositors. 
Issuance decisions models 
A small and recent selection of papers has suggested that a bank's decision to issue 
new SND must be considered when modelling market discipline. They are quasi- 
control phase studies, because they examine whether the issuance of SND by credit 
institutions depends on their risk characteristics. For example, Covitz, Hancock and 
Kwast (2001) show that riskier banks are less likely to issue SND, especially during 
times of market stress. Additionally, Covitz and Harrison (2004) provide evidence of 
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positive selection by banks in issuing public debt securities. In other words, banks 
issue debt to convey positive, private information and refrain from issuing to hide 
negative, private information. As a result of these studies, Covitz, Hancock and Kwast 
(2004) argue that a bank's decision to issue new SND is not exogenous and also 
depends on the market's perception of bank risks. Therefore, the standard market 
discipline testing methodology may lead to sample selection bias, in particular for 
primary market-based studies. They expand on the usual panel data approach by 
creating a two-stage model to control for this problem. More specifically, their 
approach is to estimate an "issuance model" that predicts whether a given bank will 
issue SND and then control for this in a traditional spread/risk regression. Their first 
stage "issuance model" reports that larger banking organisations are more likely to 
issue SND and, like Covitz, Hancock and Kwast (2001), that riskier banks (measured 
by poor supervisory ratings) are less likely to issue SND during certain periods. 
Additionally, they report that market conditions matter when it comes to SND 
issuance decisions. At the second stage, they find that correcting for sample bias 
demonstrates that perceived government guarantees during the period 1985-1988 did 
not make SND investors completely insensitive to bank-specific risks. However, their 
findings must be read with some caution as they had a very small bond sample. 
Notwithstanding this limitation to their findings, the strategy of incorporating issuance 
decision-making provides an important methodological contribution in modelling and 
assessing market discipline in the primary market. Equally, their findings suggest that 
mandatory SND holders would provide important signals to the regulatory authorities 
in distinguishing riskier from safer banks. Sironi (2001) employs an alternative 
methodology to examine credit institutions' SND issuance in line with a different 
research question. He analyses banks' SND issues using descriptive statistics in order 
to consider the design of a MSNDP. 
Subordinated debt spreads as predictors of bank risk 
As chapter two and this section of chapter three have highlighted, there has been a rise 
in interest in using SND as a potential tool to provide market discipline. This has 
naturally spurned a small but growing research into the signalling qualities of SND. In 
a similar vein to the equity market predictive studies discussed earlier, these papers 
focus on the informational qualities of bank SND spreads in the secondary market and 
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whether they can be used by the supervisory authorities and other market participants 
as indicators of increasing bank risk, and therefore, to discipline bank risk-taking 
[Jagtiani and Lemiuex, 2001; Evanoff and Wall, 2001; Hancock and Kwast, 2001; 
Krainer and Lopez, 2004; and Gropp et al., 2006]. With reference to the market 
discipline framework in figure 2-3, this facet of research is focusing on indirect 
market discipline. The section explains how this research is not only considering 
whether spreads can provide signals of individual bank fragility, but more recently, 
whether spreads can provide forward-looking indicators of banking systemic risk. 
Jagtiani and Lemieux (2001) were the first to investigate if credit institution yield 
spreads could provide indications of impending bank failure. They showed that, for 
their sample of five failed banks, spreads started rising as early as six quarters prior to 
failure. Evanoff and Wall (2001) took the analysis one stage further by comparing the 
predictive qualities of spreads to other publicly-available sources. 22 They show that 
bank SND yields do contain forward-looking information about bank risk over and 
above that contained in bank capital ratios. A concern with their findings, however, is 
that yields contain relatively high Type I (failing to identify a problem bank) and Type 
II (falsely classifying a sound bank as failing) prediction errors. This problem is 
attributed to the quality of the "signal to noise ratio" of subordinated spreads. As the 
finance literature readily identifies spreads are composed of several components 
beyond default risk and so capturing the default signal can be troublesome (Delianedis 
and Geske, 2001; Longstaff, 2002). For example: the spread can contain 
compensation for the different taxation treatment of government and corporate bonds; 
a liquidity risk component can differ between bonds due to the size of the issue as 
well as whether it is a recent issue; and finally, yields will reflect not only expected 
default risk, but also the loss given default. Hancock and Kwast (2001) analyse SND 
spreads from different data sources and conclude that careful judgement must be 
exercised when interpreting credit spreads. 23 
More recently, studies have begun to compare the predictive qualities of yield spreads 
and equity-based market indicators, such as "distance to default"24 [Krainer and 
Lopez, 2003; and Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes, 2006]. 25 Both of these studies appear to 
indicate that equity market indicators provide more value far from default, whereas 
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yield spreads have a tendency to react close to default. Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes 
(2006) show that the different properties of bond; and equity-based indicators help to 
reduce type I errors. 
In contrast to the discussion above, where market indicators are used to identify 
failing banks in an otherwise healthy banking system (microprudential), a more recent 
area of research has focussed on whether market information could be used to predict 
banking system risk (macroprudential). Borio (2003) argues that the avoidance of 
distress in individual credit institutions, while still sufficient, is not a necessary 
condition to ensure financial system stability. Therefore, academics and policymakers 
should be considering how market information could be used to predict 
macroprudential concerns not simply microprudential ones. Clearly, systemic banking 
risk is of the utmost importance to banking supervisory authorities the world over. 
Gropp (2004) appears to be the only paper that has considered this issue. He uses the 
equity-based distance-to-default measure and, by setting threshold indicators, the 
proportion of banking assets corresponding to different probabilities of failure can be 
monitored over time. The use of threshold indicators appears to substantially improve 
the quality of the signal measure. The lack of research on bond spreads in providing a 
macroprudential signal is clearly an area for further research. 
From this small body of literature on the use of market indicators to predict bank 
fragility, early indications are that a suite of different indicators may be the most 
appropriate direction for the supervisory authorities. The difficulty with each 
indicator, however, is extracting suitable signals from the noise of high frequency 
data. Clearly, there is scope for a considerable amount of further research to be carried 
out in this area. The growth in SND issuance by UK credit institutions, as highlighted 
in Chapter six, should assist through providing a large and liquid database. 
Response of bond returns to bond rating changes 
The extensive research on the response of bond prices to bond rating changes has not 
been explicitly discussed in the empirical market discipline literature. However, it is 
clear that this research area is no different to the research on the responsiveness of 
equity holders to market announcements that signal changes in bank risk, which was 
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discussed earlier. 26 Further, several SND market discipline models include ratings as 
independent variables representing bank risk (see table 3-3b). Therefore, by way of 
completeness, a short analysis of this research appears appropriate. 
A bond rating is an indicator of the potential default or credit risk associated with a 
particular debt issue and for issuer. Altman (1989) shows that the ratings agencies 
measure relative credit risk with reasonable accuracy, with a pattern of increasing 
yields as one moves down the ratings categories. 27 Additionally, Moody's Investors 
Service (1994), using data covering 1970-1993, shows that ratings are reliable 
indicators of actual default risk, with lower rated bonds being more likely to default. 
A major branch of the credit ratings literature explores the response of bond yields to 
changes in bond ratings. Early studies provided mixed findings, with Katz (1974) and 
Grier and Katz (1976) concluding that the market adjusted after a rating change. In 
contrast, Weinstein (1977) did not find evidence of abnormal returns as a result of 
ratings changes. More recent contributions suggest that rating changes do impart new 
information. Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992), Wansley, Glascock and 
Clauretie (1992) and Hite and Warga (1997) all confirm significant abnormal returns 
with rating changes. Hite and Warga (1997) and Dynkin, Hyman and Konstantinovsky 
(2002) show that the largest abnormal returns are associated with ratings downgrades 
that cause the firms to become non-investment grade. In addition, Wansley, Glascock 
and Clauretie (1992), Hite and Warga (1997) and Steiner and Heinke (2001) report 
that there is an asymmetry in the bond market's reaction depending on whether the 
rating change is in a positive or negative direction. All three papers show that 
downgrades cause abnormal negative returns, but no significant price changes are 
observed for upgrades. 
One feature common to all of the previous studies documented above is that none of 
them solely analyse bank bond ratings, which is naturally the focus of market 
discipline research and this thesis. Either, they focus on industrial bonds only or 
consider all types of firms. This fact may explain why this research is not apparent 
in 
market discipline literature. However, for the purpose of this section, the important 
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point is that bondholders do show contemporaneous sensitivity to market 
announcements that signal changes in firm risk. 
In conclusion, empirical research on SND market discipline provides a mixed picture 
of the sensitivity of SND holders to bank risk, although more recent studies have 
generally found in favour of market disciplining behaviour. Structural impediments 
have been shown to hamper market discipline, particularly in the case of public banks 
in Europe and Japanese banking supervisory policies. However, the section argues 
that the US evidence on structural impediments is less conclusive than commonly 
documented in the market discipline literature, where academics solely rely on the 
findings of Flannery and Sorescu (1996) and Avery, Belton and Goldberg (1988). 
Importantly, from a MSNDP perspective, issuance decision models provide evidence 
that a MSNDP could impose disciplining behaviour on banks in difficult times. 
Although not explicitly investigating banks, research from the credit ratings literature 
does show that bond investors are contemporaneously sensitive to changes in bond 
credit ratings. Finally, this section presents more recent research investigating the 
predictive qualities of bond yields, but this area is as yet relatively unexplored. 
Focusing on the studies that analyse the sensitivity of bond investors to bank risk, the 
section has touched on how the approach of models can differ quite significantly. 
Some studies employ cross-sectional models, while others, panel models, despite 
covering a time period that the literature argues contains structural shifts. Some 
studies have smoothed dependent variables [Avery, Belton and Goldberg, 1988] 
whereas others use the actual yield spread on particular dates [Sironi, 2003]. In some 
cases, studies even include non-SND data [Morgan and Stiroh, 2001; and Pop, 2004]. 
Section two of this chapter will analyse the models from previous SND market 
discipline studies in greater detail and argues that maybe it is not so surprising that 
there is mixed evidence of SND discipline. Equally, maybe model construction could 
provide some explanation as to why early SND studies were not reporting evidence of 
market discipline, but uninsured depositor studies were. In fact, the section goes so far 
as to argue that, in some cases, model constructions are loose specifications of the 
hypothesis: `Do SND investors' exhibit market discipline behaviour? ' 
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Conclusions 
The section has analysed the previous empirical research on market discipline for all 
three classes of bank stakeholder. The aim was to conclude if evidence of market 
discipline exists for each of those stakeholders. Despite their more senior status, 
uninsured depositor studies provide evidence of market discipline. Quantity effect 
models, which are unique to uninsured depositor empirical studies, are theoretically 
appealing and particularly conclusive in reporting investor responsiveness to 
deteriorating bank condition. The literature review in chapter two argues that SND is a 
theoretically appealing instrument of market discipline, compared to uninsured 
depositors and equity holders. In contrast to their more senior claimants, the review of 
empirical studies conducted in this section does not provide compelling evidence in 
favour of SND. The possible exception is SND issuance decision models. Although 
there have been few studies of this kind, they do provide potentially compelling 
evidence that riskier banks are unlikely to issue SND during difficult market periods, 
therefore, making a MSNDP very appealing. Chapter six of this thesis provides SND 
issuance activity evidence from UK credit institutions. The analysis supports the 
notion that issuance activity is reduced during periods of market stress. 
Equity holder market discipline research has had a slightly different focus to papers 
examining uninsured depositors and SND. Fewer papers have regressed returns on a 
general suite of bank-specific risk measures. Although these studies have shown signs 
of investor responsiveness, there have been only four such studies and the last one was 
published in 1986. This makes it difficult to compare the relative suitability of equity 
holders to the other two types of financial instruments for market discipline purposes. 
Instead, the focus of equity market discipline studies has been in analysing equity 
price movements in response to specific market events that have raised concerns of 
heightened bank risk. These specific studies have been very conclusive in indicating 
contemporaneous responsiveness. As residual claimants on a bank's assets, equity 
holders appear to be particularly responsive to new market disclosures and they 
rationally incorporate this new information. To provide some balance to the literature 
this section has analysed the credit rating research on bond investor behaviour in 
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response to specific market events (for example, a change in bond rating). The 
conclusion is that there are significant abnormal negative bond returns in response to a 
rating downgrade. Therefore, both bond holders and equity holders respond rationally 
and swiftly to new market disclosures. Further, the section has examined the 
predictive qualities of equity and bond prices for signs of individual bank difficulty. In 
both cases, the evidence is mixed, although some more recent studies suggest that 
equity prices may have earlier predictive qualities than bond yields. 
The conclusiveness of market discipline behaviour must be tempered to some degree 
as studies generally appear to want to overstate the existence of any market discipline 
behaviour. For example, in uninsured depositor studies, it is questionable whether 
having lags of one year for explanatory variables is really examining 
contemporaneous investor response. With regard to SND empirical tests, although 
studies will internally report contradictory evidence of market discipline behaviour the 
conclusion will still lie towards the positive. For example, table 3-3a highlights that 
more recent SND tests often incorporate credit ratings as well as accounting variables 
as explanatory variables. These studies always report that there is a significant 
relationship between bond yields and credit ratings. However, at the same time, they 
often show that accounting variables are poor explanatory variables of bond yields. 
Despite such contradictory evidence, such studies will often still conclude that market 
discipline behaviour exists. Another example is provided by Flannery and Sorescu 
(1996). Despite TBTF dummy variables suggesting that investors perceived large 
banks to have still been implicitly guaranteed in the early 1990s, the authors sideline 
this evidence in favour of their desired conclusion (my emphasis) that as conjectural 
guarantees reduced investors became more responsive. 
Section Two - Assessment of empirical studies on SND 
market discipline 
Introduction 
Section one summarises empirical evidence that SND investors are sensitive to 
increasing bank risk. As the thesis concentrates on SND market discipline, the aim of 
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section two is to present a thorough analysis of prior SND empirical market discipline 
studies. Without going into details, section one did raise concerns over the nature of 
model specifications and variable measurement and, therefore, conclusions on SND 
market discipline. Therefore, an objective allied to the aim of the current section is to 
assess whether the conclusions of SND empirical studies are valid given the model 
specifications tested and variables used. The analysis concentrates on the research 
methodology that dominates market discipline research and that also represents the 
methodology applied in this thesis. Therefore, the analysis of this section acts as a 
precursor to specifying the model used in this thesis. 
The section provides two clear findings. First, despite a dominant methodology 
existing in recognition phase SND studies, the models can differ quite significantly in 
their characteristics. Secondly, the section argues that SND empirical studies often 
contain model specification and variable construction/interpretation issues that are not 
sufficiently recognised as affecting the internal validity of models. Examples are 
provided to illustrate the potential implications for the conclusions of market 
discipline studies. 
Generations of studies 
A review of the empirical literature on SND market discipline highlights four 
generations of studies, each of which attempts to answer a specific research question: 
1. `Does market information accurately reflect contemporaneous information 
about credit institutions condition? ' 
2. `Does the market incorporate this information in a timely manner so as to add 
information to supervisory assessments? ' Attached to this, `Can market 
3. 
4, 
participants predict individual bank fragility? T 
'Can market participants control bank risk taking? ' 
`Can market information predict/forecast system-wide fragility? ' 
First generation 
The classification of studies in generational terms should not be construed as 
implying 
that first generation studies are inferior, or have been superseded by later generational 
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studies. It simply classifies, in a chronological order, when the key market discipline 
questions began to be investigated. First generation studies investigate the 
contemporaneous sensitivity of investors to changes in bank condition and the 
accurate reflection of this sensitivity through market prices or changes in quantities. 
The methodology is to utilise a cross-section or panel data regression founded on the 
model of Fisher (1959), where the dependent variable is regressed on a number of 
explanatory variables representing bank risk. Early studies, whether they look at 
equities, bonds or CDs, tended to concentrate on specific periods of turbulence to 
examine if risk-sensitivity altered. Later studies are analysing the market more 
generally to examine the risk sensitivity of investors. First generation studies have 
continued to develop; for example, nonlinear components are increasingly being 
considered. Krishnan, Ritchken and Thomson (2005) have recently argued that 
changes in credit spreads should be considered as a dependent variable, not only 
credit spread levels. So, although employing a similar empirical methodology, first 
generation studies can differ quite significantly in their components. Furthermore, 
despite over 30 years of research examining the existence of market discipline using 
the first generation approach, many basic model problems still remain unanswered. 
For example, how to interpret the meaning of a significant coefficient on the "bank 
size" independent variable. 
Second generation 
As some of the first generation studies began to show that the market was sensitive to 
bank risks, and at the same time the regulatory authorities were being criticised for 
their handling of failing banks (in particular, evidence of regulatory forbearance), 
questions were being asked as to whether the market could enhance, or possibly even 
replace, supervisory authority discipline. A natural extension of this problem was the 
hypothesis as to whether the market, through spreads, could foresee individual bank 
problems quicker than the regulatory authorities. Section three of chapter two 
provides a discussion on the timeliness debate between the market and the supervisory 
authorities. Attached to the timeliness debate, researchers began to investigate 
whether the market could foresee, or provide signals in advance of, bank failures. 
Despite a plethora of studies examining this issue in the equity context as early as 
1980, it was not until Jagtiani and Lemieux (2001) that this strand of literature 
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considered SND yield spreads. 
28 More recently, papers have tested the predictive 
nature of different market indicators in signalling bank failures [Evanoff and Wall, 
2001; Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes, 2006]. 
Third generation 
This area of the literature has been discussed in chapter two, section three, on control 
phase testing. As explained in the introduction to chapter three, this thesis is 
concentrating on recognition phase market discipline and so will not elaborate here on 
the discussion in Chapter two. 
Fourth generation 
The fourth generation of studies is an extension of second generation studies, but is 
directed towards system-wide indicators of risk. The second generation of studies 
examined whether market information can predict individual credit institution 
fragility. This so-called microprudential use of market indicators aims to identify 
weaker institutions amongst an otherwise healthy banking system. In contrast, fourth 
generation studies are concerned with the macroprudential level, to see if there is a 
case for bank supervisors to incorporate market information so as to identify financial 
system fragility. To date, this facet of market discipline research is relatively 
unexplored. 
This thesis aligns with the first generation of studies in examining the risk sensitivity 
of SND investors, but in the UK context. Therefore, the remainder of this chapter will 
concentrate on analysing many of the basic issues inherent in previous first generation 
studies. The implications for assessing SND holder discipline are highlighted 
throughout. 
Panel data Regression or Cross-section Regression? 
As the previous section emphasised, in testing for the existence of recognition phase 
market discipline, first generation studies have adopted a cross-section or panel data 
regression approach, where the risk premium demanded by the market is regressed on 
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a number of variables signifying bank default risk and control variables representing 
the characteristics of the financial instrument. This sub-section is the first to illustrate 
potential problems with this approach, and emphasise that careful model specification 
is necessary to appropriately tackle the market discipline question. Other sub-sections 
will highlight variable construction issues inherent in first generation studies. 
Section one of this chapter showed that the three earliest SND market discipline 
studies all looked at a similar time period spanning pre- and post- the largest US bank 
to collapse at the time - Franklin National Bank in 1974.29 Although all three studies 
examined primary market SND spreads, only one model [Beighley, 1977] identified 
signs of investors being sensitive to changes in bank risk measures. One of the other 
studies, Fraser and McCormack's (1978), showed that investors demanded a higher 
yield on new bank bond issues following the collapse of Franklin National Bank; this 
is represented by a post-collapse dummy variable. However, measures of bank risk 
such as earnings variability and capital ratios, were not statistically significant in 
explaining a rise in bond yields. Only the `marketability of the issue' variable (size of 
issue) had a significant coefficient. The distinguishing feature of Beighley's model 
was that he carried out a cross-sectional approach for each of the years under study. In 
contrast, the other two studies performed panel data regressions, where one regression 
spanned the whole time period under investigation. Fraser and McCormack's 
conclusions highlight the potential weakness of the panel data approach. The Franklin 
National Bank failure clearly caused a structural shift upwards in bond yields, 
evidenced by the significant dummy variable coefficient. The coefficients on the bank 
risk variables spanned the whole time period under investigation and so reflected their 
influence on bond yields both before and after the structural shift. As a result, signs of 
market discipline (as evidenced through bank risk coefficients) were being smoothed. 
Further, smoothed bank risk variables and a panel data specification mean that the 
structural shift is more than likely to be concentrated in the dummy variable 
coefficient, rather than being suitably apportioned across other exogenous variables. A 
cross-section specification for the post-collapse period would eliminate the need for a 
dummy variable and so specifically investigate if there was a significant relationship 
between bank risk variables and yields. By carrying out annual cross-sectional 
regressions, this is what Beighley (1977) effectively did. 
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The example above shows that it is important to appreciate both longitudinal and 
cross-sectional aspects when investigating market discipline behaviour. Year dummy 
variables, incorporated in panel models, could indicate the presence of higher or lower 
yields in particular years. Annual, cross-sectional models could then examine 
influences on yields in greater detail. Otherwise, failing to accommodate potential 
structural shifts in yields, by purely applying panel data models, may dampen 
evidence of market discipline behaviour. Several other empirical studies have 
performed panel data models only [Morgan and Stiroh, 2001 (sample period 1993- 
1998); Evanoff and Jagtiani, 2004 (sample period 1987-2000); and Krishnan, 
Ritchken and Thomson, 2005 (sample period 1994-1999)]. Evanoff and Jagtiani 
(2004) is particularly notable as the sample period encompasses the late 1980s and 
early 1990s when regulatory developments in the US clearly could have led to 
structural shifts, which this paper's methodology fails to take into account. Other 
studies have performed panel data models that cover their whole sample period under 
investigation as well as creating sub-samples that span a number of years. Examples 
include Sironi (2003) and Pop (2004). What is notable regarding both of these papers 
is that no evidence of regulatory or other structural influences is provided to support 
the sub-sample time periods. Nevertheless, Sironi (2003) uses changes in exogenous 
variable coefficients between the two sub-sample periods to justify changes in 
perceived government guarantees. This is despite being unable to provide any specific 
examples of changes in government guarantees. Studies that use primary market 
yields only (when a bond is issued) particularly suffer from a reliance on panel data 
specifications as they would have insufficient data points for annual cross-sectional 
models. 30 This thesis proposes that a mix of panel data models, sub-sample panel data 
models and annual cross section models is necessary to rigorously examine market 
discipline over a sample period. Flannery and Sorescu (1996) is the only study to have 
applied all three specifications. 
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Regulatory changes and the response of SND investors and uninsured 
depositors 
Section one of this chapter discussed how later SND empirical studies questioned 
whether the apparent lack of market discipline in earlier studies was due to the effect 
of conjectural TBTF guarantees that were said to exist at the time. The experience of 
large bank failures in the period 1980-1992 does indicate that uninsured depositors 
would be protected from losses in the event of large bank failures . 
31 Further, small 
bank failures were often resolved using the "deposit payoff' method which would 
result in uninsured depositors receiving nothing or a small fraction of their original 
investment. As a result of this implicit protection for large bank depositors, they had 
little incentive to monitor and price bank risk accordingly and so violated Berger's 
(1991) Right Participants condition. The introduction of FDICIA in 1991, with 
policies such as PCA and Least Cost Resolution (LCR), provided a clearer framework 
as to whether investors would be bailed out or not. Further, in the event of bank 
failure, the regulatory authorities were now accountable to ensure limited losses to the 
deposit protection fund. As a result, uninsured depositors are far less likely to be 
protected in the event of bank failure. 
However, the results of the uninsured depositor and SND market discipline studies in 
the 1980s highlight a massive contradiction, which has implications for the TBTF 
argument. It also provides further evidence in support of the need to construct 
appropriate model specifications and to incorporate appropriate variable measures. At 
the same time as SND studies were reporting little or no indication of market 
discipline, uninsured depositor studies were indicating responsive behaviour to 
measures of bank risk. CD holders (uninsured depositors) are more senior claimants 
than SND holders; they are insured for the first $100,000 and their funds can be 
withdrawn more easily than SND. Further, as discussed above, during the 1980s 
uninsured depositors in large banks were clearly protected in the event of bank failure. 
Additionally, Benston et al. (1986) state: "About 70 percent of total uninsured 
deposits are in banks larger than $1 billion. This represents a much larger proportion 
of total deposits for these institutions than for smaller banks". 32 These are exactly the 
type of banks that would enjoy conjectural guarantees. Equally, Ellis and Flannery's 
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(1992) study of jumbo CD rates focuses on six money centre banks (with 
presumptively strong conjectural guarantees) over the period 1982 to 1988 and they 
find evidence of investor responsiveness. So it cannot be argued that SND and CD 
market discipline studies are examining different types of institutions with different 
presumed TBTF guarantees. 
There are three potentially more compelling arguments for this contradiction, as 
opposed to the TBTF one. First, SND may contain covenants that can protect note 
holders in the case of insolvency. This means that SND holders are less likely to be 
responsive to changes in bank risk than their subordinated status may presume, 
although the senior status of CDs does provide some equivalence. 
Secondly, the variable measurement and model specifications that were adopted to 
analyse market discipline may have been more appropriate to the characteristics of 
CDs rather than SND and in some cases the CD models may have simply been better 
specifications of the market discipline problem. Table 3-4 provides a summary of the 
uninsured depositor and SND market discipline studies performed for the 1980s and 
the table assists in explaining the following discussion. Both sets of studies regressed 
risk premiums on measures of bank risk. Equally, they would typically measure the 
dependent variable as the average yield spread for each bank, and the average maturity 
of the financial instrument would be included as an independent variable. The table 
illustrates the average maturity for uninsured deposits to be in the range of 8 to 12 
months. In contrast, Avery, Belton and Goldberg (1988) had an average SND maturity 
of 108 months, and the study by Covitz, Hancock and Kwast (2004) would show an 
average SND maturity of at least 120 months (author's calculation). Clearly, SND 
studies were averaging yield spreads for a much larger range of maturities. The shorter 
maturity spectrum of CDs and the consequential lower range of yield spreads would 
ensure that an averaging of the yield spread results in a fairly realistic relationship 
between spreads and maturity for each bank in uninsured deposit studies compared to 
SND ones. Also, the bond maturity variable is almost always consistently significant 
in market discipline studies, and so a poorly measured maturity variable can lead to a 
potentially misspecified model. The results from Avery, Belton and Goldberg (1988) 
and Flannery and Sorescu (1996) suggest such a problem. In contradiction with 
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finance theory, they are the only studies to report that a higher instrument maturity 
leads to a lower spread. 33 At the same time as these findings, some uninsured deposit 
empirical studies overcame any averaging issue by analysing the spread versus bank 
risk relationship for each CD maturity separately. Therefore, poor variable 
measurement and poor model specification appear to be key reasons why uninsured 
deposit studies may have been reporting evidence of market discipline, whilst SND 
studies were not. 
Finally, and linked to the previous point, SND formed a relatively small source of 
funds for banks in the 1980s. As a result, SND studies were employing around 60 data 
points per year as opposed to around 200 for uninsured depositor studies. This would 
ensure more robust findings for the latter studies. In the extreme, the study by Covitz, 
Hancock and Kwast (2004) had only 53 SND observations for the period 1985-1989. 
Equally, all uninsured depositor studies at the time applied data of at least quarterly 
frequency, whereas SND studies were all using annual data. This provides a more 
contemporaneous relationship between the dependent variable and the independent 
variables, especially when the dependent variable for SND studies is an averaged 
spread. Finally, the smaller market for SND at this time raises concerns as to the depth 
of the market. As a result, credit spreads may have reflected a fair degree of liquidity 
risk as well as default risk. The implications for SND market discipline testing would 
probably have been a greater likelihood of no relationship between spreads and 
measures of bank condition. 
In conclusion, the literature has regularly argued that SND market discipline was not 
suitably strong in the 1980s due to perceived TBTF guarantees for large banks. 
However, over the same time period, studies were reporting that the more senior, 
uninsured deposit noteholders were exhibiting market discipline behaviour on exactly 
the same banks. Analysing the studies from this period suggests that poor variable 
measurement and model specification may have contributed significantly to this 
discrepancy in findings; and, therefore, raises doubt as to whether conjectural TBTF 
guarantees were such a strong factor in SND investor ambivalence during the 1980s. 
34 
Again, this analysis indicates how important it is to devise appropriately-specified 
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models and to include accurately measured variables that contemporaneously examine 
the market discipline relationship. 
Primary market data or secondary market data? 
Some market discipline studies have questioned the benefit of testing debt and CDs 
market discipline using the secondary market prices of financial instruments. This 
relates to the use of brokers' quotes as a proxy for pure market prices. They should act 
as a reasonably good proxy for actual prices where a particular financial instrument is 
traded in a very competitive market [Crane, 1976]. However, in thin secondary 
markets, brokers' quotes are influenced by a desire to trade and are arguably not a true 
indication of actual trading prices. Therefore, studies such as Morgan and Stiroh 
(2001), Fraser and McCormack (1978), Pettway (1976a) and Sironi (2003) make sole 
use of primary market information. As chapter two discusses, a mandatory SND 
policy would probably have most influence on credit institutions through the primary 
market with direct discipline signalling/action. Therefore, primary market studies may 
have a special policy appeal. On the downside, however, as current SND issuance is 
not mandatory, primary market empirical studies are usually hampered by a limited 
number of available data points. As a result, most primary market studies have to 
solely analyse panel data model specifications to the detriment of cross-sectional 
specifications. Equally, as Covitz, Hancock and Kwast (2001) show, voluntary 
issuance means that riskier institutions may avoid issuing new debt securities during 
turbulent market periods and so restrict the ability to test for the existence of direct 
discipline signalling/action, thereby significantly reducing the number of data points 
when market discipline is most likely to be evident. Covitz, Hancock and Kwast's 
observation also means that primary market studies may contain sample selection bias 
towards less risky institutions. Again, this would no doubt dampen the ability to 
identify market discipline behaviour. 
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Assessment of variables - Dependent variable 
Measurement of dependent variable 
Although the explanation of yields or spreads on financial instruments is the most 
common approach to the market discipline question, the manner in which variables 
are derived can differ quite significantly between models and so this may explain 
some variability in market discipline conclusions. Most models calculate the yield 
spread on debt instruments compared to equivalent maturity government-issued 
securities, but some models use a more basic dependent variable which fails to 
account for differences in maturity. For example, Baer and Brewer (1986) and James 
(1988) use the interest paid in each quarter divided by the value of outstanding CDs, 
in other words the average CD cost per quarter as the dependent variable. Both papers 
attempt to overcome this by incorporating the weighted average maturity of CDs 
outstanding and the Treasury bill rate as independent variables into the model. 
Further, both models recognise that the dependent variable is likely to incorporate the 
cost on CDs issued in previous quarters as well as newly issued CDs. Therefore, the 
calculation of an average CD yield is acting as a proxy for marginal yields (i. e. the 
yields on newly issued CDs or CDs traded in an active secondary market). This leads 
to potential measurement errors, especially when market CD yields are fluctuating 
rapidly. In these circumstances, the calculated CD yield will differ from current 
market conditions. 35 As a result, the contemporaneous linkage between the CD rate 
and the explanatory accounting variables is weakened. One way to possibly overcome 
this is to lag the accounting variables, but neither model attempts to do this. Hannan 
and Hanweck (1988) applied an alternative methodology whereby different CD 
maturities were tested separately and therefore the dependent variable did not have to 
be a spread over the risk-free rate. 
SND empirical studies can suffer with similar variable measurement problems. Avery, 
Belton and Goldberg (1988) measure the yield spread as the average (not weighted) 
premium of all outstanding issues for each bank. Like the CD yield calculation 
discussed above, it is a smoothed dependent variable. To compensate for this they 
incorporate the average bond maturity for each bank as an independent variable, 
which in turn is introducing further smoothing effects. 36 Flannery and Sorescu (1996) 
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do calculate a weighted-average yield premium for each bank for each year, but they 
use the bond principal as weights, not the maturity. Also, as discussed previously, the 
large maturity spectrum of SND means that a smoothed dependent variable will 
significantly weaken the contemporaneous relationship between yields and risk. In 
conclusion, like the uninsured depositor studies mentioned above, by regressing 
smoothed dependent variables on current exogenous variables, evidence of market 
discipline is no doubt being clouded by potential variable measurement issues. 
In a similar manner to the smoothed measurement of the dependent variable discussed 
above, some empirical studies have suffered in this regard concerning independent 
variables. Avery, Belton and Goldberg (1988) averaged some of the independent 
variables so the ability for their model to capture contemporaneous effects is reduced 
even further. 
Assessment of variables - Independent variables 
Interpretation of variables - Bank Size 
A recurring theme in the empirical studies is the impact of bank size on CD and SND 
spreads and whether this indicates that large banks are being shielded from changes in 
bank condition due to perceived TBTF guarantees. Studies examining both the CD 
and SND contexts have regularly shown that larger banks enjoy lower spreads 
compared to their smaller bank counterparts [Crane, 1976; Beighley, 1977; Avery, 
Belton and Goldberg, 1988; Hannan and Hanweck, 1988; Mondschean and Opiela, 
1999; and Jagtiani, Kaufman and Lemieux, 2002]. 
However, the inclusion of a measure of bank size in models has always proved 
troublesome to analyse, and interpret, as it could capture a number of different effects. 
Large banks may be viewed by investors as having a greater degree of regulatory 
support because of the systemic impact of a large bank failure and so investors will 
demand a lower default risk premium. Equally, though, larger banks are generally 
better at diversifying across product lines and geographical regions. Therefore, lower 
spreads for large banks may accurately reflect lower portfolio risk for investors 
instead of being a signal of TBTF. A third possibility is that the SND and CDs of 
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large credit institutions may be more liquid because the issue sizes are generally larger 
and so a greater volume of secondary market trading in these issues would result in a 
lower liquidity premium and thus lower spreads. Clearly, being able to differentiate 
between these effects would be of use in attempting to assess the occurrence of market 
discipline. Unfortunately, this is an uncertainty that no study appears to have been able 
to overcome. The uncertainty is exacerbated by some studies using the variable "size 
of security issue" as an indicator of bank size, whereas other studies use this variable 
as a proxy for liquidity. Despite empirical studies clearly indicating that there is a 
difficulty in interpreting the bank size variable, it has generally been accepted, without 
foundation, as representing evidence of a TBTF effect by investors. 
Some studies have attempted to overcome the problem in interpreting the "bank size" 
variable by including both an "issue size" and "bank size" variables in their models 
[Pettway, 1976a]. However, this gives rise to potential multicollinearity problems, 
which is the subject of a later section. 
Interpretation of variables - Return on Assets 
Analysing empirical studies highlights that it is difficult to assess the relationship 
between spreads and the "return on assets" independent variable from a market 
discipline perspective. A high return on assets could indicate a safer bank, a more 
efficient bank, or one with well diversified earnings and so there is a negative 
relationship with spreads. Alternatively, a high return on assets could suggest a bank 
that is taking risks and so there is a positive relationship with spreads. In both cases it 
could be argued that investors are recognising bank conditions and reacting 
accordingly. This difficulty in interpreting the return on assets variable is evidenced 
by Flannery and Sorescu (1996) who argue that a negative relationship between a high 
return on assets and spreads is due to monopoly rents, implying that investors are not 
monitoring banks. On the other hand, when a positive relationship between return on 
assets and spreads arises they argue that the market is disciplining higher risk-taking 
with higher spreads. 
Further, different empirical studies disagree as to the expected relationship between 
the "return on assets" variable and the credit spread. As mentioned above, Flannery 
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and Sorescu (1996) argue that market discipline is evidenced through a higher Return 
on Assets resulting in higher spreads. In contrast, Morgan and Stiroh (2001) expect a 
higher return on assets to be associated with a lower spread. Sironi (2003) confirms 
the difficulty in assessing this variable by suggesting that either direction may signal 
market discipline behaviour. 
Credit ratings 
Table 3-3b illustrates that credit ratings are consistently significant in explaining SND 
spreads when they are incorporated in market discipline models. However, the 
inclusion of credit ratings as independent variables provides an interesting, although 
ignored in the literature, perspective on whether investors exhibit market discipline 
behaviour or not. The studies argue that the positive relationship between credit 
ratings and spreads indicates that market discipline behaviour exists. On the other 
hand, credit ratings agencies themselves state that "ratings aim to look at the medium- 
to long-term" [Moody's, 1999] and they "give their ratings relative stability over the 
economic cycle" [Moody's, 2002]. Equally, the literature recognises that ratings can 
go stale over time and that investors may pay less attention to them [Ederington, 
Yawitz and Roberts, 1987; and Morgan and Stiroh, 2000]. 37 As a result, the 
relationship between yields and ratings should potentially not be as contemporaneous 
as the market discipline studies suggest. The reason the empirical evidence is 
conclusive, however, is probably because investors are using ratings agencies to 
substitute for their own monitoring activities. If the majority of investors base their 
investment decisions on the measurement of creditworthiness provided by credit 
rating agencies then this factor will predominate and feature significantly in models. 
From a theoretical market discipline perspective, the concern is that the delegated 
monitor may overlook vital information that should be reflected in current ratings, or 
information that is considered cyclical in nature. The implication would be that 
market signals to credit institutions would then not reflect current bank conditions. 
The use of ratings as a signal of market discipline behaviour is clouded further by the 
numerous studies that also regress SND yields on accounting measures of bank 
condition. Such studies frequently report that ratings explain yield spreads, but 
accounting variables do not [Morgan and Stiroh, 2001; Sironi, 2003; Pop, 2004; and 
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Imai, 2005]. Despite such studies using accounting measures of bank risk that the 
credit ratings agencies themselves consider important, the contradiction in findings 
raises a fundamental issue. All of these studies conclude that market discipline exists 
because yields reflect ratings, thereby ignoring the contradictory evidence. This is 
usually ascribed to the argument that credit ratings agencies look beyond financial 
ratios to qualitative aspects of bank condition and so provide additional information 
over and above that provided by accounting information. From the credit ratings 
literature, Ederington, Yawitz and Roberts (1987) show that agency ratings and 
publicly available financial information are equally instructive in explaining industrial 
bond yields. They also show that when ratings are added to the accounting model, 
some additional information is provided. Equally, the null hypothesis that accounting 
variables provide no additional information beyond that contained in agency ratings is 
rejected. They conclude that credit agency ratings and accounting information are 
correlated, but that each provides some new information to the market. Although their 
findings should not be construed as conclusive evidence on the matter, it does raise 
the suggestion that when contradictory evidence on market discipline is provided from 
ratings and accounting models, the models should be examined more closely for their 
accuracy in specifying the market discipline relationship. Section two of this chapter 
has already raised, and goes on further in the following sub-sections to raise, concerns 
over model specification and variable construction in accounting-based market 
discipline models. In fact, the conclusive evidence from credit agency ratings could be 
due to it being a more efficient way of processing public information, which can be 
modelled quite easily against yield spreads in a regression form. For example, at any 
point in time a bond will fall into one and only one ratings category on the right-hand 
side of a model. In contrast, in accounting-based models, a bond will provide 
information for each right-hand side variable. For some of these variables this may be 
an above average value and for other variables it may present a below average value. 
The interaction of the yield spread on every independent variable means that it is far 
harder for the accounting-based regression model to interpret the impact of each 
regressor on the dependent variable. Additionally, accounting-based models invariably 
include many more independent variables, thereby lowering the degrees of freedom 
and thus the generalisability of the findings [Hair et al., 2006]. 
38 On top of this with 
the majority of investors utilising the information of the delegated monitor in their 
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pricing decisions there is the scope for the relationship between spreads and ratings to 
be self-fulfilling. 
Overall, the discussion above indicates that the relationship between ratings and 
accounting information is very difficult to accurately interpret from a holistic market 
discipline perspective. The literature requires a more balanced assessment as to 
whether contradictory evidence between ratings and accounting-based models may be 
due to poor model specification and/or due to actual information quality differences. 
A further aspect of the inclusion of credit agency ratings as independent variables is 
the type of ratings used. The three common types are: issue ratings (assigned to 
particular bond issues and therefore taking into consideration bank default risk and the 
seniority of the debt); issuer ratings (representing the prevailing senior debt ratings of 
the issuer); and financial strength ratings. The last-mentioned represent a bank's 
intrinsic soundness without taking into consideration any external support from 
national authorities or its owners. 39 The type of credit ratings used in market discipline 
studies appear to divide on geographical boundaries. Papers examining US data have 
all used issue ratings, which can be argued as most accurately representing the 
riskiness of an SND issue. Three non-US studies [Sironi, 2003; Pop, 2004; and Imai, 
2005] have all used financial strength ratings, which is appealing as it represents the 
standalone default risk of a bank. It is particularly appropriate for studies that cover 
more than one country, as is the case with Sironi (2003) and Pop (2004), where 
different governments may provide different levels of support to their ailing banks. In 
other words, financial strength ratings can remove the influence of different national 
banking support and public bank subsidies, enabling a cleaner examination of the 
yield versus risk relationship. Unfortunately, after that, Imai (2005), who analyses 
Japanese banks only, fails to consider using issue ratings which are particularly 
appropriate for single country studies. Additionally disappointing is Sironi's (2003) 
and Pop's (2004) decisions to include issuer ratings, which as mentioned above, 
reflect senior debt credit ratings, not SND. Therefore, the relationship between 
dependent and independent variables loosens somewhat. The relationship between 
yields and bond characteristics is muddied even further in Pop's study, because he 
includes data from both senior and subordinated bonds in his sample. In conclusion, 
it 
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is important to consider the geographical scope and the underlying features of 
different credit ratings measures before deciding on the type(s) of credit ratings to 
incorporate into a market discipline model 
Credit ratings and transparency/opacity of bank assets 
Figure 2-2 of the market discipline theoretical framework illustrates two sub-phases to 
the recognition phase. The first sub-phase considers imperfections that may prevent 
investors from considering themselves at risk in the event of bank default. "TBTF", 
"bank size" and "public bank" variables are three ways, that have been discussed, in 
which this aspect of the framework can be investigated empirically. The second sub- 
phase indicates that investors must be able to effectively observe default risk. One 
way in which this can be examined empirically is to make use of split ratings. Split 
ratings is the term ascribed to the situation when rating agencies disagree on a rating, 
indicating that they are not a perfect measure of creditworthiness. As Morgan (2002) 
argues, disagreement between rating agencies provides a good proxy for the 
uncertainty associated with asymmetric information; In other words, how opaque a 
company's operations are and therefore its risk profile. Morgan (2002) illustrates that 
the pattern of disagreement between bond raters suggests that banks and insurance 
firms are inherently more opaque than other types of firms. Morgan and Stiroh (2000) 
separate their sample of bank SND issues into "transparent" issues (where different 
rating agencies agree) and "opaque" issues (where they disagree). They perform 
standard market discipline regressions on each split sample and find that asset opacity 
may hamper the market's ability to discipline bank risk. Interestingly, in Pop's (2004) 
study of European bank bond market discipline, 25% of the Moody's financial 
strength ratings differ by at least 2 notches from Fitch's equivalent, individual 
strength ratings; 45% differ by 1 notch. Despite this sign of opacity in determining a 
bank's intrinsic financial soundness, the yield versus ratings regression clearly shows 
financial strength/individual strength ratings to be significant explanatory variables of 
yield spreads. In chapter seven, this thesis will investigate the opacity of bank risk in 
the UK SND context and its implications for market discipline. 
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Bond Characteristics - Maturity, embedded options and liquidity 
From the finance literature, Fabozzi (2000) summarises that six factors influence a 
bond spread. The complete list of factors is: 1) type of issuer; 2) the issuer's credit 
worthiness; 3) the term or maturity of the instrument; 4) whether options are 
embedded in the instrument; 5) the taxability of the interest; and 6) the liquidity of the 
instrument. Three of these factors depend entirely on the bond's specific 
characteristics and not on the characteristics of the issuer. Therefore, it is important to 
incorporate these characteristics into the market discipline model or to omit them 
from the sample data. Market discipline studies have typically incorporated variables 
to accommodate the influence of maturity and/or liquidity on spreads. In the case of 
bonds with embedded options (for example, callable or convertible debt), these have 
usually been omitted from samples. 40 
The influence of maturity on spreads can be accommodated in a number of ways. The 
traditional approach has been to simply incorporate the maturity variable as an integer. 
However, this is assuming a linear relationship between time to maturity and spread. 
A recent alternative, which allows for some non-linearity in the relationship, is to 
group bonds in maturity buckets and use dummy variables for each bucket [Evanoff 
and Jagtiani, 2004]. In contrast to most studies which omit perpetual maturity bonds, 
Imai (2005) uses the same dummy variable concept enabling perpetual bonds to be 
included in the sample. 41 
To associate the relationship between bank condition and default risk as cleanly as 
possible it is important to strip out the influence of a bond's liquidity. The common 
approach market discipline studies have used to accommodate liquidity risk is to 
incorporate the issue size of the bond as an explanatory factor [Avery, Belton and 
Goldberg, 1988; Sironi, 2003; and Covitz, Hancock and Kwast, 2004]. The finance 
literature agree that issue size affects the liquidity of a bond, but, as argued in section 
two of this chapter, combining "issue size" with the variable "size of bank" does lead 
to potential multicollinearity issues. 
More recently, some market discipline empirical studies have selected their bonds 
using what is termed a representative bond approach. Instead of including all SND 
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issued by a credit institution in the data set, these studies select one representative 
bond from each credit institution [Jagtiani, Kaufman and Lemieux, 2002; and Pop, 
2004]. When that bond matures it is replaced with another one. To be included as a 
representative bond, key criteria must be satisfied, such as a minimum issue size and 
be publicly traded in the secondary market. Clearly, a representative bond approach 
has been suggested to try and create as homogenous a sample as possible, including 
minimising the influence of liquidity risk on bond spreads. Interestingly, none of these 
studies considered the depth of trading in the bond as a selection criteria. 
The finance literature provides a number of alternative liquidity proxies, which have 
not been considered in market discipline studies. 42 For example, "on-the-run" bond 
issues (the most recently issued bond by a corporate) are considered to be more liquid, 
in contrast to "off-the-run" or older bonds, as market participants often focus their 
attention on younger bonds [Elton and Green, 1998; and Fleming, 2002]. Therefore, a 
dummy variable could be included in model specifications or only "on-the-run" issues 
included in the representative bond method. Equally, how long since the bond was 
issued (or the age of the bond) could be included as a liquidity proxy variable [Elton 
et al, 2004; and Diaz and Navarro, 2002]. Both of these are desirable "liquidity" 
variable alternatives because they are unlikely to be correlated with the variables 
"issue size" and "size of bank". Therefore, by including a liquidity proxy variable the 
theoretical underpinnings of the model can be satisfied without creating potential 
model specification issues. 
Bond Characteristics - Inclusion of senior bonds 
Some studies [Morgan and Stiroh, 2001; and Pop, 2004] include senior bonds in their 
SND sample. In both cases, senior bonds represent a significant portion of the sample 
(58% of the bonds in Morgan and Stiroh's sample and 55% in Pop's sample). Clearly, 
mixing different bond ranks introduces more variability into the sample for bank risk 
variables to explain. Further, each senior bond, by its nature, may or may not have 
underlying collateral attached to the bond creating an even more heterogeneous 
sample. Mixed bond samples are accommodated through the inclusion of a SND 
dummy variable. However, this is adding a further variable that may reduce the 
influence of the key market discipline exogenous variables. In testing for SNI) market 
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discipline it is essential that samples are restricted to similarly ranked debt. Some 
studies go one step further and ensure a clean sample by removing any SND that is 
convertible, perpetual in maturity or callable [Sironi, 2003]. 
Model specification issues 
Multicollinearity 
A severe difficulty in constructing a suitable empirical model to test market discipline 
is that many independent variables that measure bank risk have the potential to be 
related. This gives rise to potential multicollinearity problems when testing the 
regression model. Multicollinearity can lead to high coefficient standard errors, which 
means that the parameter estimates are not precise. The implications of this are that 
hypothesis testing is not powerful and therefore could give inappropriate conclusions 
about variable significance [Kennedy, 1992]. Also, the regression becomes very 
sensitive to small specification changes, so that adding or removing an explanatory 
variable leads to large changes in coefficient values or the significance of variables 
[Brooks, 2002] or coefficients may have the wrong sign [Greene, 2003]. A further 
potential problem with multicollinearity is that the model may have a high R2, so it 
`looks good' as a whole, but few of the individual variables will be significant 
[Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998]. It should be noted that the presence of 
multicollinearity does not mean that the model is misspecified [Dougherty, 2002]. In 
fact, it is commonly agreed that multicollinearity is more a problem with the data than 
with the model. Therefore, incorporating more data should be able to provide 
additional information, thereby helping to reduce variances. Unfortunately, most 
market discipline studies, in particular those focusing on primary market data, often 
have to work with fairly small samples. Further, multicollinearity can be viewed as 
less of a problem if the model specification can be supported by the underlying theory. 
The alternative would be to drop one of the collinear variables, which could give rise 
to omitted variables problems in the model (refer to the section below). The following 
discussion will highlight how many instances of potential multicollinearity in market 
discipline models could be reduced or possibly eliminated through more careful model 
specification, whilst at the same the same time satisfying underlying theory. 
Also, it 
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demonstrates how studies fail to adequately discuss multicollinearity concerns and 
present robustness checks to identify or address these concerns. 
An analysis of market discipline studies indicates that the variable "bank size" is 
potentially problematic as size effects can translate into the values of other variables. 
Pettway (1976a) indicates that bank size was related to measures of capital structure. 
Interestingly, no other empirical study mentions that size effects can impact on bank 
condition variables. Pettway also suggests that the variable "size of debt issue", which 
is frequently incorporated in studies to capture bond liquidity risk, is related to bank 
size. When he included both size and marketability variables he found 
multicollinearity to be a problem and therefore had to drop one of the variables. 
Several other studies [Morgan and Stiroh, 2001; Covitz, Hancock and Kwast, 2004; 
Sironi, 2003; and Avery, Belton and Goldberg, 1988] also have both "issue size" and 
"bank size" variables in the same model. They transform one or both exogenous 
variables so as to reduce the potential for multicollinearity. For example, Sironi 
(2003) uses the log of "issue size" and a ratio-style "bank size" variable. More 
common is for studies to perform a logarithmic transformation of the "bank size" 
variable. As discussed previously, alternative proxy variables for liquidity risk could 
also be used that are unlikely to raise any multicollinearity concerns. 
Another source of potential multicollinearity is to include bank condition explanatory 
variables that are likely to be closely related to one another. For example, Barajas and 
Steiner (2000) include both a `Capital/Assets' variable and a `Total Reserves/Assets' 
variable in their model. Morgan and Stiroh (2001) use the entire breakdown of the 
assets and loan categories per supervisory reports as exogenous variables in their 
model. With potentially similar consequences, Avery, Belton and Goldberg (1988) 
and Covitz, Hancock and Kwast (2004) include different but potentially 
interdependent specifications of loan losses in the same model. 43 The empirical 
findings of both studies raise potential multicollinearity concerns. Avery, Belton and 
Goldberg (1988) report extremely high standard errors for the loan loss variables 
which means that none of them are statistically significant. Also, the sign of the 
coefficient changes between different specifications. Changes in sign are also a feature 
of the paper by Covitz, Hancock and Kwast (2004). Also, for one time period where 
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there are very few observations, the goodness-of-fit measure, R2, is exceptionally high 
compared to other market discipline empirical studies. Further support for potential 
multicollinearity between loan loss variables is provided by the methodology adopted 
in the market discipline paper by Hall et al. (2003). They use factor analysis to obtain 
a set of independent bank risk variables and find that the variables `Non-performing 
loans' and `90-day + past due loans' form part of the same factor. The omission of one 
of the loan loss variables or alternatively the use of a combined `non-performing and 
90-day + past due loans to assets' ratio would retain a theoretically important bank 
condition variable and reduce the possible implications of multicollinearity. The 
papers by Jagtiani and Lemieux (2001) and Jagtiani, Kaufman and Lemieux (2002) 
adopt the latter approach and in both cases report loan loss coefficients that are 
consistently highly significant and with the expected sign. 44 
Including more than one dummy exogenous variable that could be related to others is 
a further source for potential multicollinearity. Sironi (2003) looks at SND issues in 
14 European countries between 1991 and 2000. He includes both `currency' dummy 
variables and `country' dummy variables as exogenous variables. For the smaller 
countries in the sample in particular it is likely that these dummy variables will both 
report a '1' at the same time. A regression analysis will struggle to isolate the 
influence of each of these interdependent dummy variables on the dependent variable. 
The examples of potentially collinear variables discussed above suggest that more 
careful variable selection (including for dummy variables) rather than necessarily 
requiring more data could reduce or possibly eliminate multicollinearity concerns. 
Unfortunately, market discipline studies all too frequently fail to adequately discuss 
multicollinearity concerns nor present diagnostic measures (such as correlation 
coefficients) to identify potential problems. 
Omitted Variables 
The omission of a variable (or variables) that ought to be included in a regression 
model can have significant interpretative implications. The regression estimates are 
in 
general (but not always) biased and the standard errors of the coefficients, and 
therefore the corresponding t tests, are in general invalid [Dougherty, 1992]. 
As a 
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result, it is clearly important to try and minimise what is known as omitted variable 
bias. Although panel data models can reduce the effects of omitted variable bias by 
including time dummy variables to capture the effect of all (observed and unobserved) 
variables that do not vary over the individual sample observations, the omitted 
variable examples discussed below are concerned with regressors that do vary across 
observations and are fundamental in explaining bond spreads. 
Table 3-3b clearly shows that not until the paper by Sironi (2003) did SND empirical 
studies regularly begin to incorporate the maturity of the debt instrument as an 
independent variable. As previously discussed, one factor that affects the yield spread 
is the term or maturity of the debt instrument. Therefore, market discipline studies that 
omit the maturity variable are liable to significant omitted variable bias. Notable 
papers which did not include a maturity variable are the ones by Flannery and Sorescu 
(1996) and Jagtiani, Kaufman and Lemieux (2002). 45 Both of these papers aimed to 
provide evidence of SND market discipline in the light of a changing regulatory 
regime. The omission of such a key variable must provide some caveat to their 
conclusions. 
Pop (2004) provides another omitted variables example. He studies the secondary 
market spreads of European bonds for 14 countries, but fails to include any "currency" 
dummy variable. He does include "country" dummy variables and, as previously 
discussed, the inclusion of "country" and "currency" dummy variables would no 
doubt give rise to some multicollinearity concerns, especially for certain countries. As 
banks are not restricted to the currency of their debt issue and the currency of the issue 
is more likely to affect the spread than the nationality of the issuer it would appear that 
currency variables are essential. The discussion in section one of chapter four 
illustrates the importance of "currency" dummy variables in the European context. 
An inappropriate consideration of the liquidity of bond issues is a further example of 
omitted variables in certain market discipline studies. Flannery and Sorescu (1996), 
Jagtiani, Kaufman and Lemieux (2002), Evanoff and Wall (2004) and Krishnan, 
Ritchken and Thomson (2005) all fail to include either a "liquidity" or "size of bond 
issue" variable in their models. The first three studies do include a "bank size" 
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variable, which as previously discussed, can capture liquidity effects, but at the same 
time the "bank size" variable was interpreted in each of these studies as a proxy TBTF 
variable. It could be argued that the studies by Jagtiani, Kaufman and Lemieux (2002) 
and Evanoff and Wall (2004) do attempt to overcome liquidity difficulties by adopting 
a representative bond approach. However, both studies are longitudinal in nature and 
use secondary market data. Over time, even "representative bonds" will gradually 
become more illiquid as investors begin to hold those bonds in their portfolio rather 
than trade them. A liquidity variable taken from the finance literature (for example, 
indicating whether the bond was issued in the past year or not) would not have been 
out of place in either of these studies and would probably have enhanced the model's 
ability to evidence market discipline behaviour. 
Functional form 
Functional form considers the functional relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables in a model. The overwhelming form for market discipline 
studies has been a linear model and this is despite such models generally being poor at 
explaining a substantial amount of the variation in the dependent variable [Fraser and 
McCormack, 1978] and there being no compelling theory suggesting why a linear 
model should be used. More recently, some studies have begun to include nonlinear 
functions of independent variables as additional explanatory variables. As the 
resulting model is still linear in the parameters it can be estimated using ordinary least 
squares. In market discipline studies, nonlinear functions of independent variables are 
generally constructed in two ways, with either or both having been present in models. 
First, dummy variables may be used. A good example is the grouping of two or more 
credit agency rating bands into the same dummy variable [Flannery and Sorescu, 
1996]. This creates flexibility in the relationship between spreads and ratings. The 
same principle applies in studies where bond maturities are grouped into buckets 
[Jagtiani, Kaufman and Lemieux, 2002; and Evanoff and Jagtiani, 2004]. The second 
approach is to create multiplicative independent variables. Here, two commonly-used 
bank risk variables are multiplied together to create a further independent variable. 
Studies that have utilised such variables include Jagtiani, Kaufman and Lemieux 
(2002), Sironi (2003) and Pop (2004). Each of these papers uses the leverage ratio as 
the common scale variable, and variables that it is combined with include loan 
losses 
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and return on assets. The findings are rather mixed with only the "leverage-return on 
assets" variable showing some potentially consistent statistical significance. 
An alternative to linear models is where the model is nonlinear in the parameters. 
Gorton and Santomero (1990) suggest that the value of uninsured liabilities cannot be 
described as a linear function of risk. They use the contingent claims valuation model 
of Black and Cox (1976) to calculate the implied volatilities of banks assets and then 
regress these on measures of bank risk. They are unable to explain the volatilities. 
However, this study uses the same data set as Avery, Belton and Goldberg (1988) and 
so suffers with yield spreads that are the average of all outstanding issues of the bank 
for that year. Flannery and Sorescu (1996) are one of the only other studies to examine 
a nonlinear market discipline model. Their findings are unaffected by whether a linear 
model is used as opposed to explaining spreads using a theoretical measure based on 
the Black and Cox (1976) model. 
Credit spread levels and credit spread changes 
All the empirical studies presented to date have tested credit spread levels against 
measures of bank risk. Krishnan, Ritchken and Thomson (2005) rightly suggest that 
market discipline should be examining whether changes in credit spreads are caused 
by changes in bank risk measures. They find mixed evidence as to whether changes in 
bank-specific risk explain changes in spreads. They ascribe these findings to the 
benign banking period that their study covers (1994-1999), arguing that changes in 
bank risk were not significant. Again, this supports the idea that to truly explore the 
market discipline concept, studies need to examine periods of banking turbulence, 
where large movements in bank risk should register investor responsiveness and 
therefore, credit spread movements. 
Although a model that examines changes in spreads and bank risk is theoretically 
appealing, the linear functional form adopted by Krishnan, Ritchken and Thomson 
(2005) is intuitively limiting. For example, investors are unlikely to respond 
significantly if a sound bank records a small improvement in bank risk. However, if 
the same level of improvement in bank condition is registered by a risky bank, 
investors are likely to be more responsive and signal an improvement in yield spreads. 
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Therefore, investor response to changes in bank risk is unlikely to be linearly 
proportional and will depend on, amongst other things, a bank's current perceived 
riskiness and whether the change in risk is an improvement or deterioration from its 
current state. As a result, I would argue that the findings from Krishnan, Ritchken and 
Thomson (2005) should be read with some care and not generalised more widely. 
Equally, this discussion indicates that the use of models based on changes in spreads 
and risk is very much in its infancy, but at the same time provides a substantial 
opportunity for further research. 
Lagged variables or not? 
The final model specification issue to be discussed is whether any lagged variables are 
included in the model. Section one of this chapter highlighted how more recent 
uninsured depositor studies typically lag the independent variables by one year. This 
raises serious questions over the true signalling behaviour of such investors. SND 
market discipline studies do not suffer from the same problem, but at the same time 
this may explain the less conclusive nature of their findings. Typically, SND studies 
assume the strong form of market efficiency, with no lag between the dependent and 
independent variables. Some studies have considered the semi-strong form by 
incorporating a one-month lag to accommodate the preliminary release of financial 
information at the year-end. Studies that have adopted both approaches report no 
significant difference in their conclusions. 
Price effect or quantity effect 
The final key distinguishing feature of first generation studies is to examine market 
discipline either through a price effect, where the prices of bank liabilities reflect bank 
riskiness, or through a "supply of funds" or quantity effect. The nature of capital 
markets and instruments means that the price effect may be tested for all three classes 
of bank stakeholder. As this chapter has illustrated, this form of empirical evidence 
dominates market discipline testing. 
With regard to the quantity effect, the nature of equity and bond financial instruments 
means that, for every seller, there must be a buyer, arguably eliminating the secondary 
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market as a source of quantity-effect signalling. This is evident from the lack of 
market discipline testing in this arena. One, as yet unexplored, source of secondary- 
market, quantity-effect signalling may be the use of daily trading information. 
Typically, one would expect bank capital instruments with more uncertainty attached 
to them to trade in volumes well above their average. However, interpreting a metric 
such as trading volumes in this manner could be misleading if the market for that 
financial instrument is highly illiquid because investors are generally "buy and hold" 
investors. In this instance, lightly-traded instruments do not necessarily indicate an 
underlying strong credit institution. 
The primary market does provide a potential source of data with which to test the 
quantity effects of equity and debt instruments. Covitz, Hancock and Kwast (2001) 
show that riskier banks are less likely to access SND markets than healthier banks. 
Therefore, a mandatory SND policy would force banks to regularly present their risk 
condition to the market for assessment. A case study of the operations of the primary 
markets for equity and debt financial instruments appears to be an alternative 
methodology to investigate primary market quantity-based signalling. Comprehensive 
access to financial institutions' treasury departments and typical bond investors could 
provide evidence of investors directly penalising riskier credit institutions by 
recommending that their debt should not currently be introduced to the market. 
Unlike debt and equity financial instruments, bank deposits have the ability to be 
cashed, and therefore, do provide a potential market discipline quantity effect signal. 
The evidence from section one illustrates that, as banks shift into insured funds when 
uninsured funds are harder to access, it appears that the quantity effect of uninsured 
depositors may provide quite robust evidence for the existence of depositor market 
discipline signals. 
Conclusions 
Section two of this chapter has presented a detailed analysis of prior SND empirical 
market discipline studies. The focus has been on the dominant approach to market 
discipline testing, the risk sensitivity of bank spreads, which is the methodology 
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adopted in this study. The section provides two clear findings. First, despite a 
dominant methodology existing in recognition phase SND studies, the models can 
differ quite significantly in their characteristics. For example, is primary market or 
secondary market data used and how is the dependent variable calculated? Some of 
the differences are shown to have potential implications for market discipline 
findings. Secondly, the section argues that SND models often contain model 
specification and variable construction/interpretation issues. As examples, several 
studies have quite simple multicollinearity or omitted variables problems and it is 
clear that attempting to analyse the influence of bank size/TBTF issues can prove 
troublesome. Again, these problems can have an impact on the conclusions from 
market discipline studies and may explain the variability in findings. The issues 
discussed above indicate that the quality of the models and their inputs may be a 
fundamental reason why measures of bank risk are not reflecting SND yield 
premiums. Therefore, if market discipline does actually exist, it may be that models 
are not capturing the market's recognition phase signals. 
Section 3- Conclusions 
The aim of chapter three was to review the prior empirical research on market 
discipline and examine whether the three classes of bank stakeholders provide suitable 
market discipline behaviour and whether the results are valid in light of the research 
techniques applied. The evidence illustrates that banks are generally subject to some 
element of investor discipline, whether it be from depositors, equity holders or SND 
holders. The literature review in chapter two argues that SND is a theoretically 
appealing instrument of market discipline, compared to uninsured depositors and 
equity holders. However, the theoretical preference for SND market discipline is not 
particularly evident from a review of the existing empirical literature. The possible 
exception is SND issuance decision models. Although there have been few studies of 
this kind, they categorically show that a MSNDP may provide useful signals on bank 
condition to the supervisory authorities. 
In contrast to the mixed findings from SND studies, uninsured depositor empirical 
studies provide quite compelling evidence of market discipline behaviour by this type 
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of bank stakeholder, although including a common lag of one year for explanatory 
variables presents a significant caveat to the contemporaneous argument from these 
studies. Studies of equity holder market discipline provide compelling evidence of 
contemporaneous signalling. However, the focus of equity holder market discipline 
studies differs somewhat from the other two forms of bank investor. Most studies 
examine equity holder signalling in response to particular market events that raise 
bank risk, for example the LDC loan crisis of the early 1980s. In contrast, there are 
only four studies that adopt a general bank risk approach akin to the depositor and 
SND empirical studies. Although, they are generally in support of contemporaneous 
responsiveness, given that all of the studies are very old, and the small sample of 
studies carried out, this does raise doubts about the findings. 
The mixed evidence of SND market discipline leads on to the second aim of the 
chapter, analysing the research techniques applied to test for market discipline 
behaviour. This analysis illustrates how models can differ quite significantly in their 
characteristics despite the presence of a dominant methodology. Additionally, the 
section argues that SND models often contain model specification and variable 
construction/interpretation issues that question the internal validity of the research. 
This in turn raises concerns over the conclusions made from these market discipline 
studies and may explain the variability in findings witnessed in the review of SND 
studies in section one. Secondly, from a wider market discipline perspective, these 
issues question the external validity and generalisability of the empirical SND 
evidence. 
The analysis conducted in this chapter acts as a precursor to specifying the model used 
in this thesis, which is presented in Chapter four. The analysis has indicated that the 
internal validity of market discipline models can be improved by accurately capturing 
a bond's specific characteristics and the associated bank's risk characteristics, as well 
as specifying the model robustly. 
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' The reader is directed to table 2-2 for a summary of the limited literature on control phase market 
discipline testing. 
2 Hall et al. (2002) make a very interesting observation. They suggest that the declining percentage of 
uninsured deposits at failing banks could be the product of supervisory discipline. Banks approaching 
failure typically operate under enforcement actions that require improvement in capital ratios. One way 
to do this quickly is to allow high-priced funding (jumbo CDs for example) to run off. Therefore, they 
suggest that it is better to analyse the quantity effect on banks that are not failing. 
3 cantonal banks are semi-governmental credit institutions that operate under state guarantee. Their 
objective is to promote the Canton's economy. In contrast Regional banks are private banking 
institutions that operate at a regional level and primarily focus on traditional financial intermediary 
activities. Their regional coverage typically extends across more than one Canton. 
4 Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) show that, out of a sample of 55 countries, only 8 of them have 
coinsurance in their deposit insurance scheme and only 4 countries have risk-based premiums. No 
country has both characteristics. 
5 The FDIC was not explicitly intending to penalise smaller banks, but the legislation under which the 
FDIC was operating meant that one of its key aims was to minimise losses to the Bank Insurance Fund. 
Large banks had greater franchise values and marketability compared to small ones and so it was easier 
to sell-on the insured and uninsured deposits to potential acquirers. If no acquirer could be found or if 
the FDIC did not receive a less costly bid via a P&A transaction the deposit payoff method would be 
used. 
6 Some studies employ slight alternatives to the one explained here, but the concept is the same; to 
compare returns on the bank under investigation to returns on a control group of banks pre and post a 
specific event date. 
At the time it was the largest bank failure in US history. 
8 Pettway (1976b) showed that the Franklin Bank failure led to a significant structural effect on equity 
investors' risk cognizance. 
9 Fraser and McCormack (1978) had a year dummy variable which identified a significant rise in SND 
spreads following the Franklin Bank failure, but this could still mean that individual bank risk variable 
effects on spreads are being masked. Pettway (1976a) studied the sensitivity of debt and equity to bank 
risk, but only used annual cross section regressions for the equity data. 
to Avery, Belton and Goldberg's (1988) market discipline findings suggest that a factor such as variable 
measurement issues may be at play. Their study concludes that bank-specific risk variables are poor at 
explaining SND spreads and argue that this may be due to implicit regulatory authority insurance that 
large banks will not be allowed to fail. However, they also state that: "even if it were perceived that the 
FDIC is providing implicit insurance for some very large bank SNDs, it still would not explain why the 
level of risk premiums for such banks is so high, nor why significant variation exists in the premium 
levels for banks of the largest size class. If these banks were truly too large to fail then they would 
be 
expected to have both low and similar premiums. " 
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11 Coupled with this was the so-called "Savings and Loans Debacle". Between 1980 and 1988,563 US 
Savings and Loans (S&L) institutions failed at a cost of US$73 billion to the Savings and loans deposit 
insurance fund (FDIC, 1997). For further details on the US banking and S&L crises of the 1980s and 
early 1990s and the regulatory fallout that that entailed, the reader is directed to the following 
publications: FDIC (1997 and 1998); Kaufman (1997 and 2002); Benston and Kaufman (1997); and 
White (2002). 
12 Note that Flannery and Sorescu's (1996) observation about variability in spreads appears to 
contradict Avery, Belton and Goldberg's (1988) observation for the same period, which is quoted in 
footnote 10 of this chapter. 
13 Morgan and Stiroh (2005) look at the impact of TBTF over the periods 1984-1986 and 1993-1998. 
They show that the banks named as TBTF in 1984 not only enjoyed a flatter relationship between 
spreads and ratings than non-TBTF banks over the period 1984 to 1986, but also over the period 1993 
to 1998. Morgan and Stiroh argue that these findings suggest that investors still see those banks as 
TBTF. Alternatively, it could simply be the case that the larger banks have more diversified operations 
and so are seen by investors as less risky, even when they are downgraded. 
14 This was the largest bank failure in the FDIC's history where uninsured depositors suffered losses. 
15 The holding company held significant deposits at the failed bank. The regulatory authorities, in 
protecting all insured and uninsured depositors (which they had done for all large bank failures from 
1984 to 1992) meant that the holding company's deposits were protected. Therefore, as SND in the 
holding company matured, its deposits in the failed bank were drawn down to pay off the obligations. 
As a result, the SND holders in the failed bank were indirectly protected. It is important to realise that 
in subsequent bank failures the holding company has not held sufficient deposits in the failed bank to 
indirectly protect subordinated claimants. Equally, it is important to realise that not until legislation 
passed in 1989 could the liquidator of a failed bank distinguish claimants of equal standing (in this case 
uninsured depositors) when determining the percentage to be returned to them. 
16 The First City Bancorp of Texas failure in 1988 resulted in shareholders having a significantly 
reduced ownership and bondholders exchanging claims at a significantly reduced amount. The First 
RepublicBank Corp failure of 1988 ensured that bondholders and equity holders were wiped out. In the 
MCorp failure of 1989 they were pretty much wiped out, as they were in the Bank of New England 
failure in 1991. 
17 Part II of FDIC (1998) provides the reader with case studies of 10 large US banking failures. 
18 The previous third largest bank to require FDIC assistance (First City Bancorp in 1988) had also 
resulted in all depositors being fully protected. 
19 A reason why depositors, bondholders and shareholders would be likely to withdraw from a failing 
bank is the uncertainty associated with how long it may take to recoup any or all of their investment. 
The large US bank failures of the 1980s have shown that less senior claimants often had to pursue 
lengthy and expensive litigation to try and recover any value from their investments. 
20 The third study, Sironi (2001), is quite different to the other two in that it does not examine the risk 
sensitivity of SND spreads. 
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21 Unfortunately, the paper does not report individual bank risk variable results. 
22 The reader is directed to the timeliness debate between market and supervisory information signals of 
bank risk discussed in section three of Chapter two for a separate strand of the literature on the 
signalling qualities of market information. 
23 Interestingly, they do observe that different bond data sources exhibit strong agreement about which 
banks are in the tails of the spread distribution at each point in time, suggesting that ranking banks may 
be a particularly useful way for the supervisory authorities and other market participants to utilise 
spread data. 
24 The distance to default combines stock price information with stock volatility and leverage, and 
measures the number of standard deviations away from default, where default is defined as the point at 
which assets are just equal to liabilities. This property makes the distance to default a useful indicator 
from a supervisory perspective [Gropp, 2004]. 
25 Without deflecting from the key issue of SND spreads, other considerations have been the signalling 
qualities of implied volatilities from banks' financial option prices [Swidler and Wilcox, 2002] and of 
credit default swap spreads [Hull, Predescu and White, 2004]. However, the latter study contained only 
four credit institutions out of a sample of 31 entities. 
26 Schweitzer, Szewczyk and Varma (1992) and Billett, Garfinkel and O'Neal (1998) actually use a 
change in bond ratings as their market announcement event. 
27 This point is also apparent in market discipline studies that include credit ratings as an exogenous 
variable. Table3-3b shows that where models have included credit ratings, lower-rated debt issues have 
higher yield spreads. 
28 This may be in line with the growth in suggestions around that time that a MSNDP may be the most 
appropriate policy direction. 
29 The three studies are: Pettway (1976a); Beighley (1977); and Fraser and McCormack (1978). 
30 Even sub-sample panel data specifications can be problematic. Covitz, Hancock and Kwast (2004) 
had a sub-sample panel data specification that covered a three year period. It had only 31 observations. 
3' Eight of the ten largest bank failures during this period resulted in full protection for all depositors, 
with another of the ten for virtually all depositors. 
32 The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1999) show that SND issuance is also 
concentrated amongst the largest credit institutions. 
33 Interestingly, they are two of only three studies that have included callable debt in their SND sample. 
Both of these studies used a theoretical model to adjust the initial credit spreads of the callable debt for 
the embedded call feature to derive option-adjusted spreads. In contrast, the other study [Covitz, 
Hancock and Kwast, 2004] used a dummy variable to identify callable debt issues and therefore capture 
the influence of callability on credit spreads. 
34 See footnote number 13 in this chapter. 
35 Hall et al. (2003) highlight how this measurement error is only a problem for price-based depositor 
discipline studies and not quantity-based ones. This may explain why papers that utilise 
both 
approaches typically produce better signals of market discipline from quantity-based studies. 
95 
36 See footnote number 10 in this chapter. 
37 The data from this thesis suggests that this may be the case. Over the period 1995-2002 UK banks 
have on average seen their SND issue ratings change once. 
38 The accounting variables model used by Sironi (2003) illustrates the implications of using an 
excessive number of independent variables relative to the sample size. The predictive capabilities of the 
model (R2 and adjusted R) are extremely high. This would be considered to be an example of extreme 
overfitting of the data. In other words, the estimated parameters from the model have no 
generalisability, but relate only to the sample data. 
39 Fitch Ratings Service has a similar type of rating called Individual strength rating. 
' The exceptions being Avery, Belton and Goldberg (1988), Flannery and Sorescu (1996) and Covitz, 
Hancock and Kwast (2004). The reader is referred to footnote number 32 in this chapter. 
41 Japanese credit institutions, like those in the UK, issue a high percentage of SND with perpetual 
maturity [Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2003]. 
42 Houweling, Mentink and Vorst (2005) provide a good summary of this literature. 
43 The two variables are `non-accruing loans to total assets' and `accruing loans past due ninety days or 
more to total assets'. The supervisory authorities in the US produce Bank Performance Reports and in 
these they combine the two loan loss measures discussed above into one ratio `90+ days past due and 
non-accrual assets to total assets. ' 
44 In both papers, the loan loss ratio does include in the numerator `real estate owned' as well, which 
represents collateral obtained through the foreclosure of loans. It is not uncommon for this loan loss 
component to be included as a further exogenous variable in market discipline studies leading to three 
loan loss variables being tested in the same model, and at the same time, therefore raising further 
multicollinearity concerns. [ See Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; and Covitz, Hancock and Kwast, 2004]. 
45 As part of their robustness checks, Flannery and Sorescu (1996) do include the average outstanding 
SND maturity for each bank as an independent variable in their models. They argue that its inclusion 
does not alter their conclusions about the significance of market discipline. However, they report that 
the average maturity variable tended to have a negative coefficient, which is highly unusual and should 
have led to further examination about the model specification. 
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Chapter 4- The research hypotheses and research model 
introduction 
This chapter collates the research literature discussed in the previous two chapters to 
explain the research objectives of this thesis. The chapter is broken into the following 
sections. Section one introduces the study's research objectives and explains why 
research on the UK experience of debt-holder market discipline is of value to the 
academic community. Using the market discipline framework proposed in chapter 
two, section two introduces the thesis research questions and highlights the position of 
these objectives within the wider academic research on market discipline. Section 
three details the research hypotheses attached to the research questions that this study 
attempts to answer and the variables/models used to tackle these research questions. 
The literature review of previous empirical market discipline studies in chapter three 
provides the foundations for the model specifications and variable constituents used in 
this thesis. Section four concludes. 
Section 1- What are the research objectives and why 
research debt-holder market discipline in the UK? 
Introduction 
The aim of this section is to justify a research study of SND market discipline in the 
UK. This section will illustrate that UK banks represent a major set of SND issuers 
and, therefore, can provide a rich source of data on market discipline behaviour. 
Further, through a detailed analysis of the two studies that have examined SND 
market discipline in the European context the contribution of a single country study to 
the market discipline literature will become apparent. Additionally, the previous 
European market discipline studies have raised certain issues concerning the UK SND 
market, which a country-specific study may show has wider implications for the 
introduction of a SND market discipline policy, both domestically and internationally. 
However, this study does not solely intend to provide a contribution to the market 
discipline literature by examining a new country. As chapter three illustrates, the 
generalisability of empirical market discipline studies would be enhanced through 
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improved model specification. Section three of this chapter will outline the model 
specifications adopted in this study and explain how they provide a more 
methodologically appealing examination of market discipline behaviour. 
Research Objectives 
The principle objective of the research is to further understanding of SND market 
discipline by investigating holders of UK credit institution-issued debt. As this is the 
first market discipline study exclusively in the UK context there is scope for a vast 
array of issues to be explored. However, in order to retain a degree of manageability, 
the study focuses on issues that are prominent in the current academic literature. 
Chapter two illustrates the benefits to the financial marketplace of some element of 
investor discipline, with the academic literature having a general consensus on SND 
as being the most appropriate tool to enhance bank market discipline. This includes 
the many proposals for a MSNDP. The empirical findings reported in chapter three 
question the validity of this consensus, although the chapter does argue that model 
and variable problems could partly account for this. Given the topical nature of SND 
as a tool for effective bank market discipline, this thesis focuses on that group of 
investors. 
As section two explains there are two facets to the thesis research that both revolve 
around SND holder market discipline. First, the study will explore existing SND 
holder signalling of UK credit institution risk, and secondly examine the feasibility of 
a particular SND market discipline policy - mandatory SND. 
In order to more accurately answer the study's primary objective, the secondary 
objective of this thesis is to overcome some of the methodological failings of previous 
SND studies that are discussed in chapters three and four. Therefore, if market 
discipline does actually exist, it is hoped that the model is able to capture these 
signals. Nevertheless, whether market discipline exists or not, a more appropriately 
specified model should enhance the validity of the conclusions. 
An alternative research proposal that was considered was to look at the market 
disciplinary characteristics of holders of CDs as well and compare their disciplinary 
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influence to SND holders. However, access to suitably-detailed CD data at the bank 
level rendered this study unworkable at an early stage. 
Justifications for a UK study 
Topical relevance and the size of the UK bank-issued SND market 
As the previous chapters have explained, calls for enhancing market discipline in the 
banking regulatory environment through the use of SND holders have led to a growth 
in research in this area. This includes the many proposals for a MSNDP. 
To date, research on market discipline by SND holders has focused primarily on the 
US. However, with the increasing internationalisation of banking regulation (the 
introduction of limited market discipline principles in the Basel II Capital Accord 
[Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2001 a] is a case in point) it is imperative 
that a wider set of cases are considered. Otherwise, it would be extremely difficult to 
determine whether some form of market discipline can be introduced on a worldwide 
basis or whether it should be restricted to specific countries or types of banks. The 
four SND studies that have examined SND market discipline outside the US are 
Sironi (2001 and 2003) and Pop (2004) from a pan-European perspective, and Imai 
(2005), whose sample covers Japanese banks. The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2003) report that over the period 1990-2001 UK banks represent the 
fourth most active market for bank-issued SND (behind Germany, the US, and Japan). 
In value terms, the UK is the third highest issuer of bank-issued SND (only just 
behind the US and Germany). If the sample is split further to consider publicly-issued 
SND only, UK banks are the second largest issuer in value terms behind the US. 
Publicly-issued debt is considered to be preferable to privately placed debt in creating 
a large secondary market in SND and thus enhancing indirect market discipline 
signals. Therefore, a study of the UK context has the potential to provide substantial 
evidence as to whether indirect market discipline exists. On top of this, the size and 
issuance frequency of the UK SND market suggests that there is also potential for 
direct market discipline as well. As a result, it is clear that UK banks represent major 
issuers of SND and, therefore, can provide a rich source of data on market discipline 
behaviour. Further, any intention to introduce an international market discipline 
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policy would no doubt include major issuers, such as UK banks (even if it was only 
restricted to internationally-active banks). 
' Therefore, a study of the UK SND context 
can provide contributions to the market discipline debate at both national and 
international levels. The size and, thus potential contribution of non-US market 
discipline studies to the literature is why the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2003) state: "There seems to be considerable scope and need for 
examining market discipline outside the US". Flannery (1998) also identifies a 
significant gap in the market discipline literature when he identifies topics requiring 
more detailed investigation. He states: "What is the foreign [non-US] evidence about 
the efficacy of market analysts' efforts to identify and control banking firms' risk 
exposures? " This thesis attempts to provide such a contribution to the market 
discipline literature. 
Current European evidence of SND market discipline 
As three studies have examined SND market discipline from a pan-European 
perspective (and they all include the UK in their sample), this sub-section provides a 
detailed analysis of these papers and explains why a country-specific study of the UK 
would provide a contribution to the market discipline literature, both in Europe and 
further afield. 
Sironi (2001) analyses the SND issuance activity of European-banks from 17 
countries and the characteristics of that debt over the period 1988 to 2000. He argues 
that the characteristics of European banks' SND issues are similar to those found for 
US banks. Sironi (2003) and Pop (2004) examine the risk sensitivity of SND spreads 
for banks from the same 14 European countries. The key differences between the two 
studies are that Sironi (2003) covers the time period 1991-2000 and looks at primary 
market issuance spreads, whereas Pop (2004) examines the time period 1995-2002 
and solely covers secondary market spreads. Although both studies report that credit 
agency ratings are good at explaining spreads and accounting variables are poor 
explanatory variables, they both conclude that market discipline is present in the 
European bank-SND market. Further, both studies report that implicit guarantees for 
public banks reduce their funding costs and so act as a barrier in enabling effective 
market discipline of these credit institutions, i. e. violation of the right participants 
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condition. The two studies differ in their conclusion as to whether the risk sensitivity 
of spreads has been increasing over time. This is examined to see whether implicit 
guarantees that were present in the first half of the 1990s and have become weaker 
during the second part of the decade may have been hindering market discipline. 
Sironi (2003) argues that the risk sensitivity has been increasing, whereas Pop (2004) 
does not. The reader is directed to page 56 in chapter three for a more detailed 
discussion of this point. 
A common theme across all three of these studies is that they have a pan-European 
perspective. This presents a number of problems, which I will now discuss. Firstly, 
the richness of the results is clouded by generalised findings that span a number of 
countries. This, in turn, can lead to inappropriate market discipline policy 
recommendations. For example, as mentioned above, Sironi (2001) argues that 
European banks' SND is on average very similar in its characteristics to US banks. As 
a result of this he states: "an internationally coordinated effort to harmonize the 
characteristics of an MSNDP is considered both feasible and important" [Sironi, 
2001]. However, a deeper analysis of the results presented by Sironi (2001) highlights 
considerable differences in bank SND issuance and characteristics across different 
European countries. Naturally, this could have significant implications for an 
internationally-harmonised MSNDP. In contrast to a pan-European sample, a country- 
specific market discipline study enables a clearer picture of SND issuance activity and 
its characteristics to emerge within countries. This would facilitate a more comparable 
analysis with other major issuers of bank SND and provide a more appropriate level at 
which to investigate policy issues. 
The second problem with a pan-European perspective is that it overlooks country- 
specific environments and issues. In the UK context, a country-specific study can 
provide contributions to the market discipline literature, which the pan-European 
approaches of Sironi (2001 and 2003) and Pop (2004) are either unable to explain or 
have been overlooked. Three such examples are provided below. 
The first issue particular to the UK is a preference for SND with perpetual maturity 
and with callable features attached. This is in stark contrast to German and French 
credit institutions (and US credit institutions). Although Sironi (2001) identifies that 
-O1 
UK banks primarily issue callable perpetual-maturity debt, both Sironi (2003) and 
pop (2004) omit perpetual and callable debt issues from their research. Therefore, 
they are overlooking a significant proportion of the UK dataset and reducing the 
ability to generalise findings to the UK context as well as inappropriately analysing 
one of the major credit institution-issued SND markets. Results from chapter six show 
that 30% of all UK issues are of perpetual maturity and 64% of all issues have 
callable features attached. 
The second issue is that several market discipline studies with US and European-wide 
data have characterised a change in investor behaviour as a result of the perception of 
TBTF guarantees gradually disappearing. However, such guarantees have not been 
seen to exist in the UK for some time and the losses incurred by uninsured investors 
following the failures of the Bank of Credit and Commercial International and 
Barings support this opinion. As a result, the UK provides a prolonged period of study 
without the influence of perceived TBTF guarantees. Market discipline studies 
recognise that TBTF guarantees can mask the ability of models to identify the risk 
sensitivity of SND investors. Therefore, a study of market discipline using a UK data- 
set may help to provide far richer findings of investors' risk perceptions than existing 
studies. Allied to the lack of TBTF guarantees is the fact that the UK does not have 
any public banks. 2 Sironi (2003) and Pop (2004) find that public banks have a lower 
susceptibility to market discipline. Again, this means that a study of the UK SND 
market provides a cleaner picture of the evidence of market discipline behaviour. The 
existence of public banks and conjectural TBTF guarantees means that existing 
European market discipline studies have spent considerable time accommodating 
these effects within models when they are irrelevant for a major SND market. Further, 
as the following discussion on the third, unique UK issue testifies, this can lead to 
potentially distorted conclusions being made on other market discipline issues. 
The third issue that is particular to the UK is one that appears to remain 
fundamentally unanswered by existing research. Sironi (2003) and Pop (2004) both 
report that SND issued by UK credit institutions have higher yield spreads compared 
to their European counterparts, and this is in spite of UK credit institutions having 
strong credit ratings. Common suggestions are that the UK economic cycle differs to 
continental European countries [Sironi, 2000]3 and that UK banks, contrary to 
102 
continental European ones, did not benefit from TBTF guarantees [Sironi, 2003]. The 
author believes, for two reasons, that it is more likely to be due to UK credit 
institutions primarily issuing SND in US dollars and Sterling (see table 6-12a). First, 
these government debt markets are more liquid and have higher credit standing than 
other European countries, leading to the potential for greater spreads on corporate 
bonds. To confirm this, Sironi (2003) reports that only "Sterling" and "US Dollar" 
currency dummy variables are positively statistically significant, but he fails to 
consider an association with the significant "UK country" dummy variable that is also 
included in his sample. The second reason is provided from a table in Sironi (2000) 
that never migrated to the final version in Sironi (2003). All the research presented in 
Sironi (2003) and Pop (2004) includes public banks in their samples. The 
aforementioned table in Sironi (2000) is the only table to report any regression results 
where public European banks were excluded from the sample. In contrast to all other 
findings the "UK country" dummy variable is now insignificant, but the "sterling" 
dummy variable is still significant, as is the "US Dollar" dummy variable. By 
restricting the sample to one country, this thesis provides an opportunity to examine 
this currency hypothesis, as well as examine some of the other features that are 
peculiar to the UK context mentioned above. 
The third and final problem with a pan-European perspective is accommodating the 
influences of fourteen countries into a model of market discipline and the potential 
model specification/variable construction issues that it presents. Similar to the 
discussion in chapter three, these issues can damage the validity of the conclusions 
made. Some of the issues have already been raised in chapter three and so will be 
mentioned very briefly here, whereas some new issues are also raised at this juncture. 
First, accounting definitions can differ significantly across European countries making 
accounting-based models liable to variable measurement problems. Sironi (2003) 
rightly attempts to accommodate this in his sample by interacting accounting 
variables with country dummies. This creates a number of additional explanatory 
variables, which drastically reduces the degrees of freedom in the model, a problem 
that is exacerbated by the fact that Sironi (2003) analyses primary markets spreads 
and so, from the outset, has a very limited number of data points. Pop (2004) does not 
accommodate this pan-European accounting measurement issue at all in his study. If 
he had done so he would have faced the same small sample issue as Sironi (2003) 
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because Pop (2004) used a representative bond sample approach in his research and 
therefore had no more than 71 data points in any one year. The difficulty in ensuring 
comparable European-wide accounting measures may explain the poor evidence of 
market discipline behaviour in these two studies. As Sironi (2003) states: "The results 
confirm the interpretation that accounting measures are country-specific and tend to 
lose part of their explanatory power when used for banks from different countries. " 
By focusing on one country this thesis study can overcome accounting measurement 
variability problems, can enable the model to focus on the power of investors to 
recognise changes in bank risk, and prevent the inclusion of excessive numbers of 
variables in the model and the consequential problems that this may cause. 
The second problem with accommodating 14 countries into a market discipline model 
is the inclusion of "country" dummy variables to capture any country specific 
influences. Both Sironi (2003) and Pop (2004) include such dummy variables in their 
models. This can produce a couple of problems. First, like the previous issue, it 
creates a number of additional explanatory variables that reduces the degrees of 
freedom in the model. Again, this can be a major problem for models that have very 
few data points. The second problem is that Sironi (2003) includes both "country" and 
"currency" dummy variables in his model, which, prior to the introduction of the Euro 
currency, could lead to multicollinearity concerns. It should be noted that 76% of 
Sironi's (2003) data points relate to the pre-Euro currency period. Pop (2004) only 
includes "country" dummy variables. This may overcome potential multicollinearity 
concerns but gives rise to the possibility of omitted variables bias because the 
currency of issue has been shown to be a significant factor in explaining yield 
spreads. Again, the benefit of a country-specific sample is that the model can focus in 
on analysing the risk sensitivity of investors, which is the aim of market discipline 
studies, without having to consider eliminating noise (in this case other country 
influences) from the data. 
Euro currency 
The introduction of the Euro-currency in 1999 represents a significant development 
in 
European and international debt markets. The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2003) reports strong increases in SND issuance by European banks since 
1999, which is in line with evidence from the wider European corporate bond market 
following the introduction of the common currency. This has resulted in a broad and 
deep Euro area corporate debt market that provides an alternative avenue of funding 
for corporations and enhances the macroeconomic information content of bond prices 
[European Central Bank, 2002]. For different reasons, the recognition phase studies 
by Sironi (2003) and Pop (2004) fail to cover this important development and its 
potential market discipline implications. Sironi's study only covers SND issuance up 
until the end of the first quarter of 2000. As a result, only 24% of his study covers the 
post-Euro currency period and clearly not all of these bonds will be issued in the Euro 
currency. Pop (2004) does extend his sample until the end of 2002, but he does not 
include "currency" dummy variables in his study so any impact from the introduction 
of the Euro is impossible to determine. This thesis models recognition phase market 
discipline for all UK credit institution SND issues between 1995 and 2002, and, 
therefore, covers four years of Euro-currency debt issues. An earlier discussion in this 
chapter highlighted the potential importance of currency effects on UK spreads and, 
therefore, unlike Pop (2004), "currency" dummy variables will be included in the 
model. The inclusion of a substantial period of Euro-denominated debt issues enables 
the thesis to investigate issues such as whether the deepening Euro-denominated debt 
market has led to a weakening in the significance of "Sterling" and "US Dollar" 
currency dummy variables. 
In concluding, this section has explained that research on SND issued by UK credit 
institutions can contribute to the recent academic interest in debt holder market 
discipline. Studies of European banks' SND are all European-wide in their scope. 
Therefore, it is argued that the quality of their findings is impaired because they are 
primarily at a general level (country or type of bank level) rather than at the bank 
level. Such studies have to incorporate several additional variables in order to 
eliminate noisy influences before models are able to identify the risk-taking behaviour 
of individual banks, which is the key question market discipline studies are aiming to 
answer in the recognition phase. The discussion indicates some potential problems 
with incorporating numerous additional variables into models. By focusing on one 
country, this thesis can concentrate on analysing SND issuance and risk-sensitivity at 
a bank level; in the end it must be remembered that it is banks that issue SND not 
countries. 
4 At the same time, by focusing on a specific country, this thesis enables 
several external influences to be eliminated without recourse to additional variables. 
Additionally, the UK SND market is large by world standards, therefore providing a 
rich source of data on market discipline behaviour. The significance of the UK SND 
market internationally alongside a country specific approach means that this thesis 
can present valuable contributions to the literature, at both a national and international 
level. This thesis explores a number of regression specifications to assess the 
robustness of the analysis about market discipline. Given characteristics unique to the 
UK, these can be performed in a cleaner regulatory environment compared to the 
European-wide studies, enhancing further the potential policy contributions. 
The substantial size of the UK SND market and its appeal as a country-specific study 
prompted an initial data investigation to determine what data is available on UK bank- 
issued SND and how accessible it is given the constraints of money and time. This 
proved that substantial amounts of primary and secondary market data are available at 
minimal cost so that more than one aspect of current market discipline debates could 
be investigated. Given the available data sources, the following section of this chapter 
will discuss the thesis research questions. By way of background, data collection and 
collation issues are discussed at length in chapter five, the research design. 
Section 2- What are the research questions? 
Background to choice of research questions 
The literature review in chapters two and three indicates that a substantial number of 
studies could be performed to investigate the primary research objective of this study. 
For example, should the study examine recognition phase and/or control phase 
market discipline? Also, what generational type of recognition phase study should be 
carried out? As this section explains, the decisions were primarily driven by a desire 
to contribute to recent debates in the literature as well as provide substantive evidence 
to existing market discipline issues using data from a significant, bank-issued SND 
market. 
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The lack of market discipline studies using UK data means that research at both the 
recognition phase and control phase is open to investigation. Chapter two discusses 
how the techniques for exploring control phase testing are still very much in their 
infancy and it is questionable whether some of those studies are really examining the 
degree of control investors are exerting on credit institutions. Alternatively, chapters 
two and three explain that techniques for examining market discipline at the 
recognition phase are well established. Given the infancy of research on market 
discipline in the UK and, as the recognition phase is the precursor to control phase 
actions, it seems appropriate to concentrate on whether SND prices are sensitive to 
changes in bank condition. Also, the large size and unique structural characteristics of 
the UK bank-issued SND market (for example, a lack of TBTF guarantees) suggests 
that there is potential for indirect market discipline through investor signalling. The 
author considers that the contribution of this research study to the recognition phase 
literature is best advanced by focusing on applying well-established research methods 
to a new but important context. Therefore, the study will create a first generation 
market discipline model approach. Interpretation of the findings can then provide 
additional evidence on the existence, or otherwise, of SND market discipline, which 
at the same time is more likely to be accepted by peers as reliable. Thus, the first 
research question posed is: 
Research Question: Are yield spreads on UK credit institution SND sensitive to 
credit institution risk? 
This research question covers the whole of the recognition phase in the market 
discipline framework. For, if it is shown that SND investors are not sensitive to 
changes in bank risk it could be due to either an incorrectly specified model or that 
one (or more) of the conditions necessary for effective market discipline are not 
present. As a result, it is important that the specified model is theoretically and 
econometrically sound. 
The literature review chapters also highlight that a topical policy suggestion to 
advance bank market discipline is to introduce mandatory SND issuance. There have 
been suggestions that this policy could be introduced worldwide as part of a 
harmonisation of international banking regulation. Clearly, UK banks are one of the 
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major issuers of SND and so it is important to investigate whether a harmonised 
policy would be feasible and whether it would have implications for future bank 
capital funding. Furthermore, it became apparent that some of the data required to 
answer the first research question could be doubled up to analyse this equally 
pertinent issue. It also became apparent that a thesis background chapter describing 
the UK bank-issued SND market could form part of the analysis examining 
mandatory SND issuance in the UK context. Therefore, it was decided that the second 
research question should be focused on MSNDP proposals and their appropriateness 
in the UK context: 
Research Question: Is UK credit institution-issued SND compatible with 
mandatory subordinated debt policy proposals? 
Table 2-1 in chapter two illustrates how MSNDP proposals attempt to enhance both 
recognition phase and control phase market discipline. As a result, there are two 
facets that this research question is investigating. With reference to the market 
discipline framework, in the recognition phase this research question addresses the 
idea of whether the characteristics of UK SND (instrument characteristics) are 
appropriate so as to create right participants for signalling risk perceptions to credit 
institutions (direct and indirect market discipline). The research question also 
examines the transition sphere from the recognition phase to the control phase. This 
is because MSNDP proposals force credit institutions to issue SND regularly, thereby 
enhancing the potential for direct market discipline signalling/action. For example, a 
bank's inability to issue during difficult market conditions could send important 
signals to the regulatory authorities and other interested market participants. 
Therefore, analysing existing SND issuance activity can provide evidence as to what 
causes periods of reduced or increased SND issuance activity and whether a 
mandatory issuance policy could enhance such signals. 
The two thesis research questions complement each other. The second research 
question focuses primarily on the issuance and characteristics of SND and whether 
mandatory issuance would enable investors to signal discipline via that route. Given 
the existing characteristics of UK bank-issued SND, the other research question 
focuses on the secondary SND market and whether market participants signal to credit 
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institutions changes in their risk profile through a price-effect. Therefore, the future 
direction of any potential market discipline policy can be explored from the two key 
directions available to investors and other market participants - direct and indirect 
market discipline. The conclusion to the thesis (chapter eight) combines the findings 
from the two research questions to examine wider market discipline implications. The 
key facet that neither research question explores is whether credit institutions respond 
to investor signalling/action, i. e. the control phase. Despite this, the study does 
attempt to meet its primary research objective of furthering understanding of market 
discipline by SND investors, in this case utilising UK bank data. 
Section 3- What are the research hypotheses? 
The previous section identified two overarching research questions. This section will 
detail the different research hypotheses attached to each research question. The 
section explains how the research hypotheses are appropriate in answering the 
research questions and argues that the measurement scale of the data enables these 
questions to be analysed with the aid of descriptive and inferential statistics. Issues 
raised in the literature review chapters will assist in explaining the approaches, the 
model specifications and the variable constituents used to answer the research 
questions. 
Research Question: Is UK credit institution-issued SND compatible with 
mandatory subordinated debt policy proposals? 
The thesis will investigate the MSNDP research question first. This is because, as part 
of the analysis, it is necessary to describe the UK credit institution-issued SND market 
and it appears most appropriate to place this background description of the SND 
market at the beginning of the analytical chapters. 
As discussed above, this research question has two facets to it - SND issuance activity 
and the characteristics of the SND issued. The literature (see page 57 in chapter three) 
provides two approaches to examining credit institution SND issuance activity. 
Covitz, Hancock and Kwast (2004) estimate a probit "issuance model" for the SND 
issuance decision by US banks. They are able to infer that issuance decisions are 
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sensitive to firm-specific risks and market conditions. An alternative approach is 
provided by Sironi (2001). He analyses European banks' SND issues using 
descriptive statistics in order to consider the design of a MSNDP. 
Of the two approaches, it would be preferable to examine issuance activity using a 
probit model, because it would enable the strength of causes of reduced issuance 
activity to be examined. Unfortunately, it became apparent that constructing a probit 
"issuance model" in the UK context is difficult for two reasons. First, all previous 
studies applying this technique have been able to use accounting and SND issuance 
data of quarterly frequency. In the UK, although quarterly issuance data is available, 
accounting data can only be obtained on an annual basis, thereby severely restricting 
the potential sample size. Further, combining a probit technique with annual data 
means that there would be insufficient examples of when a UK credit institution has 
not issued SND during a year. As a result, a probit model would struggle to identify 
causes of reduced issuance activity. The second issue is that the UK does not have 
enough credit institutions to create sufficient data points in the model, which could 
have been a way to overcome the annual data problem. Linked to this, it would be 
important to include the recessionary period 1989 to 1992 in a UK issuance decision 
model as this is the only recent time period which could provide some yearly data 
where individual banks have not issued SND. However, building societies have only 
been able to issue both perpetual and term SND, like banks, since mid-1991 and so it 
would be inappropriate to include building societies prior to this date as it was not a 
level playing field. Ignoring building societies for the 1989 to 1991 time period would 
simply compound an already problematic sample size issue. 
Therefore, this study is in the spirit of the one conducted by Sironi (2001) in that it 
analyses SND issuance activity using descriptive statistics. However, this thesis study 
differs from Sironi (2001) in four distinct ways. First, to answer the research question, 
the SND data is compared with the desirable MSNDP characteristics proposed in the 
literature (see chapter two). Second, this study focuses on one country and, therefore, 
explores SND issuance and its characteristics at the bank-level. It must ultimately be 
remembered that it is banks that would have to issue mandatory SND, not countries, 
and that a MSNDP may not be appropriate for all credit institutions within a country. 
As a result, it raises concerns that credit institution SND issuance is not as similar 
in 
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different countries as the existing literature suggests. Third, this thesis study analyses 
the whole population of SND issuance data in the UK and therefore provides 
conclusive evidence of issuance activity and SND characteristics. 
5 As chapter six 
discusses, Sironi (2001) only had access to a database which does not represent the 
entire SND issuance population, and is therefore liable to sample bias. Despite having 
the whole population to analyse, the downside of using descriptive statistical methods 
is that causational strengths cannot be measured. The fourth way in which this study 
differs from Sironi (2001) is that there is some attempt to calculate inferential 
statistics; in this case, measures of association for potential indicators of issuance 
activity. Although, measures of association do not imply causation they do indicate 
the strength of relationships between variables. The study analyses UK credit 
institutions' SND issuance activity and characteristics between 1985 and 2002. This 
period was selected in order to obtain a wide time span of data. Therefore, it covers 
the introduction of the Basel Accord (at the end of 1989 in the UK), a period of 
particular difficulty for UK credit institutions in the aftermath of the Latin American 
debt crisis and the domestic recession of the early 1990s, and the introduction of the 
Euro currency in 1999. 
The predominantly descriptive nature of the data analysis and the fact that the author 
has access to the population of SND issuance by UK credit institutions means that 
answering the overarching research question is most appropriately tackled through a 
set of sub-questions linked to the general characteristics proposed for MSNDP. These 
are: 
" What would be the scope, if at all, of a MSNDP in the UK? 
" How often should banks be required to issue SND? 
" How much SND should banks be required to issue? 
" What form should the SND take? 
" Do these findings have implications for a potential MSNDP? 
There are two hypotheses that can be formulated to examine issues related to the 
overarching research question. These enable SND issuance and its characteristics to 
be explored in relation to market and economic events that are either specific to the 
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UK or otherwise affect international banks. The findings can be compared to results 
from other studies and may provide further factors that could influence the design of a 
MSNDP. The hypotheses are: 
Hypothesis 6-1: UK credit institution SND issuance activity is not associated with 
market conditions. 
" Hypothesis 6-2: UK credit institution SND issuance activity is not associated with 
economic conditions. 
Research Question: Are yield spreads on UK credit institution SND 
sensitive to credit institution risk? 
As previously explained, this research question will be tackled using a first generation 
recognition phase approach. Therefore, a single dependent variable (yield spreads) is 
analysed in relation to numerous independent variables. Hair et al. (2006) present a 
classification of multivariate techniques to assist the researcher in deciding on the 
most appropriate analytical technique. Given that there is a single dependent variable, 
whose measurement scale is metric, multiple regression analysis is identified as the 
analytical tool. Chapter three illustrates that this is in line with previous recognition 
phase empirical studies. 
Linking to issues that arose in the literature review of previous empirical studies 
(chapter three), the regression analysis will include the following characteristics in 
order to produce a robust specification. Firstly, both panel data regressions and annual 
cross-sectional regressions will be performed so that any potential structural shifts can 
be captured and accommodated. This will enable a cleaner analysis of the key 
relationship - are yield spreads sensitive to bank specific risk? Secondly, the study 
will focus on secondary market data only (and therefore indirect market discipline) 
because there would be insufficient data points for cross-section regressions if only 
primary market data was used. Thirdly, the functional form of the model will be 
linear. As chapter three explains, there is no compelling theory why a linear model is 
most appropriate, but it is the overwhelming functional form used in such studies. 
Nonlinear explanatory variables will be incorporated into the model through dummy 
variables that group credit ratings and bond maturities. Fourthly, the model will only 
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test credit spread levels as the dependent variable, because the author considers 
models of credit spread changes to be very much in their infancy. Therefore, as for 
the functional form characteristic, the author considers that it important to adopt an 
approach that is consistent with the majority of existing studies in order to produce 
research findings that can be argued as credible. Fifthly, the model will use data with 
an annual frequency and will test both the strong form (no lagging) and semi-strong 
form (lag the independent variables by one month). The time period for this aspect of 
the study is less than the other research question, in this case 1995 to 2002. This is 
due to sample size and data availability issues (for example, Financial Strength 
Ratings were first introduced in the UK in August 1995). Finally, the model will 
control for several bond-specific characteristics in a manner that should produce more 
robust model specifications. For example, the liquidity risk of individual SND issues 
will be calculated in such a way as to prevent multicollinearity with other bank 
variables, and callable bonds will be accommodated through a dummy variable rather 
than calculating option-adjusted spreads. In addition, a country-specific context 
enables several variables to be dropped in comparison to pan-European studies, thus 
increasing the degrees of freedom. The general form of the model will be as follows: 
SPREAD; t =f (RISK; t, CONTROL; t) + cit (1) 
SPREAD; t is the yield to maturity credit spread over the risk-free rate for credit 
institution i at time t. 
RISK; t reflects the default risk measures of credit institution i at time t. These can be 
measured using credit agency ratings and/or accounting-based measures and are the 
variables of interest from a market discipline perspective; in other words do RISK 
variables have a significant influence on yield spreads? 
CONTROL reflects control variables to accommodate for other factors influencing 
yield spreads. Chapter three discusses these variables and their significance in market 
discipline studies. 
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CONTROL consists of the following variables: 
CONTROL; t =f (MATURITYit, LIQUIDITY; t, SIZE; t, CIM;, CALLABLE;, 
YEAR) 
MATURITY; t proxies for the maturity of issue i at time period t. 
LIQUIDITYit is a proxy for the liquidity risk attached to security i at time t. 
SIZE; t accommodates the size of the credit institution i at time t. 
CURR; is currency of denomination of issue i. 
CALLABLE; is a proxy for whether issue i is callable or not. 
YEARt is a year dummy variable to capture year specific effects on spreads. 
In order to extensively examine market discipline behaviour, three alternative 
specifications of the equation (1) are employed, each using different RISK measures. 
The first is based on Moodys' and Standard & Poors' (S&P) issue ratings. The second 
specification is based on Moodys' bank Financial Strength ratings. Two credit 
agency ratings specifications are employed because issue ratings can be argued as 
most accurately representing the riskiness of a bond issue. From a market discipline 
perspective, Financial Strength ratings are also appealing because they are supposed 
to represent the standalone default risk of a bank. The third specification is based on 
accounting measures of bank risk (ACCRISK). The inclusion of an accounting-based 
specification is appealing because it can provide comparatives with the ratings-based 
specifications. The variable categories used in the accounting-based specification 
closely resemble those used in earlier studies (see table 3-3b in chapter three) and 
those that are recognised in credit analysis literature (Moody's 1998 and 1999; Howe, 
2001; and Grier, 2001) and are based on the following simplified representation: 
ACCRISK =f (CAPITAL, ASSET QUALITY, PROFITABILITY, 
LEVERAGE, LIQUID) 
The specific variable measures used will be explained in more detail in the relevant 
analytical chapter, chapter seven. Given the RISK variable specifications outlined 
above, the market discipline null hypotheses tested are: 
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" Hypothesis 7-1: UK credit institution SND spreads are insensitive to credit rating 
agencies' measures of bank risk 
This is tested for both issue ratings and financial strength ratings. The following joint 
null hypothesis is also tested for both types of credit agency ratings. 
" Hypothesis 7-2: Credit rating agencies' measures of bank risks are jointly 
insignificant in explaining UK credit institution SND spreads. 
Moving on to accounting measures of bank risk: 
" Hypothesis 7-3: UK credit institution SND spreads are insensitive to accounting 
measures of bank risk. 
This hypothesis is tested for each of the five accounting variable categories, 
CAPITAL, ASSET QUALITY, PROFITABILITY, LEVERAGE, and LIQUID. 
Furthermore, the following joint hypothesis is also tested: 
" Hypothesis 7-4: Accounting measures of bank risks are jointly insignificant in 
explaining UK credit institution SND spreads. 
All of the hypotheses stated above are tested using a panel data model covering the 
whole sample time period (1995-2002) and annual cross-section models for each year 
between 1995 and 2002 to indicate any structural shifts. Furthermore, the thesis study 
splits the data into sub-groups of years to investigate if yield spread sensitivity to 
measures of bank risk has altered over time. 
As discussed in section one of this chapter, previous market discipline studies of 
European banks have reported findings concerning UK credit institutions that have 
not been adequately reconciled. The author believes that the unusual findings may be 
due to UK credit institutions predominantly issuing SND in currencies which have 
very liquid government bond markets; i. e. Sterling and US Dollars. Therefore, 
although CURR is a control variable in the model, the following null hypotheses are 
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also tested: 
" Hypothesis 7-5: UK credit institution SND spreads are insensitive to whether or 
not the currency of denomination is sterling. 
" Hypothesis 7-6: UK credit institution SND spreads are insensitive to whether or 
not the currency of denomination is US dollars. 
These hypotheses will be investigated at the same time as hypotheses 7-1 to 7-4. Of 
particular interest is whether the introduction of the Euro currency in 1999 has an 
impact on the sensitivity of SND spreads to the currency of denomination. 
The final two hypotheses examine the two sub phases of the recognition phase of the 
market discipline framework and, therefore, whether these sub phase conditions are 
preventing effective market discipline. First, to test if investors do not consider 
themselves at risk in the event of default at larger banks compared to smaller banks 
(in other words, are spreads affected by bank size) the whole data sample is split into 
two sub-samples based on bank size criteria. The hypotheses 7-3 and 7-4 can then be 
tested on both samples and the results examined to see if they differ between the two 
sub-samples. Therefore, the null hypothesis for the bank size test is: 
" Hypothesis 7-7: UK credit institution SND spreads are insensitive to bank size. 
The second sub phase of the recognition phase is whether investors can effectively 
observe credit institution default risk. Again, this can also be operationalised by 
splitting the whole data set into two sub-samples. The criterion for splitting the data 
are the opacity of bank information, which is based on whether the SND issue has 
split ratings or not. Again, hypotheses 7-3 and 7-4 can then be tested on both samples 
and the results examined to see if they differ between the two sub-samples. Therefore, 
the null hypothesis is: 
" Hypothesis 7-8: UK credit institution SND spreads are insensitive to the 
transparency of bank condition information. 
116 
Section 4- Conclusions 
This chapter explains the objectives of this thesis study and where these objectives are 
positioned in the market discipline literature. As a result, the contribution of this 
thesis to the research discipline is explained. The research focuses on the topical issue 
of SND market discipline and includes MSNDP within its coverage. The UK credit 
institution SND market provides the context for the study. The chapter explains the 
importance of furthering market discipline research outside the US context and how 
the large UK SND market supplies a potentially rich source of data on market 
discipline behaviour. Therefore, research findings have both domestic and 
international policy potential. Additionally, a specific-country focus creates a number 
of benefits over existing European banks' SND research, thus enhancing the 
secondary objective of the study-producing a robust specification to model market 
discipline behaviour. 
The chapter presents two overarching research questions and explains where they sit 
within the market discipline theoretical framework. One research question focuses on 
the signalling behaviour of SND investors in the secondary market (indirect 
discipline). The other research question concentrates on UK credit institutions' SND 
issuance activity and characteristics and compares them to MSNDP proposals in order 
to assess the appropriateness, or otherwise, of a MSNDP in the UK. The chapter 
explains the research hypotheses attached to these research questions and outlines the 
methodological approaches that will be used to answer the research questions posed. 
The detailed models, the hypothesis test results and the implications for the thesis 
research questions will be discussed in the analytical chapters, six and seven. 
However, before reporting the research findings, having now presented the proposed 
research objectives, research questions and research hypotheses, the next chapter will 
discuss how the selected research design is compatible with the objectives of this 
thesis. 
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' The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003) report that 6 of the world's largest 33 issuers of 
bank SND between 1990 and 2001 were UK banks. 
2 If one analyses the three largest issuers of SND in Europe by country, both Germany and France 
include some public banks in their sample. The UK does not. 
3 This is the working paper that preceded the paper Sironi (2003). 
4 For example, MSNDP proposals place conditions on individual banks. Also, recognition phase tests 
primarily investigate if investors can respond to increases in bank-specific risk. 
5 As a result, descriptive statistics can provide some evidence that is on a par with that provided by 
Covitz, Hancock and Kwast (2004), who used inferential statistics. For example, they report that larger 
banking organisations are more likely to issue SND. Chapter six of this thesis conclusively reports 
similar findings. 
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Chapter 5- The research design 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the research process adopted in the thesis and in so doing 
discusses different issues relating to alternative approaches to research. The chapter 
focuses on the research philosophy and methodology, the empirical data collection 
approach and the methods of analysis. The research design process has a significant 
impact on the validity and reliability of research findings and, accordingly, the extent 
to which the research objectives have been appropriately answered. It should be 
apparent that the thesis research design was formulated in the light of the research 
objectives, the research hypotheses, the nature of the data, and previous studies in this 
area. Therefore, the credibility of the research findings in the thesis is enhanced. 
The layout of the chapter is as follows. Section one presents issues one must consider 
when choosing an appropriate research strategy or design. This section explains why 
the thesis research design is underpinned by a positivist philosophy and the research 
methodology is firmly of an experimental nature. Section two concentrates on the data 
collection methods utilised. A contribution of this paper to the research on market 
discipline is the use of multiple data sources in creating a comprehensive database on 
SND issuance and their characteristics. This section explains the benefits of adopting 
such a detailed approach. Section three discusses the data analysis methods used in 
the thesis and how they complement the higher order issues of research design 
discussed in the previous sections to formulate a robust research strategy. Section four 
concludes on the thesis research design and how it provides a valid and reliable 
approach in answering the thesis research questions. 
Section 1- The thesis research design process 
This section introduces the concept of a research design or strategy. The layers of 
research design are discussed, with a particular focus on the higher-level elements, 
namely, the epistemology and theoretical perspective underpinning the thesis research 
design and the research approach and methodology that shapes the choice of methods. 
This section explains how an objectivist perspective, and therefore, positivist research 
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philosophy drive research on market discipline. Research methodologies that 
complement this theoretical perspective are introduced. Again, the regularity of these 
methodologies is apparent in market discipline research. 
What is research design? 
Kerlinger (1986) describes research design as: "The plan and structure of 
investigation so conceived as to obtain answers to the research questions. " An 
appropriate research design, therefore, ensures that the study is relevant to the 
research objectives and questions. Research design guides the selection of sources and 
types of information and so requires the specification of procedures. These procedures 
include decisions on identifying an appropriate methodology to resolve the problem, 
the method of collecting appropriate data, the determination of what is to be measured 
and how it will be measured, and the method of analysing the data. 
The different stages of the research design process 
Figure 5-1 is adapted from Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2000) and is a diagram of 
the research design process. It presents the different layers of research design enquiry 
suggested by Kerlinger (1986). The process commences with the question of 
epistemology, which deals with the nature of knowledge, the nature of truth. Attached 
to one's epistemological stance is the way in which you perceive knowledge to be 
developed (the theoretical perspective). A researcher's epistemological beliefs and 
theoretical perspective should inform the methodologies most appropriate to tackle 
the research objectives and questions. Then, dependent upon the time horizon of the 
study, data collection and analysis methods should be adopted that most appropriately 
align with the research methodologies. Figure 5-1 illustrates how the thesis is 
embedded in objectivism, positivism and the quantitative methodologies and methods 
most commonly associated with this theory of knowledge. The remainder of this 
section explains why, in the field of market discipline, this deductive research process 
is deemed most appropriate in deriving credible and reliable research findings. 
Epistemology, theoretical perspective and research approach 
Maynard (1994) explains the relevance of epistemology in the research process as: 
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"(being) concerned with providing a philosophical grounding for deciding what kinds 
of knowledge are possible and how we can ensure that they are both adequate and 
legitimate". Therefore, epistemology raises the following types of questions: "What 
characteristics do we believe knowledge to have? "; and "Why should the readers of 
our research regard the outcomes we present as constituting knowledge? " Hence there 
is a need to identify, explain and justify the epistemological stance adopted in the 
research process. [Crotty, 1998]. 
There are a range of epistemologies, but two dominate the literature; Objectivism and 
Constructionism. Objectivist epistemology holds that meaning exists as such apart 
from the operation of any consciousness [Crotty, 1998]. Reality is assumed to be 
unproblematically existing "out there" and independent of the perceptions, beliefs and 
biases of the researcher [Chia, 2002] and so if the researcher goes about the study in 
the right way the objective truth is waiting for us to discover it. Constructionism, on 
the other hand, rejects this view of knowledge and argues that meaning is not 
discovered, but constructed [Crotty, 1998]. The crucial distinction to objectivism is 
that different people may construct meaning from the same phenomenon in different 
ways. 
A positivist theoretical perspective neatly aligns with an objectivist epistemology. 
Positivists prefer "working with an observable social reality and that the end product 
of such research can be law-like generalisations similar to those produced by the 
physical and natural scientists" [Remenyi et al., 1998]. As a result, "Positivism 
assumes that the researcher is a sort of spectator of the object of enquiry" [Chia, 2002] 
"that neither affects or is affected by the subject of the research" [Remenyi et al, 
1998] and who "coolly makes detached interpretations about data that have been 
collected in an apparently value-free manner" [Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2000]. 
In contrast, critics of positivism argue that the world is more complex than reducing 
knowledge to a series of law-like generalisations. 
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As the nature of objectivism and positivism is that there exists an objective truth, Gill 
and Johnson (1997) explain that this leads to an emphasis on highly structured 
research methodologies to facilitate replication and, therefore, provide credibility to 
knowledge. This leads on neatly to the next aspect in research design, the approach 
used to answer the research questions. 
Two alternative research approaches exist, deduction and induction, and they differ in 
how clear the researcher is about theory at the beginning of the research study. A 
deductive research approach is where the researcher first develops theory and 
hypotheses and then designs a research strategy to collect and analyse data so as to 
test the hypotheses. In contrast, an inductive approach would involve collecting and 
analysing data so as to build theory. 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2000) characterise the key facets of a deductive 
approach as being: 
"a need to explain causal relationships between variables; 
" applying controls to ensure validity of data and allow the testing of hypotheses; 
" operationalising concepts to ensure clarity of definition and enable facts to be 
measured quantitatively; 
" selecting samples of sufficient size in order to generalise conclusions; 
" ensuring the researcher is independent of what is being researched. 
Further, Robson (1993) lists the sequential stages through which deductive research 
will progress: deducing hypotheses from theory; expressing hypotheses in operational 
terms; testing the operational hypotheses; and examining the outcomes to either 
confirm the theory or indicate the need for modifications. The use of highly structured 
research methodologies is a characteristic of deductive research approaches to ensure 
replicability. 
The preceding analysis suggests that a deductive research approach is closely aligned 
with a positivist theoretical perspective, where objective truths can be determined 
using measurable concepts that are tested using structured methodologies. In contrast, 
an inductive approach is argued as having a closer understanding with the research 
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context under investigation and so has less concern with a need to generalise its 
findings. Traditionally, this has resulted in researchers utilising data of a more 
qualitative nature and adopting a variety of data collection methods in order to 
establish different views of phenomena (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 1991). 
Consequently, an inductive approach is commonly associated with the Constructionist 
epistemology. 
Chapter three of this thesis analysed the prior research conducted on market discipline 
and with reference to this chapter it is clear that this research discipline is firmly 
entrenched in the deductive approach. Hypotheses that are said to represent the 
concept of market discipline are created. These are formulated, with the aid of 
quantitative data, so as to enable relationships to be tested using established analytical 
methods. The adoption of a structured approach and established methodologies is 
argued as enhancing the validity of the findings. Also, in prior studies, researchers 
have consistently applied the characteristics of independence and the search for law- 
like generalised truths concerning market discipline. Therefore, it is clear that a 
positivist theoretical perspective underpins market discipline research. 
Types of research methodology 
Having established the research approach, the following layer in the research design 
process is the research methodology adopted to establish and answer the objectives 
and research questions respectively of the study. These should be consistent with the 
theoretical perspective underpinning the research discipline and drive the methods of 
data collection and analysis. The key aspect in deciding which methodology to adopt 
is that it should be appropriate for the objectives of the study and the research 
questions posed (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2000). With reference to Chapter 
four, this sub-section will provide a rationale for the experimental methodology 
adopted in this study. Further, the coherence of such a methodology to the methods of 
data collection and analysis adopted in this study is outlined. 
The key types of research methodology available are: 
" experiment; 
" survey; 
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case study; 
grounded theory; 
ethnography; 
" action research. 
Gill and Johnson (1991) construct a continuum of research methodologies that allow 
the researcher to discriminate between the different methodologies based on certain 
characteristics. As they explain: "We can discriminate between different methods in 
terms of their relative emphasis upon deduction or induction, their degree of structure, 
the kinds of data they generate and the forms of explanation they create. " Figure 5-2 
below reproduces the continuum with the case study and grounded theory 
methodologies added by the author. Looking at the diagram, it is clear that the 
extremities of the continuum align with the characteristics of deductive and inductive 
research approaches discussed earlier in this section. 
Figure 5-2: Research methodology continuum 
Deductive, highly structured, use of Inductive, minimum structure, use 
quantitative data and explanation of of qualitative data and explanation 
causal relationships of subjective meaning systems 
Laboratory Quasi Surveys Case Action Grounded Ethnography 
Experiments Experiments Study Research Theory 
This chapter has already argued how research on market discipline is firmly 
entrenched in the positivist theoretical perspective and hypothetico-deductive research 
approach. Chapter four indicates that this thesis follows a similar line to prior market 
discipline research. The objectives and research questions of the study are defined 
through hypotheses that are capable of being tested to analyse causal relationships. As 
a result, the following discussion on methodologies will focus on those towards the 
left-hand side of the spectrum. Surveys and experiments are probably the main 
vehicles associated with the deductive approach. 
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Case Study 
A case study is the other methodology that may be appropriate in this thesis; however 
it can quickly be dispelled for the following reason. Morris and Wood (1991) explain 
that a Case Study approach would be of particular interest if you wish to gain a rich 
understanding of the context of the research and the processes being enacted. In the 
case of market discipline in the UK, a case study approach would not only investigate 
the hypotheses described in chapter four, but also extend the analysis to explore the 
interaction between participants in the market for SND. The use of various data 
collection methods is typical of case study research and so questionnaires and 
interviews would add to the data already obtained for econometric testing, to 
investigate the operations of issuance and secondary market trading of bank-issued 
SND. The findings of this aspect of the study could then be examined to see if they 
provide explanations gleaned from the econometric aspect of the study or even enrich 
knowledge of market discipline theory through a more thorough understanding of 
market participant actions. As far as the author is aware, there is neither existing 
research on market discipline in the UK SND market nor any research on the 
operations of participants in this market, therefore, a case study approach would entail 
a mammoth thesis undertaking. However, as explained in the conclusion to the thesis, 
chapter eight, a detailed understanding of the market for SND, does present a valuable 
future research opportunity. 
Surveys and Experiments 
Moving on to discuss Surveys and Experiments as potential methodological 
approaches, surveys can present a very effective means of obtaining primary data that 
can subsequently be used to test theories/hypotheses (analytical survey) or to describe 
the characteristics of a population (descriptive survey). Surveys are typically carried 
out using questionnaires, although other data collection methods that may belong to 
the survey methodology include structured observation and structured interviews. 
However, this study will not utilise a survey approach because the nature of the data 
required is not primary data, but secondary data. Information pertaining to financial 
markets and the financial performance and position of credit institutions are required 
for this study and such data can be obtained fairly easily from secondary sources. 
Further, a survey approach is often carried out to access a representative sample of the 
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population being studied. This thesis, on the other hand, covers the entire population 
of SND issued by UK credit institutions between 1985 and 2002. The collection of 
data for this study will be discussed in greater detail in section two of this chapter. 
Experimental designs can take two forms, Laboratory experiments and Quasi- 
experiments. In both forms, the primary aim is to analyse causal relationships between 
variables and so test hypotheses. However, they differ primarily due to the ability of 
the researcher to control the experimental conditions. In a pure experiment, the 
researcher will be able to allocate subjects to control and experimental groups and 
then manipulate the incidence of independent variables and restrict the impact of 
extraneous variables (Gill and Johnson, 1991). Naturally, such characteristics are 
usually only possible under laboratory conditions. Quasi-experiments attempt to 
utilise the logic of structured methodologies from pure experiments, but apply them to 
the actual environment under investigation without the researcher's direct 
intervention; for example, where manipulation of independent variables is not 
practically feasible. Ryan, Scapens and Theobald, (1992) explain that many research 
designs employed in empirical financial research are of a quasi-experimental nature 
and they specifically include regression techniques, such as those employed in this 
study, as one such example. 
Gill and Johnson (1991) explain that a problem with quasi-experiments is that: "the 
researcher is gaining ... validity as subjects are 
investigated in their ... everyday 
environments. However, this strength is acquired only at the expense of trading off 
control over certain extraneous variables -a reduction in aspects of the internal 
validity of findings. " Bryman (1988) explains that the main aim of experimental 
designs is to maximise "internal validity", namely the extent to which the presumed 
cause really does have an impact on the presumed effect. Therefore, a key aspect of 
studies that employ experimental techniques is to apply robustness checks to the data 
in order to enhance the internal validity of the findings. This study applies robustness 
checks to the econometric models tested in chapter seven. Further details on the 
data 
analysis techniques adopted in this study are discussed in section three of this chapter. 
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Exploratory, descriptive or explanatory studies? 
A further manner in which the research methodology of a study can be classified is 
whether it is an exploratory, descriptive or explanatory study. Again, the value of such 
a classification is that it can assist in driving the types of data and methods necessary 
to meet the purpose of the study. As the following paragraphs explain, this study is 
tackling research questions that are most appropriately classified as descriptive and 
explanatory in their purpose. 
Exploratory studies are an investigation where the final research problem has not been 
clearly fixed. The primary aim is to provide insights needed by the researcher to 
develop a more formal research design and as a result exploratory studies tend to have 
loose research structures. 
Blumberg, Cooper and Schindler (2005) define a descriptive study as: "The researcher 
attempts to describe a subject often by creating a profile of a group of problems, 
people or events. " One aim of this thesis is to study SND issuance by UK credit 
institutions in order to answer the research question, "Is UK credit institution-issued 
SND compatible with MSNDP proposals? " This objective appears to fall under the 
category of a descriptive study as the UK SND market characteristics will be 
described and subsequently compared to those suggested by academics as necessary 
for a MSNDP. Blumberg, Cooper and Schindler go on to say. "A major deficiency of 
descriptive studies based on existing data sources, however, is that they cannot 
explain why an event has occurred or why the variables interact in the way they do. " 
This study does attempt to attain a higher ground by theorising why the patterns of 
issuance are as they are, hence becoming an explanatory study, what Blumberg, 
Cooper and Schindler describe as "(a study that) goes beyond description and 
attempts to explain the reasons for the phenomenon that the descriptive study has only 
observed. " Descriptive studies are most appropriately analysed using descriptive 
statistics in order to answer questions of the type, "Who? ", "What? ", "Where? ", 
"When? ", or "How much? " Chapter six of the thesis utilises such statistical methods 
to investigate patterns of SND issuance by UK credit institutions as well as some 
comparative statistics to suggest reasons for SND issuance patterns. 
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Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2000) define an explanatory study as one "which 
establishes causal relationships between variables ... the emphasis here is on studying 
a situation or a problem in order to explain the relationship between variables. " This 
thesis also investigates the research question, "Are yield spreads on UK credit 
institution SND sensitive to credit institution risk? " As chapter three explains, such a 
question in the market discipline arena is overwhelmingly tackled using inferential 
statistical methods such as multivariate regression. Therefore, hypotheses can be 
postulated and these relationships can be tested using appropriate econometric 
models. Chapter four of the thesis presents the hypotheses under investigation and the 
econometric models that aim to test the hypotheses. The model testing and the 
findings are discussed in greater detail in chapter seven. 
Time Horizon: Cross Sectional and Longitudinal Studies 
A further layer in the planning of a successful research design is to ask if the study 
covers a snapshot in time (cross-sectional study) or is repeated over an extended 
period (longitudinal study). This will have implications for the type of data required 
and the method through which it may be collected. The thesis aims to investigate 
market discipline characteristics over the period 1985 to 2002. Therefore, research 
methodologies such as surveys are inappropriate as they create primary data at the 
date of the survey. Published (secondary) data provides an appropriate form in which 
to obtain data over an extended period and this is the nature of the data collected in 
this study. This is explored in greater detail in section two below. 
Data collection and data analysis methods 
The final layers in the research design process are data collection and analysis 
methods. As Chia (2002) states: "For positivists, good research consists of the 
undistorted recording of observations obtained through efficiency-driven methods of 
investigation and the use of precise terminologies and classifications in the 
documentary processes. Observational rigour on the part of the researcher using 
systems of cross-referencing provides the necessary form of quality assurance 
in this 
process of knowledge production. It thus follows that good researchers must 
diligently 
rid themselves of all subjective tendencies by adopting a dispassionate attitude 
in the 
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enquiry process and by using well-established data-recording methods in a rigorous 
manner in order to ensure the reliability and validity of the data collected. 
Explanations regarding the observed pattern of regularities connecting one set of 
phenomena with another can then be systematically developed and empirically 
verified. " 
Gill and Johnson (1991) explain that these observations are most likely to be 
quantifiable in nature and so lend themselves to statistical analysis methods, in other 
words having the characteristics of deductive research; testing theory through an 
experiment or other form of empirical inquiry. 
The following two sections discuss in greater detail the data collection and data 
analysis methods adopted in this study. The characteristics of positivist/deductive 
research discussed above are readily apparent, such as rigorous data collection to 
enhance the reliability and completeness of data, and the use of highly structured 
research methods, i. e. econometric data analysis, to facilitate replication and to enable 
hypothesis testing. 
Section 2- Data collection and collation 
This section analyses in detail the approaches that have been undertaken to collect, 
collate and form the data. The chapter illustrates that a key intention was to formulate 
a comprehensive record of SND issuance by UK credit institutions over the sample 
period, 1985-2002. Prior studies (Sironi, 2001,2003) have relied on a single source to 
record bond issues, usually the Bondware database of debt issuance. This thesis shows 
that the Bondware database is biased in its reporting of issues and contains 
irregularities which could skew the final outcomes (see chapter six). Through data 
triangulation techniques the Bondware database is compared with individual SND 
information from Datastream, the International Capital Market Association (ICMA), 
credit ratings agencies and credit institutions' Annual Reports and Accounts. This 
results in the compilation of an extensive record of SND issuance and their 
characteristics by UK credit institutions, known in this study as the "master 
database". 
This is then used to analyse issuance activity over the sample period and provide 
evidence of the extent to which UK credit institutions issue SND which 
is compatible 
with the desired characteristics for a MSNDP. Further, by combining the master 
database with other sources of information on credit institutions (credit ratings and 
financial statement ratios) and individual SND prices, an econometric model can be 
formulated to test the sensitivity of bond yields to changes in bank risk. 
Types of research data 
Research data can be distinguished according to its source as either primary or 
secondary data, and this will have implications for the data collection methods 
utilised. Primary data is data collected for the needs of a particular research project 
(Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch, 1997). In contrast, secondary data is data that 
already exists and which may be of use in carrying out your research. Primary data is 
most appropriately collected through interviews, questionnaires, observational 
methods and experiments. Secondary data can be obtained through a variety of 
channels, including documentary evidence (such as reports), ongoing surveys and 
censuses or a mixture of the two (multiple source secondary data). The latter includes 
databases, such as Datastream and Bankscope, where documentary evidence on 
companies is compiled from numerous secondary sources to form a further secondary 
data source. 
As discussed in section one above, primary data is most appropriate for cross- 
sectional studies as time constraints on the researcher make it difficult to collect 
primary data over a prolonged time period. An advantage of secondary data is that 
longitudinal studies can be carried out if appropriate data has been collected from 
existing sources. The thesis aims to investigate market discipline characteristics over 
the period 1985 to 2002 and so secondary data has to be considered as the key source. 
However, as secondary data may not be collected for your specific research problem, 
Blumberg, Cooper and Schindler (2005) recommend that the usefulness of your 
secondary data sources must first be addressed through successfully answering "yes" 
to the following three questions: 
1" Is the information provided in the secondary data sufficient to answer your 
research problem? 
2. Does the secondary data address the same population you want to investigate'? 
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3. Was the secondary data collected in the relevant time period? 
The remainder of this section focuses on the secondary data sources required to 
answer the research questions posited by this study. This section discusses how 
secondary data sources are appropriate to answer the thesis research problem. 
However, in order to successfully answer questions one and two above, the section 
discusses how a number of sources have had to be utilised, and data triangulation 
techniques adopted, in order to ensure that a true representation of the credit 
institution population has been covered. Further, data limitations have meant that the 
time period for answering the first key research question of this study differs from the 
time period attached to the second key research question. 
At this stage, it is appropriate to assist the reader in understanding the role of the 
secondary data sources to the overall thesis design by presenting figure 5-3. This 
diagram provides an overview of the linkages between the research questions posed 
by the study (as discussed in chapter four), the secondary data sources used (discussed 
below) and the data analysis techniques adopted (discussed in the subsequent section) 
to answer the research questions. As a result, figure 5-3 will be referred to on several 
occasions during the remainder of this chapter. 
SND issuance and their characteristics data - the creation of a `master 
database' 
Bondware 
The starting point for data collection was the Bondware database. This database has 
been used extensively by other academics researching market discipline as it provides 
primary market details on bonds issued by financial and non-financial institutions (see 
Sironi, 2001 and 2003, and Pop, 2004). Therefore, it acts as a good foundation source 
for both sets of research questions in this study. Figure 5-3 shows how the master 
database (which is based on the Bondware database) is of use in both empirical 
aspects of the thesis. A tailored request to the database provider enabled selected 
characteristics fields to be collected for SND issues by UK credit institutions 
between 
1985 and 2002.1 This time period was selected in order to cover the introduction of 
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the Basel Accord (at the end of 1989 in the UK) and also to capture a period of 
particular difficulty for UK credit institutions in the aftermath of the Latin American 
debt crisis and the domestic recession of the early 1990s. 
The data was cleaned by removing all non-UK institutions' issues and ensuring that 
any debt issued by non-UK institutions, but which is guaranteed by a UK credit 
institution, was retained. The Moody's Credit Agency's bond issues database was of 
use here as it clearly states whether a bond's rating reflects support from a parent 
institution and who that institution is. The Bank of England Statistical Abstract was 
also of use as it lists credit institutions by country of origin. Appendix 5-2 is a list of 
those debt issues that were eliminated due to difficulty in determining whether they 
were guaranteed by a UK institution or not. 
Annual Reports and Accounts - Subordinated Liabilities note 
Since the beginning of the time period under consideration in this study credit 
institutions' financial statements have shown the detail of individual subordinated 
liabilities and so this made it possible to perform a completeness check between the 
Bondware and Accounting data sources to capture all SND issues. The use of 
different data collection methods to ensure that the data is telling you what you think 
it is telling you is known as "Data Triangulation" [Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 
1991]. As far as the author is aware, supplementing Bondware data with alternative 
sources of issuance data has not been carried out before by academics researching 
market discipline and represents a contribution of this thesis to the literature. Chapter 
six discusses the findings of this study concerning the SND issuance activity of UK 
credit institutions. This chapter explains how relying on the Bondware database to 
record issuance activity understates the number of SND issues made by credit 
institutions over the thesis sample period as well as biasing against certain types of 
institution, in particular building societies and merchant banks. As a result, in Chapter 
six SND issuance activity is primarily analysed using credit institutions annual reports 
and accounts because it covers the whole issuance population. 
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Datastream, ICMA and Credit Agency data 
Other sources of secondary data required for this study enabled further data 
triangulation to occur. The credit rating agencies, Moody's and S&P, provide ratings 
for individual SND issues via their web service and the databases Datastream and 
ICMA. info provide both SND characteristics and price information. As a result, these 
three additional sources could be cross-referenced with the Bondware database, and 
each other, to ensure that as many SND bonds issued by UK credit institutions as 
possible would be captured. 
Although only those fields essential to the study were requested when the Bondware 
database was purchased, not all fields contained data for each SND issue. Therefore, 
the four additional data sources (financial statements SND notes, credit ratings agency 
information, Datastream and ICMA) not only enabled further SND issues to be 
included in the initial sample, but also to cross-reference SND issue characteristics, 
both with the initial Bondware database and with each other. As a result, gaps in the 
SND characteristics could be completed and additional characteristic fields could be 
included. The cross-referencing between data sources was of particular benefit in 
enhancing the completeness of the data fields "credit ratings at launch" and "first call 
date". New data fields "credit ratings history" and whether the debt was categorised as 
subordinated or junior subordinated were created. 
Finally, the cross-referencing of data sources had a third benefit. The credit ratings 
agencies' databases recorded whether a bond was subordinated or not and as a result it 
identified some issues in the original Bondware database that were actually preference 
share issues and so which had to be removed. Chapter six discusses in greater detail 
how the inclusion of preference shares would have biased certain results. 
Having used data triangulation to expand the number of SND issues, fill in 
information gaps, add further SND characteristic data fields, and remove incorrectly 
included debt issues, those debt issues that had been identified elsewhere and which 
were not in the original Bondware list were chased up with Bondware. 
The task of cross-checking the different data sources so as to produce a more 
complete picture of the true SND issuance activity of UK credit institutions was 
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laborious. However, the process was aided by the fact that all of the data sources apart 
from the financial accounts included the bond unique identifying number (ISIN or 
CUSIP) in one of their data fields. With such a range of data sources being used it was 
quickly decided to create one database of SND issues by UK credit institutions so as 
to marry up the information from each source. This made it easier to chase up any 
significant gaps and provided one clear snap-shot of the available data. The final 
outcome of cross-referencing was a comprehensive list of SND issues that this study 
has termed the "master database". Only SND that was in Bondware and one of the 
other data sources was included in the master database. It was necessary that the bond 
was in Bondware as this database provided many of the data fields analysed in 
chapters six and seven. Figure 5-4 below graphically represents the different data 
sources that were used to form the master database. Despite the creation of a master 
database proving time consuming, it resulted in a number of additional SND issues 
being added to the database , as well as filling in many gaps in the initial dataset and 
providing new data fields that would enhance the data analysis chapters. As a result, 
the credibility of the data applied in this study is enhanced, which in turn should raise 
the validity and reliability of this study's findings. Appendix 6-3 provides a snapshot 
of the final master database for this study. As figure 5-3 highlights, this database 
provides substantial foundation in analysing credit institution SND issuance 
characteristics and for the insertion of certain variables into the econometric model. 
Other data sources 
Figure 5-3 highlights other data sources that were required to answer the thesis 
research questions. These were Datastream, ICMA. info, credit ratings agency data 
and credit institution annual reports and accounts. As previously discussed, these were 
of use in creating a master database of SND issues and their characteristics. However, 
figure 5-3 illustrates that they were also used in their own right to provide other data 
for the study. This section discusses their additional uses. 
Credit institution Annual Report and Accounts 
As discussed above, UK accounting regulations require credit institutions to report as 
a note in their financial statements individual subordinated liability issues. This 
data 
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source enabled the amount of outstanding subordinated liabilities for all credit 
institutions to be constructed over the thesis sample period. This data was not 
available from any other source, such as Bankscope, as that particular database only 
holds the last ten years of bank data and the thesis sample period extends back to 
1985. Further, Bankscope is limited in its clarity as to what constitutes SND. 
Although Bankscope records the amount of SND per the accounts, credit institutions 
are becoming increasingly inventive in the type of subordinated liabilities they create. 
As a result, such liabilities do not always appear in the balance sheet account caption 
`Subordinated liabilities', especially the Tier 1 style instruments that have recently 
become commonplace. The accounting body, the Urgent Issues Task Force (UITF), 
issued "UITF 33" in 2002 indicating that many Tier 1 instruments are in effect 
subordinated liabilities and so other account captions have to be interrogated to 
capture the true extent of SND being issued by UK credit institutions. 2 Therefore, 
relying on Bankscope to record the total SND outstanding, which several market 
discipline studies have done, is misleading. Appendix 6-1 provides the outcome of 
this process. 
The same appendix also records the number of SND liability issues by each UK credit 
institution over the sample period. Whilst pursuing the triangulation process between 
Bondware and the financial accounts described in the previous sub-section, it became 
clear that one can use the financial accounts to trace when all SND issues are made, 
along with some basic characteristics, and also when they are redeemed. Therefore, a 
record of each SND issue, its characteristics and when the bond was redeemed as per 
the financial accounts was created (supported by data from the "master database" 
where necessary). The outcome of this is Appendix 6-2. The data supports the number 
of issues data in appendix 6-1 and table 6-2 in chapter six. This forms the primary 
data source in examining SND issuance frequency and their characteristics including 
which SND issues are redeemed prior to maturity. This detailed analysis is reported 
in 
chapter six and provides a substantial source of evidence (along with the "master 
database") in examining UK credit institution-issued SND and its compatibility with 
MSNDp proposals (see figure 5-3). The use of accounting data has not been analysed 
in this context in previous market discipline studies and apart from providing some 
quite unique evidence to answer the research question, its use is particularly pertinent 
in the UK context because so many SND issues have call features attached to 
them. 
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Credit institution annual reports and accounts were also of use because they could 
provide a source of information for the accounting variables used in the econometric 
model. As the model focuses on the period from 1995 to 2002 it was an aim that a 
complete set of financial statements was acquired for the years 1994 to 2002 whereas, 
prior to this date, the complete set of a set of accounts would not have to be copied as 
the key financial statements and the relevant subordinated liabilities notes would be 
sufficient to derive SND issuance activity. 
The collection of credit institution Annual Reports and Accounts proved a significant 
task. The author visited a number of libraries across the country and subscribed to the 
Companies House Direct service. To control this data collection process, a table 
recording which Annual Reports and Accounts had been collected (including in what 
format) and which were outstanding was created and regularly updated. A copy of this 
table is in Appendix 5-3. 
Datastream 
The Datastream international bonds dataset was purchased to access the secondary 
market prices, yields of bank-issued SND and spreads over appropriate benchmark 
treasury securities. 3 These are used as the dependent variable in the econometric 
model. As previously mentioned, the Datastream database also enabled a cross-check 
to the Bondware database to see if issues and data fields are missing from the master 
database. 
All spread data was collected for the sample period and a column was created in the 
master database so that SND for which spread data was available could be readily 
identified. Of the 399 SND bond issues in the "master database", 281 have spread 
data available (representing 70% of the sample). 
Credit rating agency data 
Access to S&Ps `RatingsDirect and Moody's' web service enabled historical credit 
ratings and SND issue data to be collated, (covering, for example, whether the 
bond 
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has underlying support from another group company or not? ) As discussed above, this 
data provided a source of cross-checking to the Bondware database. However, it was 
also of benefit in its own right as the source for exogenous variables in the model 
testing (namely the rating of the SND or the issuer). 
As explained in chapter four, two types of ratings were collected, S&P's and 
Moody's' individual bond issue ratings and Moody's' Financial Strength ratings. 
Any bonds or issuers for which the whole rating history could not be initially obtained 
were chased up with the relevant credit rating agency. The master database identifies 
whether an issue rating history is available for the lifetime of the bond, part of the 
bond's lifetime or whether no issue rating is available at all. A checklist of whether I 
had a history of Financial Strength ratings for all relevant UK credit institutions was 
created and is reproduced in Appendix 5-4. The year in each cell represents when the 
rating commenced for that institution. 
In sum, this section has discussed how an extensive period of data collection took 
place. Multiple sources were identified that would be appropriate to answer the thesis 
research questions. These sources covered both the primary and secondary bond 
market. Triangulation techniques across the multiple data sources enabled a 
comprehensive history of SND issuance and their characteristics by UK credit 
institutions to be ascertained. Each data source also provides unique pieces of 
information that would be of use in aspects of the empirical research. The use of 
multiple data sources was managed through creating a number of checklists. This 
enhanced data collection efficiency by preventing duplication of effort and identifying 
data gaps. A master database was created to collate the data from each source in one 
location. Longitudinal data that could not be stored in the master database was 
referenced therein so as to identify for which bonds such data was available. 
Section 3- Data analysis techniques 
This section highlights how the statistical data analysis methods employed in this 
thesis complement the higher order issues of deductive research design discussed 
in 
the previous sections and thereby help formulate a robust research strategy. 
Also, the 
section raises issues in quantitative research that must be addressed at the research 
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design stage in order to produce credible research findings. How this thesis study 
attempts to overcome these issues is then discussed. 
Statistical data analysis 
Section one of this chapter discusses how market discipline research follows a 
deductive approach and adopts experimental methodology. The section summarises 
the key facets of a deductive approach identified by Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 
(2000). They are repeated below: 
0 
0 
0 
a need to explain causal relationships between variables; 
applying controls to ensure validity of data and allow for the testing of 
hypotheses; 
operationalising concepts to ensure clarity of definition and enable facts to be 
measured quantitatively. 
These characteristics clearly identify with quantitative research and statistical data 
analysis methods, such as descriptive and inferential statistics. As Bryman (1988) 
identifies, one of the preoccupations with quantitative research "is the need to render 
observable the concepts which are rooted in the hypotheses. " Johnson and Harris 
(2002) state that: "Quantitative research always involves the numerical analysis of 
data. " This is regardless of whether descriptive or inferential statistical analyses are 
used. 
Applying these characteristics to the thesis, chapter four presents the purpose of this 
thesis's research and identifies two overarching research questions. The chapter 
argues that these questions can be analysed with the aid of descriptive and inferential 
statistics. Furthermore, hypotheses are postulated that identify exogenous factors 
whose variation, according to the theory, explains changes in the dependent variable. 
For one of the research questions it is harder to postulate hypotheses, but with the 
whole data population available in this study it is possible to report conclusive 
evidence on concepts related to the research question. Chapter four and the previous 
section of this chapter discuss the data; it is clear that the measurement scale of the 
data is at least ordinal (credit agency ratings) but predominantly of ratio scale 
(for 
example, yield spreads and accounting variables). As a result, quantitative variables 
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can be created which operationalise the exogenous factors, the dependent variable and 
therefore, the hypotheses. Chapter four also explains that the multivariate data 
analysis technique to be applied, multiple regression analysis, is appropriate given a 
single metric-data dependent variable and several exogenous variables. Therefore, this 
discussion illustrates that the research questions and hypotheses posed and the 
descriptive and inferential statistics used sit neatly within a deductive research 
approach, which this chapter has argued the thesis research is framed within. 
Replicability, Reliability and Validity 
In order to produce research findings that can be argued as credible and a contribution 
to knowledge, experimental or quasi-experimental research needs to be replicable, 
reliable and valid. 
Replicability is an essential feature of experimental approaches. As Johnson and 
Harris (2002) state: "If results cannot be replicated then either the original research is 
of questionable quality or is of limited generalisability. " They go on to state: 
"Replicability is much easier to achieve in quantitative research where the process is 
more structured and the raw data are less dependent on the analyst's interpretative 
skill. " As previously mentioned, Gill and Johnson (1997) explain how the nature of 
positivism and an objective truth leads to an emphasis on highly structured research 
methodologies to facilitate replication and, therefore, provide credibility to 
knowledge. This thesis study uses data that is available to other researchers and uses 
highly structured research methods (i. e. descriptive and econometric data analysis) to 
facilitate replication and to enable hypothesis testing. 
Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe (1991) describe the concept of reliability in the 
deductive approach as: "Will the measure yield the same results on different 
occasions? " Robson (1993) provide four potential threats to reliability that must be 
considered at the design stage. They are: subject error; subject bias; observer error; 
and observer bias. These threats pose a significant problem in research that involves 
researching individuals and where primary data is collected. In the market 
discipline 
field, the collection of market-sourced secondary data restricts the potential 
for 
observer threats and subject error. However, as the literature review 
in chapter three 
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identified, subject bias is possible in primary-based market discipline tests where only 
those credit institutions that have recently issued SND are being econometrically 
modelled. This thesis study concentrates on secondary market data for modelling 
investor responsiveness and therefore covers both recent and historical SND issuance. 
The research literature describes two varieties of validity to research findings: internal 
validity - "Do the conclusions we draw about a demonstrated experimental 
relationship truly imply cause? " - and external validity - "Does an observed causal 
relationship generalise across persons, settings and times? " (Campbell and Stanley, 
1963) 
The internal validity of an experiment determines whether valid conclusions can be 
drawn from a study. It is itself determined by how much control has been achieved in 
the study. Therefore, deficiencies in the research design will lead to studies with low 
internal validity (Ryan, Scapens and Theobald, 1992). Particular threats in the finance 
literature are: sample bias; the omission of, or failure to control for, relevant variables 
in a functional relationship; a mis-specified functional relationship; and variable 
measurement errors (Ryan, Scapens and Theobald, 1992). If these issues can be 
minimised then the results from econometric tests can be more accurately used to 
imply causation. Chapter three of this study analysed prior empirical research on 
market discipline. One outcome was that several examples were identified, similar to 
the ones described above, where the internal validity of studies may have been 
compromised to some degree. Chapter four presents this study's model for testing 
market discipline. One emphasis is this study's focus on producing a rigorous model; 
that is, a model which is theoretically supported, has accurately specified and 
measured variables, and therefore can be reliably used to draw conclusions. As 
chapter four discusses, one uncertainty with this study's model is an appropriate 
functional form, but the market discipline literature in general lacks direction on this 
matter. 
Apart from being able to draw valid conclusions from a study, researchers are also 
concerned with external validity, in other words establishing whether the research 
findings can be generalised beyond the confines of the current location to other 
research settings. This shows that external validity is linked to the concept of 
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generalisation. Johnson and Harris' (2002) discussion of replicability presented above 
shows that replication is also related to generalisation. In fact, replication can provide 
a means of checking the extent to which findings are applicable to other contexts. 
This thesis is in itself partly replicating previous market discipline research by 
examining whether the UK context provides evidence of market discipline. Data 
accessibility limitations provide threats to external validity. These include restrictions 
on the population and time period under investigation. For example, concentrating on 
data from one country can restrict the degree to which the researcher can draw 
generalised inferences from their study. In a similar vein, time validity can restrict the 
extent to which the results of a particular study can be generalised to other time 
periods. Temporal structural changes can be particularly problematic in this instance. 
Applying these concepts to this thesis, although this study aims to cover the whole 
UK credit institution SND population, the study's findings cannot be said to be 
representative of other European countries as well. Additionally, the econometric 
testing aspect of the thesis only covers the time period 1995 to 2002. It would have 
been preferable to also cover the time period 1989 to 1993 as the first aspect of the 
thesis research shows that the recessionary period 1989 to 1992 was one of particular 
difficulty for UK banks. The review of market discipline literature in chapters two and 
three illustrates that more volatile market conditions could provide cleaner evidence 
of market discipline behaviour. The period 1994 to 2002 has witnessed solid 
economic growth in the UK where banks have been able to produce strong profits. As 
a result, investors have had fewer requirements to signal concerns to banks. Hall et al. 
(2003) and Krishnan, Ritchken and Thomson (2005) suggest that favourable 
economic conditions over roughly the same time period in the US may explain their 
studies' weak evidence of market discipline behaviour. Therefore, the findings of this 
thesis may not be easily generalisable to a prior or future period of economic 
difficulty for UK credit institutions. 
Ryan, Scapens and Theobald (1992) explain that the researcher has to trade-off 
internal and external validity. In other words, optimising in one dimension will tend to 
reduce validity in the other dimension. This study has tended to align itself with 
ensuring internal validity through constructing a robust model to model market 
discipline, taking into account specific UK SND characteristics, but without being 
overly radical in its functional form, and through attempting to rigorously analyse the 
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whole SND population, thereby reducing sample bias. In this way, although this 
study's findings cannot 
be generalised across international settings, the recognisable 
model structure and data collection approach will be accepted in the research 
community as valid knowledge, which can then be replicated using datasets from 
other countries. Despite this discussion on external validity, this thesis can contribute 
to market discipline debates from an international policy perspective. The UK 
represents one of the largest bank-issued SND markets in the world. Additionally, the 
UK has some of the largest internationally-active banks in the world. The increasing 
internationalisation of banking regulation means that they would be affected by 
international market discipline policies. Therefore, the UK context can provide 
significant evidence concerning bank market discipline behaviour and assist in 
shaping future market discipline policies. 
Figure 5-5 below is a diagrammatic representation of the thesis research design and 
process. It illustrates the linkages between the different aspects of the study. 
Section 4- Conclusions 
The chapter explains why, in the field of market discipline, the positivist theoretical 
perspective and deductive research process is deemed most appropriate in deriving 
credible and reliable research findings. The nature of the research questions in this 
study complements the positivist stance of prior research on market discipline. The 
chapter explains that such deductive research is most appropriately tackled using 
experimental or quasi-experimental methodologies that apply quantitative data 
analysis. These research design characteristics are also evident in prior empirical 
market discipline studies. As a result, quantitative data is collected (in this case 
secondary data), hypotheses are formulated and operationalised and descriptive and 
inferential statistical methods of analysis are used. 
The research design process has a significant impact on the validity and reliability of 
research findings and, accordingly, the extent to which the research objectives have 
been appropriately met. The discussion in this chapter explains that the thesis research 
design was formulated in the light of the research objectives, the research hypotheses, 
the nature of the data, and previous studies in this area and that they complement each 
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other at all stages of the process. 
Therefore, the credibility of the research findings in 
the thesis is enhanced. 
' Appendix 5-1 lists the initial 16 bond characteristic data fields that were requested from Bondware. 
2 As a result of UITF 33, some credit institutions have had to move Tier 1 instruments back to the 
Subordinated Liabilities account caption, but for a couple of years they were being recorded elsewhere; 
in particular, under the caption `minority interests - non-equity'. 
3 The author's research institution already had access to the domestic bonds dataset. 
Chapter 6- Issuance activity and characteristics of UK credit 
institution-issued SND 
introduction 
This chapter is associated with the thesis research question, `Is UK credit institution- 
issued SND compatible with Mandatory Subordinated Debt Policy Proposals? ' As 
chapter four explains, this research question is most appropriately answered using 
predominantly descriptive statistics, as well as some inferential statistics, to analyse 
SND issuance activity and SND characteristics. Therefore, the chapter extensively 
examines, across a number of bond characteristics, the UK credit institution-issued 
SND market. This is first carried out at a national level and then at a bank level. 
Benefits of a UK specific focus and a bank-level approach are highlighted within the 
chapter through comparative references to conclusions made by Sironi (2001), who 
analyses SND issuance activity across 14 European countries. An additional 
contribution of this study to the market discipline literature is the use of accounting 
data alongside the more commonly used Bondware database of debt issuance. As a 
result, this thesis has access to the whole population of UK SND issuance to support 
the findings. 
The layout of the chapter is as follows. Sections one and two analyse UK credit 
institution SND characteristics between 1985 and 2002 for trends. The difference 
between the two sections is that section one cuts across all relevant financial 
institutions to provide a national picture, whereas in section two the focus is on 
individual credit institutions' SND issuance. In order to answer the research question 
posed at the beginning of this introduction, section three applies the findings from 
sections one and two to the general characteristics proposed in MSNDPs. As MSNDP 
proposals are directed at individual banks, the bank-level approach applied in this 
chapter provides a unique focus in answering this topical research question. Section 
four provides a summary of the main findings and draws conclusions that, inter alia, 
relate to the implications for UK credit institutions of implementing a MSNDP. 
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Section 1- UK credit institutions' SND issues: 1985-2002 
This section analyses UK credit institutions' SND issues across a number of different 
bond features to provide a comprehensive picture of issuance activity and 
characteristics over the period 1985 to 2002. The time span is selected in order to 
cover the introduction of the Basel Accord in 1989 and the introduction of the Euro 
currency in 1999, as well as to capture a period of particular difficulty for UK credit 
institutions, the domestic recession of the early 1990s. By examining as wide a 
coverage as was feasible the thesis study provides an authoritative insight into the 
influences on issuance activity. As chapter five explains, the study goes beyond the 
usual data source for examining SND issuance, Bondware, and incorporates data from 
other locations (see figure 5-3 in chapter five). As a result, the whole population of 
UK credit institution SND issuance can be constructed over the sample time period 
and a number of additional bond features can be examined that have been overlooked 
by the only study similar to this one, Sironi (2001). The contribution of alternative 
data sources to the comprehensive picture of UK SND issuance is discussed briefly 
below because it helps to explain the structure of this section. 
Contribution of alternative data sources 
As UK credit institutions must disclose details of individual Subordinated Liabilities 
in their Annual Reports and Accounts it is possible to construct the whole population 
of SND issuance and some of their basic characteristics for the sample time period 
from this data source. Through data triangulation techniques with the Bondware, 
Datastream and ISMA databases for completeness purposes, an analysis of the 
accounting source forms the first part of this section. Appendix 6-2 identifies all SND 
issues from credit institution annual reports and accounts over the sample period and 
forms the primary basis for the accounts SND analysis. ' 
The more commonly used Bondware database can provide a number of data fields not 
available in the Annual Reports and Accounts and therefore provide additional 
evidence on SND characteristics. However, as this chapter highlights, the Bondware 
database has limitations that have not been readily recognised in previous studies. 
In 
particular, it does not provide the whole population of SND issuance activity and 
is 
biased against the recording of issues from certain types of credit institution. 
Again, 
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data triangulation with accounting data, Datastream, credit ratings agency data and 
ISMA can complete some information gaps to produce the so-called "master 
database". However, as the Bondware database is only a sample, data triangulation 
cannot produce a complete population of SND issuance and their characteristics 
necessary to answer the research question. The structure of this section accepts the 
strengths and weaknesses of both underlying data sources and uses the strengths of 
both sources to examine the research question. As a result, the second part of this 
section analyses SND issuance activity and characteristics from the "master 
database". By using two underlying data sources (annual reports and accounts, and the 
"master database") to examine the research question, and comparing their strengths 
and weaknesses, a number of new themes relevant to market discipline research can 
be gleaned. A snapshot of the "master database" is located in Appendix 6-3.2 
Table 6-1 summarises the data contributions for the two key data sources used in this 
chapter (see bold columns). 3 The table shows how data triangulation enhanced the 
completeness of information. In particular, it illustrates how the "master database" is a 
collation of the five other data sources (see figure 5-4 in chapter five). The table also 
highlights that the "master database" only contains a sample of the SND population. 
The implications of this will be discussed in further detail later in this section. 
Analysis of Annual Reports and Accounts SND data 
Issuance activity and values 
General issuance activity and values - Table 6-2 outlines the general issuance activity 
and issuance values of UK credit institutions' SND issues over the sample period 
1985 to 2002. The total number of issues between January 1985 and December 2002 
was 589, i. e., an average of 33 per year. The value of all SND issues totals £90 
billion, with an average issuance of £5 billion per year. However, these totals hide 
periods of markedly different issuance activity. For example, there was a doubling in 
the average number of SND issues after 1998 (average of 57 issues per year compared 
with 26 per year for the period 1985-1998). Equally, between 1985 and 1998, the 
average value of SND issues was £2.9 billion per year. However, from 1999 onwards 
this rises significantly, culminating in an average for the period 1999-2002 of £12.4 
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billion per year. The period 1999-2002 not only witnesses a rapid increase in issuance 
activity and values 
but, compared to the years preceding 1999, the average value of 
SND issues also rises significantly to above £200 million (in nominal terms) for the 
first time since 1985. 
The table also presents the overall data by type of credit institution, because it 
highlights distinct differences in issuance activity and issuance values, some of which 
reflect regulatory developments. Banks overwhelmingly dominate issuance activity 
and SND values, with 72% of UK credit institution SND issues being by banks. In 
value terms, this represents 91 % of all SND issues. Stripping out building societies 
accentuates the rise in issuance activity during the period 1999-2002 (49 issues per 
year) compared to the prior period (17 issues per year). However, this can partly be 
attributed to the conversion of 10 building societies to banks during the period 1989- 
2000 (see Tables 6-17a and 6-17b). Nevertheless, it is clear that UK banks have 
significantly increased their issuance activity and SND issue sizes since 1998. 
1999-2002 - The large rise in SND issues after 1998 can be explained by a number of 
factors. The introduction of the Euro in 1999, for example, appears to have had a 
significant influence on issuing activity. The Bank for International Settlements 
(2000) suggests that structural factors are the primary reason for the surge in Euro- 
denominated debt in 1999, in particular, the significant expansion in the investor base 
and the portfolio diversification opportunities this presented to investors. However, 
Table 6-12a also illustrates that the growth in Sterling and US Dollar-denominated 
issues was equally spectacular. This suggests that it was favourable debt market 
conditions that prompted the large growth in SND issues by UK credit institutions 
after 1998. The period was marked by a reduction in the supply of government debt 
issuance, which led investors to search for highly-rated issuers as substitutes for 
benchmark pricing. 4 As a result, when yield spreads increased during this period, 
although the number of high-yield issues fell, investors found high quality corporate 
bonds a suitable substitute for the lack of government instruments (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2001). Moreover, the sharp correction in the equity markets 
in 2000 made the issuance of equity instruments less attractive and further encouraged 
the shift of excess funds into debt instruments, which are trading at historically low 
yields (see figure 6-1). As a result, the private sector has probably responded to the 
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new availability of funds 
by issuing record amounts of debt. In addition, the global 
economic slowdown and the consequent reduction in the demand for industrial 
working capital, combined with the historically-low long-term yields, have 
encouraged borrowers to extend the maturity of their debt (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2002). Table 6-7a illustrates a significant rise in perpetual SND issues 
over the period 1999 to 2002, suggesting that such a policy may have been evident in 
the UK. Over the same time period table 6-7a also indicates that UK credit institutions 
were willing to issue non-perpetual SND with maturities of over 40 years. 
An equally important development on overall SND issuance activity and on the 
number of perpetual issues made during the period 1999-2002 was a regulatory 
announcement released in 1998. As Hitchins, Hogg and Mallett (2001) state "The 
Basel Committee issued an interpretation of the Basel Capital Accord to clarify the 
treatment of what were termed "innovative" capital instruments. This permitted the 
minority interests in the equity of consolidated special purpose vehicles to be included 
in tier 1 capital provided that the instruments concerned meet various conditions. " 
Eligible instruments would be subject to a limit of 15% of tier 1 capital for regulatory 
capital calculation purposes and such instruments would not be eligible for tier 1 
status unless the tier 1 capital ratio excluding these instruments exceeds 6%. The 
appeal for credit institutions is that instruments, which to all intents and purposes are 
SND securities, could be included as tier 1 capital rather than tier 2, thereby 
strengthening regulatory capital ratios and enabling further capital raising 
opportunities. An issue concerning the eligibility of these securities as tier one equity 
capital arose in the UK because the FSA insisted the regulatory treatment should 
follow the accounting treatment. Therefore, the instruments should be reported as 
equity in the balance sheet. This led to several innovative structures for tier one 
securities. For example, a bank would create a special purpose vehicle that issues 
preferred securities which are guaranteed by the bank. The funds would be transferred 
to the bank through the bank issuing SND to the special purpose vehicle which has 
identical characteristics as the preferred securities. On consolidation the SND would 
cancel out and the Minority interests would appear as equity in the balance sheet. The 
regulatory and accounting treatment was muddied even further when the Urgent 
Issues Task Force clarified the accounting treatment in 2002. This led to a number of 
tier one securities being reclassified as subordinated liabilities, but they were allowed 
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to remain as tier one securities for regulatory capital purposes. For the purposes of 
this thesis, tier one securities have been included as SND if they are classified as SND 
in the credit institution's balance sheet or the innovative preferred securities are 
guaranteed by the bank and the bank have issued SND with identical characteristics to 
the preferred securities. 
The effect of the Basel Committee announcement on "innovative" capital instruments 
was to initiate a number of tier one securities issues by UK banks over the period 
1999-2002. Table 6-3 presents some summary statistics on the characteristics of these 
securities. It is clear that tier one securities are issued at above average issue sizes; 
therefore, although tier one securities represent 16% of all bank issues over the period 
1999-2002, in value terms this is 27% of all bank issues. The issues are virtually all 
perpetual in maturity, they are all callable and they have been issued across all three 
major currencies. To see if the introduction of tier one securities has led to the 
phenomenal rise in SND issuance over the period 1999-2002, table 6-2 reports 
summary totals excluding tier one issues. The average SND issuance per year is still 
double the average for the period 1985-1998 and, in value per year terms, is over 
three times. As banks are the only credit institutions able to issue tier one securities, a 
look at the summary totals under the banks only columns reports equally spectacular 
SND issuance activity and values over the period 1999-2002 compared to the prior 
period. Therefore, it is clear that the growth in SND issuance activity and values over 
the period 1999-2002 is not purely due to the relaxation of regulatory developments 
concerning tier one instruments. Later sections of this chapter will assess the impact 
of tier one securities on other SND characteristics, such as maturity. 
Building Societies and SND Issuance during 1988-1993 - The passing of the Building 
Societies Act 1986 led to the prohibition on building societies' issuing term SND 
being lifted in 1988. Table 6-2 clearly illustrates the impact, with 1988 being the 
second most active year, in issuance terms and value terms, for building societies' 
SND ever. The next regulatory development was the lifting of restrictions on building 
societies issuing a form of perpetual SND in mid-1991, known as Permanent Interest 
Bearing Shares (PIBS). 5 Again, this resulted in a spate of PIBS being issued in 1991 
and 1992 (see Table 6-4). In fact, PIBS represented 15% and 21% of all UK credit 
institution SND issues in 1991 and 1992 respectively. The impact of these two 
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regulatory developments means that building society SND issuance witnessed its most 
prolific period between 1988 and 1993. Table 6-2 illustrates how annual issuance 
activity and issuance values were above average for this period. 6 The relaxation of 
regulations for building societies and the consequential above average trend for SND 
issuance masks a period of reduced issuance for banks between 1990 and 1992. For 
example, 50% of all issues by value were by building societies in 1990 and just under 
50% in 1992. In both years the number of issues by building societies exceeds those 
by banks. Again, by splitting out overall SND issuance into the categories banks and 
building societies, table 6-2 indicates that bank issuance activity and issue values on 
average dipped between 1990 and 1992.7 
Banks SND Issuance during 1990-1992 - The low SND issuance over the period 
1989-1992 also appears to reflect the state of the debt market and the general 
economic climate during that period. The Bank of England (1991) stated at the time 
that: "unfavourable market conditions allowed only a small number of SND issues to 
be eligible for inclusion in the capital base. " A tightening of monetary policy had led 
to historically-high long-term interest rates. Moreover, the wholesale funding markets 
were nervous because of the Middle East conflict, the financial pressures on smaller 
UK banks following the closure of BCCI and British and Commonwealth Merchant 
Bank (Hall, 1999), and the UK's uncertain position with regard to the ERM. The 
severe domestic recession around this time also led to a period of low growth in new 
business activity, a rise in bad debt problems and pressure on profit margins, which 
led banks to focus on improving the efficiency of their operations. The Bank of 
England (1990) stated: "With income growth from traditional business ever more 
difficult to achieve, there was a continuing emphasis on cost control, and on less 
capital-intensive, fee-based income sources. " This, in turn, may have dampened the 
supply of new capital issues. The Bank of England (1990) also reported "A number of 
banks have disposed of assets in order to improve their [capital] ratios. " A further 
explanation could be that, in attempting to meet the Basel Capital Accord 
convergence criteria, European bank SND issues increased significantly from 1988 
onwards. As a result, the stock of SND in the international capital markets could have 
caused an over supply that may have deterred UK credit institutions, which were 
already meeting the Basel criteria, from issuing further debt. 
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The prior discussion suggests that banks may be deterred from accessing SND capital 
markets during periods of particular economic and market difficulty. A consequence 
of banks appearing to access SND markets when conditions are favourable is that it 
may provide a bias in studies that examine market discipline through primary market, 
yield-spread data. A particular appeal of a MSNDP is that it would force credit 
institutions to issue appropriately-structured SND during difficult as well as 
favourable conditions. Therefore, the ability to issue and/or the yield at which a bank 
has been forced to issue during a difficult economic period may provide useful signals 
to interested market participants on bank condition. Hypotheses 6-1 and 6-2 of this 
thesis assesses whether there is any association between SND issuance activity and 
economic and market conditions. This is tested in section three of this chapter. 
Subordinated Loans - Analysing annual reports and accounts illustrates that a further 
form in which subordinated liabilities can be issued by credit institutions is through 
subordinated loans. Table 6-5 below presents summary characteristics for the 
subordinated loans issued by UK credit institutions over the thesis sample period 
1985-2002. Although 9% of all SND issues are loans, they represent only 1% by 
value, indicating that they are of extremely small issue size. This is emphasised by the 
average issue size of loans being £lOm compared to £153m for all SND issues. 
Further, for 11 of the 15 years in which SND loans have been issued, they provide the 
smallest SND issue size. Therefore, it is no surprise that SND loans have primarily 
been issued by smaller building societies and smaller banks to enhance their capital 
raising options. In fact, 83% of the SND loan issues have been made by building 
societies, therefore table 6-5 compares the number and size of SND loans to all 
building society SND issues. This confirms that SND loans are of small size. For, 
although SND loans represent 27% of all building society SNID issues, in value terms 
they represent only 4%. The table also illustrates that the percentage of building 
society issues that are loans and their percentage value has been above average for the 
period 1997 -2002 in comparison to the prior period. This is as a result of a number of 
larger building societies, who have rarely if ever issued SND loans, converting to 
banks since the mid- i 990s. Therefore, the influence of loans on building society SND 
issuance is heightened. At the same time, the historically-low yields witnessed in the 
UK sterling debt markets have encouraged smaller building societies to enter the 
SND 
market for the first time. The most appropriate form in which to do this are loans, 
52 
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because the issue sizes are small. The last column of table 6-5 illustrates how these 
loans have extremely long average maturities so they are being used by smaller 
building societies to raise long-term SND finance. 
The discussion on SND loans is raised at this time because these instruments will be 
removed from the subsequent analysis on UK credit institution SND characteristics 
for the following reasons. The extremely small issue sizes of SND loans make them 
inappropriate as a form of MSND (although they could represent a significant capital 
raising function for small institutions). Also, these loans are being issued by small 
building societies that would be extremely unlikely to be included in a MSNDP as 
their issuance frequency would be too low. Imposing a MSNDP on them would cause 
them to severely alter their funding structures. This tallies with the theoretical 
literature on the suitability of MSNDP for smaller credit institutions. 8 A further 
problem with loans is that they are not tradable instruments. Therefore, they would 
not provide regular secondary market prices, which is essential in creating potential 
indirect market discipline in a MSNDP. 
Table 6-6 reproduces table 6-2, with the exception that all SND loans have now been 
removed. The overall dataset reduces to 536 SND bonds over the sample period. The 
minor influence of SND loans in the overall SND analysis is confirmed by the fact 
that the trends identified in the preceding discussion on periods of reduced and 
increased SND issuance activity are not altered in any way. Additionally, the table 
highlights that building societies issued fewer SND bonds after 1997 following the 
conversion of five building societies. As mentioned previously, all subsequent SND 
analysis concentrates on SND bond instruments only. 
Maturity Characteristics 
Table 6-7a reports that UK credit institutions issue a high percentage of perpetual 
SND. They represent 33% of all issues and 45% by value. The period 1999-2002 
witnessed a large rise in perpetual issues, which could coincide with the issuance of 
tier one securities. Table 6-3 recorded that all tier one security issues, bar two, were 
perpetual. So, to accommodate this potential regulatory influence on maturity 
structures all of the maturity analysis tables report summary totals that both 
include 
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and exclude tier one securities. 
Despite this adjustment, perpetual issues still represent 
29% of all issues and 36% by value. These figures are high compared to other 
European countries. Sironi (2001) reports, that between 1988 and 2000, perpetual 
issues in France represented only 7% of all SND issues and in Germany 2% of all 
issues. This contrast between UK and other major European credit institution SND 
issuers could lead one to argue that achieving bank SND harmonisation in a European 
MSNDP may be difficult. Equally, US banks' SND issues are rarely perpetual in 
maturity (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1999), suggesting that a 
worldwide MSNDP would also prove troublesome to introduce without having to 
force some institutions to significantly alter their funding composition. 
UK credit institutions issue non-perpetual debt with an average initial maturity of at 
least 10 years. In contrast to the prior period (1985-1998), the period 1999-2002 has 
seen some increases in initial maturity, with each of these years having issues that 
now exceed 40 years. This could be attributed to the historically-low long term bond 
yields during this period. 
Tables 6-7b, 6-7c and 6-7d break the issuance data into years and into periods of 
distinct issuance activity that were discussed above. Table 6-7b shows that non- 
perpetual debt is most frequently issued in the 1 0-year maturity bracket (31 % of all 
issues). In contrast, the issuance of SND with an initial maturity of less than 10 years 
has been very infrequent over the sample period (9% of all issues). Therefore, these 
tables illustrate that between 1985 and 2002, and excluding tier one securities, 60% of 
all issues (66% in value terms) have been either 10-year or perpetual maturity issues. 
Equally, the tables indicate that there are two distinct maturity groups; the 10-15 years 
maturity bracket and the above 20 years maturity bracket. 87% of all issues (93% in 
value terms) lay within these two brackets. 
Analysing SND maturity trends over time (Tables 7c and 7d), once the impact of tier 
one securities is removed from the period 1999-2002, the percentage of bonds in the 
10-year and perpetual maturity brackets is seen to remain fairly stable over the thesis 
sample period. Two exceptions are the large number of perpetual debt issues in 1985 
and 1986 reflecting the fact that, as of May 1985, the Bank of England accepted 
floating rate perpetual debt as "primary capital" (Hall, 1999). 
9 The second exception 
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is that, when banks' SND issues waned (1990-1992), the proportion of perpetual debt 
dropped to its lowest level over the whole sample period, presumably in response to 
the historically-high long-term interest rates experienced at the time (see figure 6-1). 10 
In contrast, 10-year bonds rose in importance and bonds with a maturity of between 5 
and 10 years recorded their highest level of activity, thus further suggesting that 
during a period of high interest rates credit institutions sought to shorten the maturity 
of their funding. The relative stability of issuance within the 10-year and perpetual 
maturity brackets indicates that medium and long-dated SND issuance has been a 
regular feature of the UK market for a considerable period of time. As discussed 
below, this is in contrast to evidence provided by European banks' SND maturity 
characteristics. 
Tables 6-7e and 6-7f break the sample time period into two based on the revival of 
SND issuance following the lacklustre period 1990-1992. One table reports issuance 
frequency, the other issue values. The tables clearly show that the proportion of SND 
issues with initial maturities over 20 years has doubled over time. This is consistent 
with the theory that, as bond yields fell during the 1990s, issuers sought to take 
advantage of that by extending the maturity of non-perpetual debt to lock into these 
advantageous funding rates. Equally, as governments during the late 1990s and early 
2000s sought to reduce issuance of longer dated instruments, investors have looked to 
alternative long-term, high quality credits. Banks are one type of high quality credit 
that filled this gap. 
Table 6-7g looks at the maturity characteristics of bonds issued pre- and post- the 
introduction of the Basel Capital Accord. The UK moved immediately to implement 
the Basel convergence agreement at the end of December 1989 and, therefore, the 
table has been divided to reflect domestic policy. This shows that the Basel Accord 
has had little effect on UK SND issues, with nearly all still being equal to or in excess 
of 10 years in maturity. The final column in table 6-7g appears to confirm the 
apparent unimportance of the Basel Accord on UK SND maturities. They indicate that 
the average initial maturity of non-perpetual debt issues has not shifted significantly 
over the period 1985 to 2002. What is of note, however, is that the introduction of the 
Capital Adequacy Directive in 1996 has given rise to some shorter dated issues 
(although they are still very small in number), which can be used as tier 
3 capital. The 
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apparent unimportance of the Basel Accord on UK SND maturities contrasts with the 
findings of Sironi (2001), who indicated that, since the Basel Capital Accord came 
into effect, there has been a significant increase in the number of issues by European 
banks with a maturity equal to or in excess of 10 years. A possible explanation for this 
is that the classification of capital under the Basel Accord did not represent a 
significant departure from the UK capital adequacy regime prior to the Accord. " As a 
result, UK banks appear to have been issuing SND with sufficiently long maturities 
(before the five-year amortisation rule would apply) for some time. 
Fixed Rate Issues 
The percentage of fixed rate issues, shown in Table 6-8, illustrates a clear trend 
towards this type of finance from 1992 onwards. This transition coincided with the 
general expectation, around that time, that future interest rates would come down as a 
result of the anti-inflationary policies of the monetary authorities. Furthermore, from 
1993 onwards, the percentage of fixed-rate debt has typically remained around 70 
percent of total issues. Figure 6-2 presents the data based on the percentage value for 
each coupon type in each of the sample years. Again, the transition from floating rate 
to fixed rate coupons around the year 1992 is readily apparent. 
One limitation of analysing SND issuance using the Bondware database is that one is 
unable to drill-down and investigate coupon types in greater detail. The database 
simply presents coupon types as either fixed or floating. In reality, more complicated 
coupon structures exist and analysing SND issuance through credit institutions' 
annual reports and accounts enables this level of detail to be examined. Table 6-8 and 
Figure 6-2 break the SND issues down into more detailed coupon types. Pure vanilla 
floating and fixed coupons dominate, but over time there is a distinctive move 
towards more complicated coupon structures, which involve, for example, step-ups in 
coupon or a rate reset, after an agreed time period. These rate changes normally occur 
at the first call date when the issuer has the option to redeem the whole issue. 
Table 6-9 reproduces Table 6-8 with the exception that coupon types are now 
analysed for perpetual SND issues and non-perpetual issues separately. As in Table 6- 
8, tier one securities are included in the analysis because excluding them has no effect 
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on the findings. In general, there 
is a preference to issue perpetual SND with fixed 
rate coupons. The 
finding in table 6-8 that there was a shift away from floating rate 
coupons to fixed rate ones in 1991 is very clearly mirrored here. Prior to 1991, all 
perpetual securities were issued with floating rate coupons; since 1991, virtually all 
have been issued with fixed coupons. Equally, the complexity of coupon structures 
has also changed dramatically in later years as innovation has occurred in the 
financial markets. The dramatic shift from floating rate to fixed rate perpetual SND 
suggests that this is the primary driver for the general observation that overall coupon 
structures have shifted over time. However, the shift from floating to fixed coupons is 
also apparent in non-perpetual issues. On average, the coupon of non-perpetual issues 
could equally be fixed or floating, but in the 1980s bonds were typically issued with 
floating coupons. Again, with a cut-off in the very early 1990s, there has been a shift 
towards a preference for fixed coupon issues since. Additionally, like perpetual 
securities, more innovative coupon structures are being created. This is happening for 
both floating and fixed rate non-perpetual securities. 
In summary, as global interest rates have fallen there has been a shift to fixed rate 
SND securities along the whole maturity spectrum. The infinite maturity of perpetual 
securities means that, in the financial and economic environment of the 1990s and 
early 2000s, this transition has been more pronounced. Therefore, virtually all such 
securities are being issued with fixed rate coupons. Innovation in the financial 
markets has led to more complicated coupon structures being created in the 1990s, 
which again pervade both perpetual and non-perpetual securities. 
Callable Issues 
Data is only available for 494 of the 536 issues, but they represent 97% of the value of 
all SND issues over the time period covered by the thesis. As Table 6-10 illustrates, 
UK credit institutions frequently attach call features to their SND, enabling an issuer 
to call a bond prior to its maturity. The sample period average of 64% is broadly 
in 
line with Sironi's (2001) observation that UK credit institutions are some of the 
largest issuers of callable SND in Europe. In only two of the eighteen sample years 
does the percentage of callable issues drop below 50% (see figure 6-3). In contrast, 
Sironi (2001) reports that, on average, only 17% of European banks' SND 
is 
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callable. 
12 The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1999) report that, 
currently, US bank 
SND typically does not have call options attached. Again, UK 
credit institution-issued SND has features that are unique compared to other major 
issuing countries. This finding is probably not surprising given the high proportion of 
perpetual debt issues made in the UK. Table 6-10 splits the callable data into 
perpetual and non-perpetual data to investigate this farther. 13 The table illustrates that 
enabling an issuer to call a bond prior to its maturity is a very important feature of UK 
perpetual SND. 92% of all perpetual debt issues (98% in value terms) have callable 
features. Throughout the sample time period the percentage of perpetual bonds that 
are callable remains very high. However, on average, only 48% of all callable issues 
are perpetual SND suggesting that callable options are a common feature of non- 
perpetual SND as well. 14 50% of all non-perpetual SND is callable, highlighting that 
call features are popular across the whole maturity spectrum of UK SND issues. 
The average first call date for all callable issues over the sample period is 10 years, 
but the standard deviation highlights significant variation. In any given year, the first 
call date typically ranges from five years to thirty years. Table 6-10 also highlights 
how the average first call date has lengthened over time from five years to over ten 
years, with a sizeable jump occurring in 1992. These observations can be attributed to 
perpetual callable SND, which experiences a large increase in the first call date from 
five years to around fifteen years from 1992 onwards. Equally, prior to 1991, 
perpetual SND had remarkably standardised first call dates, hence the small standard 
deviations. In contrast, after 1991, there is an extremely wide range of first call dates. 
Interestingly, the shift to longer first call dates coincides with the shift from floating 
rate coupons to fixed rate coupons on perpetual SND around 1991 (see table 6-9). 
Both of these trends suggest that UK credit institutions altered the structure of their 
perpetual SND characteristics to take advantage of the expectation of falling interest 
rates. Issuers have shifted to fixed coupon securities to lock into low funding rates for 
a considerable number of years. In contrast, floating rate coupon perpetual SND have 
historically had short first call dates enabling issuers to redeem the issue early 
if 
funding costs became uneconomical. 
In contrast to perpetual SND, non-perpetual issues have not experienced any 
noticeable shift in first call dates over the sample period, 
15 but this could be due to the 
158 
coupon typically attached to a callable non-perpetual bond. Despite Table 6-9 
indicating that non-perpetual SND has moved towards fixed rate coupons over time, 
the majority of callable non-perpetual SND issues are floating rate. Therefore, as for 
perpetual floating rate SND, issuers retain short first call dates to protect funding 
costs. 
Redemption of Issues 
An additional contribution of analysing SND issues through annual reports and 
accounts over the Bondware database is that individual callable issues can be traced to 
examine whether they have been redeemed prior to their maturity date or not. The 
benefit is that it can provide a picture of whether callable features are frequently taken 
up or otherwise by UK credit institutions. 
Table 6-11 splits all callable bonds between perpetual and non-perpetual issues and 
indicates how many can be called by the end of 2005. The table reports whether the 
bond was redeemed in part or in full, and whether this occurred at the first call date or 
after the first call date but prior to maturity of the bond. There is a clear difference in 
the historical redemption of the two types. Of the 43 perpetual bonds that could have 
been redeemed by the end of 2005, just under half have been (the majority having 
been done so in full). In contrast, 83% of non-perpetual bonds have been redeemed in 
full, or partly redeemed, at or after the first call date. Again, the majority have been 
redeemed in full and, in this particular case, most of them at the first available 
opportunity. The table shows that redemption occurs in waves suggesting that bonds 
issued at certain periods become suitable for early redemption because, under current 
market conditions, they are now expensive to fund. This appears to be the case for 
non-perpetual bonds issued between 1996 and 1999 as they have all been redeemed or 
repaid in full before their maturity date. All bar two of them have been redeemed in 
full at the first possible opportunity. The favourable market conditions for issuing 
bonds in the early 2000s, such as falling long-term yields (see figure 6-1), may 
have 
prompted this, because all bar two of those redeemed had floating rate or 
floating/step-up coupons. Early redemption would allow credit institutions to 
issue 
new fixed rate securities that lock in at today's historically low rates 
for some 
considerable period of time, thus protecting against medium term rate rises. 
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The average lifespan of bonds called early indicates that non-perpetual bonds often 
last for no more than 6 years. Given that most callable non-perpetual bonds have been 
called before maturity, an analysis of their initial maturities was performed. 
Consistent with Table 6-7b on SND maturities, callable non-perpetual bonds have an 
initial maturity of at least ten years. It is noticeable how since 1996 the average initial 
maturity has been ten years with a call option after five years, which has nearly 
always been invoked. Therefore, UK credit institutions have recently been issuing 
callable non-perpetual SND which is more often than not called early leading to 
bonds with a lifespan of no more than six years. Whether this is due to particular 
market conditions in the past ten years or so has been suggested, but table 6-11 does 
record that non-perpetual bonds have frequently been redeemed early ever since the 
sample commencement period of 1985. Therefore, it could be a feature of UK credit 
institution SND that callable non-perpetual debt is issued to provide the issuer with 
funding flexibility. 
Having analysed perpetual and non-perpetual SND for maturity, coupon and callable 
characteristics it appears appropriate to characterise the period since 1992 as follows. 
As a result of historically low interest rates, credit institutions have been issuing 
perpetual SND at fixed rates of interest and with long first call dates. On top of this 
there has been a gradual shift from floating rate to fixed rate non-perpetual SND 
without call options due to the historically low rates. In contrast, floating rate coupon 
non-perpetual debt is more likely to be callable in case there is a rise in funding 
rates. 16 
Currency of Issue 
The preferred currency of issue has clearly been Sterling and US Dollars throughout 
the sample period (see table 6-12a). The advent of the Euro gave rise to a number of 
issues in displaced domestic European currencies during 1998.1 
7 However, the 
introduction of the Euro in 1999 subsequently led to it becoming the third most 
important currency of issue for UK SND issues. In 1999, Euro issues even outstripped 
those issued in sterling, but from 2000 onwards the supply of Euro issues has 
fallen 
behind those issued in Sterling and Dollars. This suggests that, perhaps, the 
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increase in Euro issues reflected the novelty value of the currency. However, as the 
Euro weakened against Sterling, its attractiveness as a base currency for SND issues 
declined. As previously discussed, it is important to note that the sudden rise in SND 
issues in 1999 cannot be solely attributed to the introduction of the Euro, as both 
Sterling and Dollar issues rose significantly at this time. Table 6-12b concentrates on 
the three key SND issuance currencies. The totals rows clearly illustrate that banks 
have issued as much Sterling and Dollar SND during the period 1999-2002 as in the 
preceding fourteen years. 
It is also interesting to note that, although the number of Euro issues declined, Table 
6-12a indicates that the average size of issues denominated in Dollars and Euros are 
generally much larger than their Sterling SND counterparts. This suggests that they 
are probably easier to sell in large amounts compared to their Sterling equivalent. 
Although this may be the case, the numbers are slightly misleading because building 
societies can only issue SND securities in Sterling. Table 6-6 illustrates that each 
building society SND issue is on average fives times smaller than a bank SND issue 
over the period 1999-2002. Therefore, Table 6-12b separates Sterling issues by type 
of credit institution, enabling a more meaningful comparison with Dollar and Euro 
issues. Sterling still has the smallest average issue size of the three, but the gap is now 
more meaningful. The table indicates that, during the period 1999-2002, average issue 
sizes have exceeded £200 million pounds for all three currencies, which is similar in 
size to US bank SND issues (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
1999). 
Tables 6-13a, 6-13b and 6-13c examine the coupon and maturity characteristics of 
each major currency of issue for any trends that may assist in explaining earlier 
observations. A particularly interesting point is that both Sterling and Dollar issues 
have moved from floating coupons to fixed coupons, with 1991 providing the switch 
Year. The move to fixed coupon SND has been particularly striking for Sterling with 
90% of all SND issues between 1999-2002 having such a composition. These years 
represent an unprecedented period of historically-low interest rates for 
Sterling, and 
credit institutions have taken advantage by locking funding obligations at these rates. 
In tandem with this, 52% of all Sterling issues during 1999-2002 were perpetual 
maturity SND, suggesting that issuers are locking in at these rates for some 
ý61 
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considerable period of 
time. In contrast, both Dollar and Euro perpetual issues 
represented 30% of their respective 
issues during the same time period. For the same 
reasons as suggested above, table 
6-13a shows that Sterling non-perpetual SND has 
also seen widening maturities since 1998. 
Analysis of Bondware SND data 
The Bondware database can provide evidence on a couple of features of UK credit 
institution SND that are unavailable in annual reports and accounts. This section 
examines those two characteristics; the spread at launch of the issue and the method 
by which the issue is released to the market. The relevance of these characteristics to 
the market discipline debate is explained when each characteristic is analysed. First, 
this section outlines some limitations with the Bondware database and their potential 
implications for market discipline conclusions if this database is used exclusively. 
A caveat to Bondware analysis 
The Bondware database forms the initial dataset for several market discipline studies 
and represented the starting point for this study. However, data triangulation raised a 
number of concerns with this dataset, hence the predominant analysis of LJK credit 
institution SND issuance and characteristics was carried out using annual reports and 
accounts data. As the Bondware dataset is the foundation for the "master database", 
the same limitations apply therein. Particular concerns are, first, that Bondware is 
erratic in its recording of PIIBS; some are in the database and others are not. As 
previously mentioned, it is important to include PEBS in the analysis because 
conversion of a building society to a bank causes PIOBS to become undated SND- This 
understatement of SND activity links to the second point. Several bonds, as well as 
PEBS, could be located in other data sources (credit agency ratings, the existence of 
secondary market spreads) but were not recorded in the Bondware dataset. 
There are 
several reasons specific to the collation of data in Bondware that explain this 
discrepancy. Bondware will only record SND issues that are released 
in the bond 
market by private placement if the issuing credit institution is willing to supply 
the 
information. This may explain why the number of issues excluded 
from the Bondware 
database tended to be higher for some credit institutions compared to others 
(for 
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example, building societies), thereby 
biasing issuance activity in favour of certain 
institutions. Equally, the reduced likelihood of including private placement bonds 
njeans that publicly-issued bonds are more likely to be included in the database, 
which raises other bias concerns that are discussed below. Additionally, even 
publicly-issued bonds are excluded from Bondware if there is no bookrunner on the 
deal. This was true for at least 15 bonds. The third problem is that data triangulation 
identified that Bondware was reporting a number of security issues that were, in fact, 
preference share issues and not SND. The inappropriate inclusion of these would have 
overstated the proportion of perpetual securities issued by UK credit institutions. 17 
such securities were removed from the initial Bondware dataset. Given these and 
other minor problems identified during the data collation stage, the author was able to 
obtain a further 32 SND issues and their data characteristics from the Bondware 
supplier. This represents a 9% increase in the number of issues recorded in the 
Bondware dataset leading to a final "master database" of 399 SND issues. 18 
Nevertheless, given the nature of Bondware data collation, some potential bias 
remains against private placement and building societies issues. The following section 
utilises the "master database" to examine two additional characteristics of UK credit 
institution SND. 
Spread at Launch 
This infortnation is only available for fixed rate issues since 1991 and of the 253 fixed 
rate issues during that time, information on primary spreads is only available for 209 
of them (83%). The evidence is presented in Table 6-14 and highlights an average 
sPread over comparable Treasury instruments of 148 basis points, with a standard 
deviation of 71 basis points. Even during the exceptional issuance period 1999-2002, 
the average spread at launch was 175 basis points and the standard deviation 73 basis 
Points. In order to impose a penalty on high-risk banks, Calomiris (1997) suggested 
that qualifying mandatory SND should not offer a yield spread in excess of 50 
basis 
Points. In the UK context, such a policy would have resulted in only 5 
issues being 
unpenalised between 1991 and 2002.19 Equally, the variability of UK spreads 
suggests that imposing and determining an optimal rate cap for qualifying 
SND would 
be diffIcult. 
163 
Table 6.14: Spread at launch characteristics by year (1991-2002) 
Year 
No. of 
Spread at launch (basis points) 
Issues Mean Median Max Min 
Std. 
Dev. 
1991 4 163 166 185 135 19 
1992 6 122 149 155 37 44 
1993 23 155 140 280 90 44 
1994 9 141 110 255 63 73 
1995 7 107 105 170 62 42 
1996 19 85 89 125 11 27 
1997 11 82 82 120 55 19 
1998 13 81 90 125 46 27 
1999 29 141 146 240 72 43 
2000 34 249 244 415 112 69 
2001 29 165 155 288 87 55 
2002 25 124 110 225 70 39 
Total 209 148 135 415 11 71 
Source: Bondware. 
Clearly, UK credit institutions' preference for perpetual debt may be influencing the 
large spreads. Table 6-15 presents the same spread data., but split by maturity type. 
Despite categorising the data in this manner large initial spreads and wide spread 
variations still remain. Comparing the UK non-perpetual spread data with European 
banks spread data in Sironi (2003) it is clear that UK SND spreads are almost the 
highest in Europe and are significantly higher than several other European countries. 
Therefore, a qualifying SND spread ceiling of 50 basis points would penalise some 
cOuntries banks over others. 
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The table indicates for both maturity types that a gradual fall in spreads occurred 
throughout the 1990s, rising rapidly in 1999 and then falling again during the early 
2000s (see figure 6-4). This has two implications for the spread versus bank risk 
analysis conducted in chapter seven. First, the necessity for a maturity variable is 
evident from the consistently wider spreads for perpetual debt over non-perpetual 
SND. Secondly, the variability in spreads over time indicates that both panel and 
cross-sectional model specifications should be analysed for structural shifts in market 
conditions. 
Issue Method 
The type of market issue can provide some indication as to whether the market for 
UK SND would be able to support a suitable MSNDP. Although both public and 
private placing of SND issues may provide suitable direct discipline 20 , public 
issuance is viewed as a necessary condition to create suitable depth in secondary 
markets and, therefore, the potential for successful indirect market discipline (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2003) . 
21 As Table 6-16 indicates, the average 
issue size of public issues far outweighs that for private placements. Similarly, the 
majority of SND issues (94%) are public and the dollar value of these issues 
represents 98% of total SND value. The vast majority of these public issues are 
eurobonds, with 79% of all SND issues being euro - public issues. These percentages 
far exceed those presented by Sironi (2001). As such, they serve to highlight the 
existence of structural differences across the EU SND markets and suggest that some 
countries' bank issues may be better placed to support price-based indirect market 
discipline than others. A caveat to these findings is that the construction of the 
Bondware database is likely to bias in favour of public issues over private placement. 
Naturally, this is likely to occur for both UK and continental European banks and so 
the general conclusion that structural differences exist is unlikely to be materially 
affected. However, if Bondware are able to extract more comprehensive bond 
issuance data from certain countries compared to others this may affect the 
comparative findings. Looking at the UK case more specifically, Bondware only 
includes 399 out of the 536 bonds reported in the annual reports and accounts 
analysis, leaving a shortfall of 137 missing SND issues. 51 of these 
have credit ratings 

E 
49 
p.. I. - N C) 
CV 
(» Ö 
MM !ý 
F OOýMO 
Op 0 
0 
E 
40 
ý 
ý 
0 
I- 
4- 
0 
o 
0 
(fl 
CO Co ON 
U«) d' O CO 
O c6 -r-- c» 
OO 
T- 
co N d' M 
M ti M 
MN Iý 
0 
cfl c4 
M 
ti 
Oý 
O 
tfl 
N 
P 
P 
M 
C) 
M 
N. 
M 
MN 
C. 6 
oLO 00 
O t- O 
0 
(0 
N 1`- 
0) M 
e2 
M 
r 
O 
e- 
M 
N 
M 
(D 
CO 
n 
N 
tfl 
Md'Lf) 
6 d' r- 
0 0 N (0 
i++ 
ýi 
=3 (1) Cl) 
W .. 
0 
M W WI .ý.. 
0 -5 :8 
Vja, Cl- 
4-0 a, C: 1 
N' 
'n 
II 
E o2 -0 0 ýWýiC7 
.. _ 
.äv 
N 
Eý a) ÜN 
C, o U 
0.. 
ý 
cu 
.ý (ß 
0.. 
(Q - a) 
> ý- nt 
L- a> > .P '^L 
ý> CL 
Cl) 
NI C)) 
EON 
00 in W LL 
to 
c4 
ý 
r 
t 
M 
O 
Ö 
O 
ý 
d' 
w 
It 
'd' 
N 
Tý 
0 
ö 
0) 
O) 
M 
ý 
ý 
O 
H 
which suggest that they may be publicly-traded. This would leave a shortfall of 86 out 
of a SND population of 536 (or 16%). If one makes the extreme assumption that all 
16% are private placements then the percentage of UK issues publicly traded would 
fall from 94% to 78%. This is still extremely high for market discipline purposes. It is 
impossible to compare this number to the European evidence from Sironi (2001) 
because there is no possibility of determining what percentage of the European SND 
population his Bondware sample covered. 
Summary of accounts and Bondware analysis 
An analysis of annual reports and accounts produces a definitive account of UK credit 
institutions' SND issuance activity over the thesis sample period 1985-2002. Issuance 
has averaged 33 issues per year, but this hides troughs and peaks in issuance activity. 
Regulatory developments have certainly influenced issuance activity and prevailing 
economic conditions also appear to be an influence; the latter will be tested in section 
three of this chapter. The key characteristics of this debt are that perpetual securities 
have consistently represented a significant proportion of SND issues. Further, callable 
features are prominent both in perpetual and non-perpetual securities. Both 
characteristics differ significantly from those SND issues by continental European and 
US banks, which raises questions concerning the instigation of a global MSNDP. This 
question is also examined in greater depth in section three. 
Bondware enabled an analysis of two further SND characteristics; spread at launch 
and the issue method. The spread at launch exhibited wide variability across each year 
which raises concerns for any potential mandatory SND policy that instigated a 
qualifying SND spread ceiling. Again, Europe-wide evidence suggests that certain 
countries' banks would be penalised,, whereas others would not. In a similar vein, an 
analysis of the method of issue of SND highlighted potentially significant disparities 
in structural conditions across Europe. Therefore, some countries' bank issues may 
be 
better Placed to support price-based indirect market discipline than others. 
As for the 
annual reports and accounts analysis, these issues will be revisited in section three of 
this chapter which draws the key conclusions for a MSNDP in the UK. 
Before this is 
Possible, the following section of this chapter explores UK SND issuance at 
the credit 
institution level in order to examine the potential scope of a MSNDP 
in the UK. 
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Section 2- Bank and building societies' individual issuance 
previous studies examining MSNDP have concentrated on their appropriateness at a 
country-level, This study is unique in focusing on one country and exploring SND 
issuance and its characteristics at the credit institution-level. It must ultimately be 
remembered that it is credit institutions that would have to issue mandatory SND not 
countries and that a MSNDP may not be appropriate for all credit institutions within a 
country. The purpose of this section is to examine the potential scope of a MSNDP in 
the UK given credit institutions' own SND issuance history. 
Unlike other studies on European market discipline, this thesis has purposefully 
incorporated two types of domestic credit institution in order to assess whether the 
market for SND is sufficiently deep to include issues from both types of institution in 
a MSNDP. As financial regulatory policy in the UK converges for both types of credit 
institution, it is important to see if a MSNDP could affect the level playing field. The 
data is from the Annual Reports and Accounts analysis section and excludes SND 
loans. 
Issuance Activity 
The 536 SND issues of UK credit institutions over the sample period relate to 44 
different issuers (pre-mergers). 8 were merchant banks and 24 were (and some still 
are) building societies. By the end of 2002, mergers and takeovers had reduced the 
nuraber of issuers to 26, of which 13 were banks. This means that 13 of the 65 
currently-registered building societies have issued SND. A brief examination reveals 
that 12 of these have assets in excess of El billion and 8 represent the largest UK 
building societies. With regard to the banks, an examination of the 94 UK-owned 
banks (as at March 2002) reveals that 12 SND issuers were in the top 13 
banks, as 
measured by total assets, and all 13 were among the 14 largest banks 
in the UK (see 
Table 6-18). This concentration of SND issuance highlights that a lot of smaller 
UK 
banks and building societies do not issue SND and so a MSMDP would 
have to be 
restricted to the larger UK credit institutions. The question, however, 
is whether such 
a policy would be appropriate for even these institutions. 
Table 6-17a: UK bank and building society SND issuance (1985-2002) 
Bank Average 
Building 
Year issues* / issuer 
Society 
issues* 
Average / Total 
Issuer issues 
1985 23(11) 2.1 N/A 0 23 
1986 22(13) 1.7 N/A 0 22 
1987 6(4) 1.5 N/A 06 
1988 22(6) 3.7 16(9) 1.8 38 
1989 13(6) 2.7 8(7) 1.1 21 
1990 8(5) 1.6 9(8) 1.1 17 
1991 12(6) 2.0 15(9) 1.7 27 
1992 8(5) 1.6 13(12) 1.1 21 
1993 20(10) 2.0 12(10) 1.2 32 
1994 15(7) 2.1 4(4) 1.0 19 
1995 16(6) 2.7 3(2) 1.5 19 
1996 21(9) 2.3 10(6) 1.7 31 
1997 22(9) 2.4 6(5) 1.2 28 
1998 19(6) 3.2 2(2) 1.0 21 
1999 54(11) 4.9 9(6) 1.5 63 
2000 48(12) 4.1 1(1) 1.0 49 
2001 41(12**) 3.4 5(4) 1.3 46 
2002 47(10) 4.7 6(6) 1.0 53 
Total 417 119 536 
*In parentheses is the number of different issuers during the year. 
"During this year the Bank of Scotland, Halifax PLC and the merged entity 
HBOS 
PLC all issued SND. For the purposes of this table this has been counted as 
involving 
OIIIY two issuers. 
Source: Annual Reports and Accounts 
168 
Table 6-17a examines issuance activity by type of credit institution and supports the 
discussion in section two of this chapter, which highlighted that banks have made the 
overwhehning number of issues. For example, the frequency of issuance by banks 
numbers between two and three per year, rising to four per year since 1999, whereas 
building societies consistently average between one and two per year. The decrease in 
building society issues after 1997 reflects the relatively-large number of plc 
conversions; however, this hides the trend for smaller building societies to enter the 
market for SND. 
Accordingly, Table 6-17b shows how the number of issues by building societies that 
have not converted has risen in the period 1999-2002. Continuing on the same theme, 
table 6-17c illustrates the SND issuance activity by traditional banks, i. e. those that 
were banks at the commencement of the sample period. This highlights that it is not 
just the conversion to plc status that has raised the number of bank SND issues in 
table 6-17a, because it is clear that traditional banks have also raised their debt 
issuance since 1999. 
Taken together, the three tables on issuance frequency suggest that the smaller 
institutions that have issued SND (certainly those that are still building societies) issue 
debt with such irregularity that it would be inappropriate to require them to follow a 
MSNDP. Additionally, it must be stressed that tables 6-17a to 6-17c only record 
actual issuance and, therefore, the fact that an institution may refrain from issuing 
during a year is not apparent. As a result, average SND issuance activity for a 
Particular institution may be even lower than the general averages reported therein. 
To provide an institutional analysis of SND issuance table 6-18 provides a list of the 
largest UK banks and building societies as at the end of 2002 together with 
SNI) 
issuance data from the annual reports and accounts analysis, and key balance sheet 
and regulatory capital information. The outstanding SND number is sourced 
directly 
ftOM credit institutions' tier two regulatory capital disclosure, as are Total 
RWA and 
Regulatory Capital. 22 
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Table 6-17b: Subordinated debt issues by building societies that have not 
converted to PLC status 
Number of 
Year conversions to 
PLC status* 
Non- Total issues 
converted Average by building 
building /Issuer societies** 
societies** (Table 6-17a 
1988 0 3(2) 1.5 16(9) 
1989 1 4(3) 1.3 8(7) 
1990 0 5(5) 1.0 9(8) 
1991 0 3(3) 1.0 15(9) 
1992 0 7(7) 1.0 13(12) 
1993 0 3(2) 1.5 12(10) 
1994 0 3(3) 1.0 4(4) 
1995 1 1(1) 1.0 3(2) 
1996 1 1(1) 1.0 10(6) 
1997 5 2(2) 1.0 6(5) 
1998 0 1(1) 1.0 2(2) 
1999 1 9(6) 1.5 9(6) 
2000 1 0(0) 0.0 1(1) 
2001 0 5(4) 1.3 5(4) 
2002 0 6(6) 1.0 6(6) 
Total 10 53 
* Including those building societies acquired by banks. 
**In parentheses is the number of different issuers during the year. 
Source: Annual Reports and Accounts 
119 
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Table 6-17c: Subordinated debt issues by banks that were classified as banks as 
at 1' January 1985 
Year 
Total issues 
by banks as at Average / 
Ist January Issuer 
1985* 
Total issues 
by banks* 
(Table 17a) 
1985 23(11) 2.1 23(11) 
1986 22(13) 1.7 22(13) 
1987 6(4) 1.5 6(4) 
1988 22(6) 3.7 22(6) 
1989 11(5) 2.2 13(6) 
1990 8(5) 1.6 8(5) 
1991 11(5) 2.2 12(6) 
1992 4(4) 1.0 8(5) 
1993 18(9) 2.0 20(10) 
1994 10(6) 1.7 15(7) 
1995 13(5) 2.6 16(6) 
1996 18(8) 2.3 21(9) 
1997 18(8) 2.3 22(9) 
1998 15(5) 3.0 19(6) 
1999 39(7) 5.6 54(11) 
2000 36(7) 5.1 48(12) 
2001 30(6**) 5.0 41(12**) 
2002 34(6) 5.7 47(10) 
Total 338 417 
*I" parentheses is the number of different issuers during the year. 
**During this year Bank of Scotland, Halifax PLC and the merged entity HBOS 
PLC 
all issued SND. For the purposes of column 4 this has been counted as 
involving only 
twO issuers and for the purposes of column 2 treated as only involving one 
issuer. 
SOurce: Annual Reports and Accounts 
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Although all ten large banks have substantial amounts Of SND outstanding when 
compared to RWA, 
23 table 6-18 highlights a concentration of SND issuance amongst 
the six largest credit institutions. These six institutions were responsible for 388 of the 
536 issues made over the sample period, i. e. 72% of all issues. The dominance of 
these institutions is further emphasised by the fact that their issues represented 86% of 
the total value of SND issues over the sample period. Moreover, these six financial 
institutions were the only issuers to average at least two SND issues per year, which is 
seen as the minimum annual issuance frequency for a MSNDp24 (see table 6-22 -A 
summary of MSNDP proposals, which is reproduced in chapter 6 from chapter 2). 
The averages in table 6-18 fail to illustrate that two smaller banks (Standard Chartered 
and Northern Rock) have issued debt with some regularity during the period 1999 to 
2002 and could, therefore, be considered under a MSNDP. However, institutions of 
similar size (Nationwide, Alliance & Leicester and Bradford & Bingley) have quite 
different issuing patterns, which suggest that the imposition of a MSNDP on either 
Standard Chartered or Northern Rock may put them at a competitive disadvantage 
during difficult trading conditions in the bond market (see table 6-19). 
In contrast to the six largest banks, the smaller institutions issue debt with such 
irregularity that it would be inappropriate to require them to follow a MSNDP- This is 
in line with proposals by the US Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (2000) and 
Wall (1989) to exempt small banks from a mandatory debt requirement. Their 
infrequent issuance during the recent period of demand for corporate debt suggests 
that a MSNDP would impose excessive regulatory costs by causing them to 
significantly shift funding patterns away from the optimum. As a result, it appears that 
only the six largest credit institutions, which are all banks, would be appropriate for 
inclusion in a MSNDP in the UK. 
The high issuance numbers for the six largest banks could, however, be misleading 
because they have all been created from mergers and acquisitions over the sample 
Pefiod. Therefore, the average issues per year reflect the activities of more than one 
institution. Table 6-19 reveals far lower issuance activity when the analysis 
focuses 
Oil the constituents. Nevertheless, this does not detract from the fact that going 
fOrward, only six UK banks are large enough to regularly issue SND and, therefore, 
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be included in a MSNDP. To provide consistency across time periods, table 6-20 
recreates table 6-19 with tier one securities excluded. Both tables 6-20 and 6-19 
indicate that the issuance activities of the six largest credit institutions fluctuated 
significantly over the sample period. This fluctuation appears to be related to debt 
market conditions; the highest issuance activity for all six institutions was during the 
period 1999-2002, when bond market conditions were favourable. During this period, 
these institutions made at least three issues per year, but some institutions made 
considerably more. In contrast, the difficult trading conditions of the early 1990s 
coincided with a period of low annual issuance when large credit institutions barely 
averaged more than 1 issue per year. 25 Covitz, Hancock and Kwast (2000) and 
Calorniris and Powell (2001) suggest that riskier banks are less likely to issue SND, 
especially during periods of banking stress. Although chapter four of this thesis 
explains that it is difficult in the LJK context to construct an econometric model 
relating SND issuance activity to measures of bank risk, the evidence in table 6-19 
suggests that banks are less likely to issue debt during periods of market and bank 
stress. Therefore, a MSNDP with a regular issuance requirement would force banks to 
issue debt during inopportune periods to enable the market to price bank risks through 
direct market discipline. 
As an aside, the literature review in chapter two explained that a potential limitation 
of a MSNDP is that it may constrain credit institutions' funding opportunities given 
that they also have to adhere to regulatory capital restrictions for capital adequacy 
Purposes. Conversely, some commentators have suggested that, because banks issue 
more SND than the 50% percent of tier one capital that is permitted for capital 
adequacy purposes under the Basel Accord, a mandatory issuance policy structured on 
current capital ratios should not constrain banks' funding possibilities. However, they 
fail to recognise that only term SND is limited to 50% of tier one capital. Perpetual 
SND can be included, for capital adequacy purposes, up to a maximum of 100% of 
tier one capital. This is important because this thesis has already stressed how 
Perpetual SND forms a sipificant proportion of UK issues. Therefore, although 
MUM 8 in table 6-18 suggests that all large UK banks have outstanding 
SND in 
excess of 50% of tier I capital, in reality it is all included for regulatory capital 
Purposes. Column 9 confirms that term SND for all large UK banks lies within 
the 
50% restriction (although Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley are extremely 
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close). Consequently, regulatory capital regulations may be having a larger influence 
on the type of SND 
being issued than is currently recognised in the literature. For 
example, the rise in perpetual 
issuance, and especially tier one issues, in the period 
1999-2002 has provided UK banks with a degree of leeway in their term SND ratio 
and overall tier 2 to tier I ratio. 
26 Column 10 in table 6-18 reports that two of the six 
largest UK banks had more perpetual SND outstanding than term SND at the end of 
2002. The same two institutions have been the largest issuers of perpetual SND over 
the period 1999-2002. 
issue Size 
A finiher characteristic of a MSNDP is the minimum issue size of a bond so that 
credit institutions cannot by-pass mandatory debt issuance by issuing in small 
27 
quantities. At the same time, minimum issuance amounts ensure that a significant 
proportion of suitable investors are regularly at risk of bank failure and, in tandem 
with regular issuance, that the bank must frequently call on large numbers of investors 
to replace existing mandatory debt. This enhances disciplining options. 
Table 6-21 presents the average issue size of SND by the six largest UK credit 
institutions over the thesis sample period, split by groups of years. The SND issue 
values have been adjusted in real terms to the end of 2002, therefore, the earlier the 
issue the larger its real value compared to its nominal value. The table excludes tier 
one securities. The average issue value over the thesis sample period is E223 million, 
but this hides periods of marked difference. 28 Issue values were clearly lower during 
the period 1990-1992 when issuance activity was lower. In contrast, issue values were 
significantly higher at the beginning and end of the sample period, again for reasons 
discussed previously. Looking at overall issuance value per year, the period 1999- 
2002 is 5 times larger than 1990-1992. Therefore, a minimum issuance value 
somewhere between the extreme periods would appear to provide a suitable 
hurdle 
during less favourable economic and financial conditions. 
Summaty 
This secfion has examined SND issuance activity at the institutional 
level. The credit 
illsfitution-level 
approach provides a unique focus in the market 
discipline literature in 
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. Mnining 
the appropriateness of MSNDP proposals in contrast to the country-level ex 
focus of previous studies. Furthermore, such an approach is consistent with the fact 
that it is ultimately credit institutions that would have to issue mandatory SND not 
countries. The section has concluded that a MSNDP, if introduced, should be 
restricted to the largest internationally-active credit institutions in the LJK- Smaller 
institutions issue SND with such irregularity that a MSNDP would cause them to 
significantly alter their funding structures from their current circumstances and create 
an uneven playing field. Section three will now apply the key findings and themes 
ftom sections one and two to the general characteristics proposed in MSNDPs and in 
that way answer the research question: "Is credit institution-issued SND compatible 
with Mandatory Subordinated Debt Policy proposals? " 
Section 3- UK credit institutions' SND and the implications for 
Mandatory Subordinated Debt Policy proposals 
Having examined the issuance activity and characteristics of UK credit institutions, 
this section will apply the findings from the previous two sections to the key 
characteristics suggested in the literature for an appropriate MSNDP. In that way, the 
implications for the introduction of a MSNDP in the UK and wider afield can be 
assessed. Chapter four also suggests that some wider research hypotheses could be 
investigated that may indicate influences on SND issuance activity and which could 
also provide a contribution to the existing literature on mandatory SND. These will 
also be examined in this section. 
ImPlications for Mandatory Subordinated Debt Proposals in the UK 
The literature review in chapter two provided a summary of the key facets that an 
appropriate MSNDP should contain. This table is reproduced below as table 6-22. 
Chapter four provided a set of research sub-questions that align with these key 
characteristics so that the evidence from sections one and two can be applied to the 
theoretical literature. These questions are reproduced below: 
' Rat would be the scope, if at all, of a MSNDP in the UK? 
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. How often should 
banks be required to issue SND? 
. How much SND should banks be required to issue? 
s "atform should the SND take? 
# Do thesefindings have implicationsfor a potential international MSNDP? 
Scope of a MSNDP in the UK? 
The evidence from section two highlights significant issuer concentration in the 
market for UK SND- The largest six institutions were responsible for 86% of the total 
value of SND issues over the sample period and had 87% of the outstanding SND on 
their books at the end of 2002 (see table 6-18). In order to encourage sufficient 
investor monitoring and to ensure that the level of SND is related to a bank's risk 
profile, MSNDP proposals suggest a level of outstanding SND of between 2% and 5% 
of RWA. The ten largest banks in the UK all satisfy this condition, suggesting that 
SND already forms an integral portion of bank funding. However, a key feature of a 
MSNDP is the requirement for regular issues, of between 2 and 4 per year. Although 
8 banks have recently met this requirement, tables 6-18 and 6-19 indicate that only the 
six largest banks have met this requirement over the thesis sample period. 
Nevertheless, it should be remembered that mergers and acquisitions have enabled 
these six institutions to grow sufficiently to be able to meet this requirement. This 
suggests that it is only recently that they have found themselves in a position to make 
sufficient, regular calls on the market. It is also interesting to note that each of these 
six banks had assets in excess of E200 billion at the end of 2002, whereas the seventh 
largest bank had an asset base that was less than half that. Therefore, imposing a 
MSNDP exclusively on the six largest banks suggests that it will not significantly 
influence the competitive playing field within the UK banking industry, which is 
desirable, yet would cover around 85% of UK banking assets. 
HOW often should banks be required to issue SND? 
Although all six large banks issued SMD at an average of between 2 and 5 times a 
year) issuance activity varied significantly over the sample period. The post 
1999 era, 
for exarnple, has witnessed a period of unprecedented issuance activity 
because cheap 
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funding could be obtained (between 3 and 9 issues per year). However, this was 
previously offset by a period of markedly-reduced calls on the market, especially 
during the difficult trading conditions of 1989-1992 (between 1 and 3 issues per year). 
This suggests that requiring banks to issue four times per year (once every quarter) 
njay provide a suitable hurdle without imposing excessive regulatory costs. This 
would enable investors to regularly price bank risks into new SND issues and to 
provide the regulatory authorities with an additional insight into bank condition. In 
fact, with the finance literature questioning the quality of bank-specific information in 
debt prices (Delianedis and Geske, 2001; Longstaff, 2002), maybe the informational 
power of a MSNDP lies in the quantity-based signals arising from whether, or not, 
banks can regularly issue SND. 
How much should banks be required to issue? 
As previously suggested, the largest UK banks would satisfy a MSNDP requirement 
for outstanding SND capital that lay between 2% and 5% of RWA. Looking at current 
SND levels (see table 6-18) and given the extremely large SND issues in the past four 
years, it appears that a minimum of 4% of RWA is appropriate. This is in line with 
current, voluntary SND amounts held on banks' balance sheets. As such, it indicates 
that a MSNDP would not force banks to lever themselves above the unconstrained 
optimum and crowd out other funding sources. The extremely high levels of tier I 
capital recorded by UK banks confirm that these voluntary SND amounts are in no 
way restricting equity sources of funding to the minimum. The average size of each 
issue over the thesis sample period is E223 million ($350 million), which compares 
favourably with US findings of between $250m and $400m (Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, 2000) and is larger than the European average of $250m 
(Sironi, 2001). The UK evidence indicates that issuance values have varied over time 
in light Of market conditions. As a result, to accommodate periods of reduced market 
activity, each issue should be at least E200 million in value. That would require the 
six banks to issue E800 million of mandatory SNI) each yearg which may not seem 
substantial given issuance activity and values in the period 1999-2002, 
but which 
Would appear to provide a hurdle if market conditions deteriorated. 
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What form should the SND take? 
Section two indicates that the current issues of UK credit institutions are, primarily, 
fixed-rate perpetual or ten-year maturity debt. The long maturity Of UK issues easily 
exceeds the extreme MSNDP requirement for debt with an initial maturity of five 
years. However, in line with most MSNDP proposals, it can be argued that the 
average initial maturity of UK SND, of 13 years, is too long to provide suitable 
market discipline monitoring and signalling. European and US data indicate average 
SND maturities that also easily exceed 5 years. Therefore, requiring banks to issue 
SND with a maximum maturity of 5 years will conflict with capital adequacy 
regulations 
29 and cause banks to alter funding strategies from the unconstrained 
optimum and, as a result, the maturity characteristic of MSNDP proposals should be 
reviewed. On the other hand, it is argued that capital adequacy regulations requiring 
banks to amortise debt by 20% each year over the last five years have encouraged 
banks to issue debt with greater maturities. Therefore, if this requirement were 
removed, banks might issue shorter maturities. 
Other features associated with LTK debt issues are that they typically have call features 
attached to them, which contrast with desired MSNDP characteristics (Evanoff and 
Wall, 2001). Also, the debt is almost always publicly issued, which raises the 
potential for both direct and indirect market discipline. Taking into account the large 
average issue size, this suggests that the secondary market undoubtedly has the 
potential to be liquid. 
These SND characteristics contrast with the findings of studies on the US SND 
market (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2000) and the European 
findings of Sironi (2001), where ten-year maturity fixed-rate debt with non-callable 
features predominates. 30 As a result, the harTnonisation of an international MSNDP 
may prove more difficult than previously envisaged, even if the policy was restricted 
to the largest global credit institutions. The standardisation of SND features 
is 
desirable because it would make it easier for market participants and the regulatory 
authorities to perform comparative analyses and to decipher the market signals of 
bank risk. 
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Do these findings have implications for a potential MSNDP? 
The answer to this question can be framed around two policy considerations: domestic 
and international 
implementation of such a policy; and, given the costs, would a 
MSNDp enhance direct and/or indirect market discipline? 
At a domestic level, a MSNDP should be implemented, but restricted to the six largest 
banks in the UK. A policy of at least four issues per year with at least 4% outstanding 
SND to risk weighted assets would not prove overly burdensome for these banks nor 
constrain alternative funding sources, whilst at the same time enhancing, quantity- 
based, direct and indirect market discipline signals. Although the largest banks are 
currently issuing SND at a rate of more than four times per year, history indicates that 
issuance can soon dry up in difficult market and economic conditions unless a 
mandatory policy is in force. Furthermore, as the six largest banks are significantly 
larger than the rest, imposing a MSNDP exclusively on them suggests that it will not 
influence the competitive playing field within the UK banking industry. The large 
proportion of public issues raises the potential for a liquid secondary market and 
hence, suitable, price-based indirect market discipline. 
MSNDP proposals suggest initial maturities on qualifying SND of no more than 5 
years. A concern is that UK credit institutions voluntarily issue SND that easily 
exceeds this requirement. This, is in part, because of the 5-year amortization rule in 
the Basel Capital Accord. The extremely long average maturity of UK SND suggests 
that initial maturities would still exceed 5 years if the 5-year amortization rule was 
scrapped. A standardised form of qualifying SND is essential in creating directly 
cOmParable securities for moni toring secondary market yields across issuers and over 
time. Therefore, a price-based, indirect-discipline MSNDP would force UK 
institutions to significantly alter their debt funding mix and so is not desirable. 
However, standardizing SND maturities is not as critical in implementing quantity- 
based direct market discipline. Here, mandatory issuance becomes the overriding 
POlicY tool. If a bank is considered risky then investors are unlikely to subscribe 
fullding, unless it is at a considerable above-peer average cost to the 
bank and then 
this is likely to become market news. Regular SND issuance would mean 
that credit 
ýstitutions are frequently scrutinised by potential investors. Further, 
the requirement 
that credit institutions make regular SND issues would prevent them 
from constantly 
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issuing extremely long maturity debt in order to cover the 4% of RWAs requirement, 
because existing investors would become uncomfortable at the rise in leverage ratios. 
Retaining the current Basel Capital Accord rules on qualifying SND would ensure 
that n1aturities of less than five years would be unlikely. Therefore, in the presence of 
a direct market discipline policy that contains no maximum initial maturity 
requirement, by default institutions will continue to issue across the maturity 
spectrum. Further, as the paper has shown, individual institutions have a tendency to 
follow each other in issuing debt with similar maturities depending on market 
conditions. For example, the period 1998-2002 has seen UK banks taking advantage 
of low long-bond yields to issue an unprecedented amount of long maturity debt. 
Therefore, investors will have the capacity to compare yields to similar recent issues 
and decide whether to refrain from investing or request a higher yield. Again, if 
Wing can only be provided at a considerable above-peer average cost to the bank 
then this is likely to become market news. 
Therefore, from a cost-benefit perspective, a UK MSNDP should be restricted to 
primary market direct discipline. Debt issuance compels disclosure to the market 
about an institution's current condition and prospects. Regular calls on the debt 
market will provide mandatory SND investors with a significant governance 
mechanism, subjecting credit institutions to frequent monitoring and scrutiny and 
direct discipline signalling. Extending the policy to include indirect discipline through 
standardised mandatory SND would impose substantial funding constraints on UK 
credit institutions and therefore should not be implemented. 
With the globalisation of banking activities and banking regulation becoming 
increasingly international in scope, it is also essential to consider the implementation 
of a MSNDp from an international perspective. UK banks make relatively-large 
issues, which are comparable in size with US and European banks. However, 
analysing the market for SND at an institution-level and purely focusing on one 
cOuntrY Provides evidence of SND characteristics unique to the UK. 
Therefore, the 
hannonisation of standardised, mandatory SND across countries may prove 
far more 
difficult than authors , such as Sironi 
(2001), envisage. A global MSNDP would 
force 
sOnie cOuntries' banks to significantly alter their funding structures 
from the 
uncOnstrained Optimum and so distort the international level playing 
field. Consistent 
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with the UK policy recommendation 
developed above, maybe country-specific direct 
discipline MSNDPs would be the most appropriate policy direction. National banking 
supervisors would set minimum issue sizes and minimum issue frequencies for their 
internationally-active credit institutions. Again, a regular issuance requirement would 
be the key policy tool. Credit institutions could continue to issue debt appropriate to 
their niarket and circumstances, but mandatory issuance would subject them to 
ftequent monitoring and scrutiny and provide direct market discipline signals of bank 
condition to the national supervisory authorities. 
Research hypotheses pertinent to the mandatory SND debate 
One of the reasons that a MSNDP is perceived as being of value in the banking 
regulatory system is that it can force credit institutions to issue SND during both 
favourable and less favourable economic and market conditions. Therefore, during 
difficult market conditions, more solvent credit institutions are more likely to issue 
SND and less solvent credit institutions will be forced to issue SND at above market 
rates. Covitz, Hancock and Kwast (2004) estimate a probit "issuance model" for the 
SND issuance decision by US banks. They are able to infer that issuance decisions are 
sensitive to firm-specific risks and market conditions. Chapter four of this thesis 
explained that a probit model, in the mould of Covitz, Hancock and Kwast (2004), 
would not be possible in the UK context. However, it is possible to formulate two 
hypotheses that can examine whether financial market and economic conditions are 
associated with UK credit institutions SND issuance activity. In that way the thesis 
can provide additional evidence on the controlling potential of a MSNDP- 
Section one illustrated on a number of occasions that the recessionary period 1990- 
1992 represented one where banks reduced their issuance activity and that they also 
appeared to shorten the maturity of their debt compared to other parts of the sample 
time period. Equally, section one discussed how SND issuance appeared to be 
influenced by long-term bond yields. Therefore, the two hypotheses that this section 
Will test are: 
HYPOthesis 6-1: UK credit institution SND issuance activity is not associated with 
market conditions 
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Ilypothesis 6-2: UK credit institution SND issuance activity is not associated with 
econOtnic conditions 
These hypotheses are tested using Pearson Product Moment Correlation. Although 
correlations do not measure causation they do provide evidence of measures of 
association. The variable measures of economic and market conditions, namely GDP 
and benchmark long-term bond yields respectively, are widely accepted as 
appropriate. Yield measures from both UK and US benchmark bonds are tested to 
investigate the robustness of the findings. SND issuance is measured using a number 
of variables based on number of issues and value of issues. In both cases, these are 
measured for all bonds over the sample time period and for the combined subset of 
Sterling and Dollar bonds. Although all bonds include non-Sterling and Dollar bonds, 
the author considered it appropriate to include this measure because the introduction 
of the Euro may have diverted some issuance away from Sterling and Dollar 
denominations. 
The tests cover the whole time period, but to provide some element of consistency 
and cleaner data the tests only include banks that were originally banks at the 
beýinning of the sample period, 1985 .31 Building societies are excluded 
because 
sections one and two of this chapter illustrate that building society SND issuance was 
influenced by particular relaxations in the regulatory environment for building 
societies during the thesis time period. Equally, those building societies that have 
converted to banks have been excluded as this would inflate the issuance activity later 
in the time period. In addition, section one explains how bank issuance activity in the 
pefiods 1985-1986 and 1999-2002 was no doubt influenced by particular regulatorY 
developments. As a result, floating rate peTpetual debt from 1985-1986 and all tier 
one issues between 1999-2002 have been removed from the issuance activity data. 
The expectation is that all measures of issuance activity will be negatively correlated 
with long-term bond yields and GDP. Therefore, one-tail tests will be conducted. 
The findings are presented in table 6-23 below. All measures of US and 
UK 
benchmark yields are significantly negatively correlated with measures of 
SND 
issuance activity by UK credit institutions. Therefore, the null hYPOthesis 
6-1 can be 
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rejected at least at the 
5% significance level. Although measures of association tests 
do not allow one to directly infer the direction of causation, the suggestion would 
probably be that yield 
levels influence issuance activity. In all cases the results are 
tighter when issuance activity includes all issues rather than the subset of Sterling and 
Dollar issues. The author believes that this may be due to the introduction of the Euro 
in 1999 deflecting some SND issuance away from the previously two dominant 
currencies (see table 6-12a). Figures 6-4 and 6-5 present a couple of scatter plot 
diagrams to highlight the significant negative relationships between yields and 
issuance activity. Looking at the relationship between economic conditions and 
issuance activity, the null hypothesis 6-2 cannot be rejected and this is the case across 
all four measures of issuance activity. 
In conclusion, the evidence suggests that issuance activity by UK credit institutions is 
associated with bond market conditions, but not with the general economic climate. 
From a mandatory SND perspective, a negative relationship suggests that banks 
would be less likely to issue SND during difficult market conditions, which probably 
comes as no surprise. These findings also support the findings of Covitz, Hancock and 
Kwast (2001 and 2004). Therefore, a mandatory policy appears to have some 
potential in providing disciplining control over banks through forcing them to issue 
and open up to investor scrutiny. In addition, bank profitability is likely to be 
influenced by the general economic climate. A concern, however, is that difficult 
bond market conditions, as measured by high yields, is not necessarily associated with 
a poor economic climate, because there can be many other influences on bond yields, 
such as demand and supply for bonds and substitute financial securities. Therefore, 
although issuance activity may be reduced during periods of bond market stress, 
banks may not be refraining from issuing SND because of their inherent condition, 
which is the intention of market discipline. They may be simply substituting 
alternative sources of funding. 
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Figure 6-5: Scatterplot of UK 10-year benchmark yield and number of UK credit 
illstitution SND issues (1987-2002) 
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Figure 6-6: Scatterplot of UK 15-year benchmark yield and value of UK credit 
institution SND issues (1987-2002) 
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Section 4- Conclusions 
This chapter examines the issuance activity and characteristics of UK credit 
institutions over the period 1985 to 2002 to answer the research question 'Is UK credit 
institution-issued SND compatible with Mandatory Subordinated Debt Policy 
proposals? ' A descriptive analysis of the population of SND issued over the time 
period raises a number of themes, many of which are unique to the UK. First, in 
contrast to US and European banks' SND issuance, perpetual maturity debt 
constitutes a significant proportion of UK credit institution issues and has done so 
consistently throughout the 18-year sample period. Secondly, 64% of UK SND has 
callable features attached, which again is in stark contrast to European and US 
averages. Thirdly, spread at launch analysis indicates that UK issuance spreads are 
consistently some of the highest compared to European counterparts. Finally, the 
method of issuing SND suggests that structural differences exist across European 
countries, raising the possibility that some countries' banks may be better placed to 
support price-based indirect market discipline than others. The chapter applies these 
findings and bank-level analyses to the general characteristics proposed for a suitable 
MSNDP to answer the research question. The conclusion is that a MSNDP would be 
feasible for the six-largest UK banks only, which also happen to be internationally- 
active banks, because smaller banks and building societies issue SND with 
insufficient frequency. Additionally, mandatory SND would not force these six banks 
to alter their funding structures from current voluntary SND amounts, but at the same 
time would provide a hurdle during less favourable bond market conditions. However, 
the characteristics of UK credit institution SND (at least ten-year or perpetual 
maturity with callable features) do not align with the theoretically desirable SND 
features for a MSNDP. As a result, a MSNDP would force UK banks to alter the 
characteristics of their SND debt significantly from current, unconstrained maturity 
structures. 
The chapter explores these implications for implementing a MSNDp in the UK 
It is 
argued, from a cost-benefit perspective, that the regular issuance of mandatory 
SND 
should be the overriding policy tool. Therefore, a LJK MSNDP should 
be restricted to 
Pfirftary market direct discipline, where debt issuance compels disclosure to 
the 
Market about an institution's current condition and prospects. Regular calls on 
the 
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debt Inarket will provide mandatory SND investors with a significant governance 
mechanismg subjecting credit institutions to frequent monitoring and scrutiny and 
direct discipline signalling. Extending the policy to include indirect discipline through 
stmdardised mandatory SND would impose substantial funding constraints on UK 
credit institutions and therefore should not be implemented. 
in contrast to the existing literature, the chapter has also raised significant concerns 
about the wide variation in credit institution SND across Europe and further afield 
(even in the most active SND issuance countries). The implications for an 
international MSNDP are discussed. It is concluded that, as things stand, there are too 
many fundamental differences between different countries' SND characteristics to 
apply a standardised SND policy. However, an extension of the regular issuance 
policy suggested for the UK could be applied in other major countries. This would 
enable SND features that are unique to particular countries to be retained, but at the 
same time force frequent SND issuance and thus elicit the primary market direct 
discipline benefits that entail. 
Finally, to investigate the UK evidence on other factors that may influence the design 
of a MSNDP, the chapter tests the relationship between UK credit institution SND 
issuance activity and bond market and economic conditions. The findings are that 
there is a strong negative association between issuance activity and UK and US 
benchmark yields, but no association with UK economic conditions, as measured by 
GDP. Therefore, bond market conditions may be having a sizeable influence on UK 
credit institution SND issuance. The thesis is unable to investigate if this may be due 
to bank-specific risk factors. Chapter seven examines the sensitivity of SND yields to 
measures of bank condition. 
Appendix 6-1 complements appendix 6-2 by reporting the SND liability balances in credit 
institution 
annual reports and accounts over the sample period. The number of issues per year 
is consistent with 
each institution's record in appendix 6- 1. 
2 Only a snapshot is provided due to the size of the spreadsheet. 
3 Afick'Means that that data field is complete for the. whole set of SND in that 
database. 'Partly' 
means that there are some 
data field gaps in that database. 
4 All UK credit institutions that have issued SND have current Moody's Financial Strength Ratings of 
C and above, with nearly all 
banks in tile category W. 
5 The similarity of ROBS to perpetual SND is reflected in the conversion of building societies to banks, 
where PIBS become undated SND financial instruments. 
6 The most prolific period for building society SND issuance, in value terms, was 1996. This coincides 
with a number of the largest building societies issuing SND in what were historically large amounts for 
them Noticeably, four of these building societies converted to banks the following year. 
1 Note that the period 1993 to 1998, which is sandwiched between the exuberant period 1999-2002 and 
the languish period 1990-1992, was fairly stable, with the number of issues ranging from 15 to 22 per 
year and the value of issues ranging from E2.2 billion to E3.2 billion per year. 
8 Nearly all the loans issued by building societies since 1993 have been by what would be classed as 
inid-tier building societies. The exception is the Portman building society. 
9 It is clear from the data that, from 1 st May 1985, all perpetual debt issues for the next two years were 
floating rate issues. 
10 All bar two of these perpetual SND were issued by building societies in the form of PIBS. 
11 See Hall (1999) for details on the LJK capital adequacy assessment regime prior to the Basel Accord. 
12 Using Sironi's (2001) data, 10% of French issues and 3% of German issues are callable. 
13 Table 6-3 examines the characteristics of tier one securities and reports that all 32 tier one security 
issues are callable. The author examined all the callable data with tier one securities omitted from the 
analysis and there were no significant differences from the findings reported in this section. 
" In value terms, this represents 68% of all callable issue values showing that, on average, perpetual 
callable SND have larger issue sizes than non-perpetual callable SND. 
t5 Notice that the median first call date barely changes for non-perpetual SND issues. 
16 Of the 115 non-perpetual SND issues in table 6-11 that could be have been redeemed early, 24 (2 1 %) 
have fixed rate and 91 (79%) have floating rate coupons. 
17 This may explain why far fewer issues were made in Sterling during that year. 
18 Having cleaned the initial Bondware datset of non-LJK issues and preference shares, this left a total 
of 367 issues to which the additional 32 were added, leaving a final total of 399 SND issues sourced 
ftOln Bondware. The final "master database", which is founded on the Bondware dataset, is partially 
available in Appendix 6-3. Note that the 399 SND issues in the "master database" account for 74% of 
all issues per the annual reports and accounts (90% in value terms). 
19 4 of the 5 issues occur in the years 1996 to 1998, which table 6-14 illustrates is a period of markedly- 
reduced issuance spreads. The author ascribes the lower spreads in these years to general market 
conditions as Sironi (2001) shows a similar, although less pronounced, pattern for 
European banks' 
SND. 
20 Ile price at which a public issue is taken to market should provide a strong indication of 
investors' 
views on the riskiness of that issuer; however, with private placements, it is less certain 
if sufficient 
scrutiny of the issuer takes place. 
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21 It must be remembered that, although 
large public issues raise the opportunity for liquid secondary 
markets, if bond 
investors simply "buy and hold" SND in their portfolios, such issues will be illiquid 
and therefore result 
in misleading secondary rnarket signals. Therefore, it is important to understand 
investors' motivations for purchasing SND (both in public issues and private placements), and whether 
they regularly monitor institutions' risk-taking and, thus, reflect this in secondary prices. This 
behavioural aspect to market discipline provides an opportunity for future research. 
22The outstanding SND figure is unlikely to match with an institution's SND balance in Appendix 6- 1, 
which uses the SND balance sheet note, for a number of reasons. First, all tier one securities are 
reported under tier one capital in regulatory capital 
disclosures. Secondly, the five-year amortisation 
rule means that any SND within five years of maturity will be recorded at a reduced balance for 
regulatory capital calculations compared to the accounting balance sheet. Furthermore, table 6-18 
includes a credit institution's consolidated balances and therefore may include non-UK credit 
institution subsidiary SND, which is not included in Appendix 6- 1. 
23ThiS compares with the findings from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003) of an 
average of 3.5% for German banks, 3.0% for American banks and 1.5% for Japanese banks. 
' This continues to apply when tier I securities are excluded from the analysis (see table 6-20) 
25During the period 1990-1992, Midland Bank, The Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Bank 
managed only I SND issue in total. 
26 Table 6-7d illustrates that perpetual maturity debt represented 22% more in total SND issuance value 
over the period 1999-2000 compared to the period 1993-1998. Excluding tier one securities, the rise is 
6%. 
27 It must be noted that debt issuance costs may deter credit institutions from issuing extremely small 
amounts. 
" Including tier one securities would raise the average issue size in the period 1999-2002 to E280 
million and the overall average issue size for the whole thesis sample period to E239 million. 
29 In order to tie-in with capital adequacy requirements, a minimum initial maturity of five years would 
be preferable. 
30 The UK's unique preference for perpetual debt is an area for further research. 
31 Due to data availability issues, some measures of benchmark bond yields are not available 
for the 
whole firne period 1985-2002. 
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Chapter 7- Empirical examination of secondary market 
discipline of UK credit institution-issued SND 
Introduction 
This chapter is associated with the research question,, 'Are yield spreads on UK credit 
institution SND sensitive to credit institution risk? ' As chapter four explains, this 
research question is most appropriately answered using inferential statistics in the 
form of an econometric model. Therefore, the chapter extensively tests for evidence 
of market discipline in the secondary market for credit institution-issued SND. 
The layout of the chapter is as follows. Section one reminds the reader of the general 
econometric model specification used in this chapter and presents some initial test 
findings in order to derive the final model specification. In addition, some descriptive 
statistics concerning the data are presented. Sections two and three test the risk- 
sensitivity of UK credit institution SND between 1995 and 2002. The difference 
between the two sections is that section two focuses on market measures of bank risk, 
namely credit agency ratings, whereas in section three the focus is on accounting 
measures of bank risk. Section four explores the two sub-phases of the recognition 
phase of the market discipline theoretical framework (right participants and observing 
signs of bank risk) by splitting the data set into two. First, the data is split based on 
bank size and, secondly, based on transparency. In this way, these sub-phases can be 
examined to see if they are hindering market discipline. Section five provides a 
summary of the main findings and draws conclusions that relate to the implications 
for market discipline of LTK credit institutions. 
Section I- Model specification and sample characteristics 
A#Odel specification 
Chapter four introduces the basic model specification for testing evidence of market 
discipline behaviour in this thesis. The specification is in line with previous studies 
and in general terms is as follows: 
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SpREADit =f (RISKit, CONTROIt) + cit (1) 
The variables employed in the study are now discussed in greater detail. 
SpREADit is the yield to maturity credit spread over the risk-free rate for credit 
institution i at time t. 
Kýshnan et al. (2005) furthered the methodological debate in analysing market 
discipline by arguing that, for market discipline to be effective, not only should bank- 
specific risk variables influence credit spread levels, but that changes in credit spreads 
should be influenced by changes in bank-specific variables. Although this study 
would like to be able to carry out both approaches, data availability prevents the 
change in spreads and change in bank-specific risks as being dependent and 
independent variables respectively in the model. As has been argued in chapter three, 
when modelling market discipline it is important to provide as contemporaneous a 
relationship as possible between the dependent and independent variables. This study 
is limited to annual bank risk data. Therefore, it would be misleading to try and model 
changes in spreads and bank risk over annual intervals as many other factors are likely 
to influence changes in spreads over such time intervals. Krishnan et al. (2005) had 
access to quarterly spread and US bank risk data, enabling a more accurate 
responsiveness model to be created. Therefore, the model specifications applied in 
this study will solely use the year-end credit spread level as the dependent variable. 
RISK-t reflects the default risk measures of credit institution i at time t. 
These are the variables of interest from a market signalling perspective. In other 
words, do RISK variables have a significant influence on yield spreads? In order to 
exainine market discipline behaviour, three alternative specifications of the equation 
(1) are employed, each using different RISK measures. The first two are market 
measures of bank risk (based on credit agency ratings) and are tested in section two of 
this chapter, and the third are accounting-based measures, which are tested 
in section 
three of this chapter. 
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The fIrst market measure is Moody's and S&P's issue ratings; the second is based on 
N40ody's Bank Financial Strength ratings. Two credit agency ratings specifications 
are eniployed because issue ratings can be argued as most accurately representing the 
6skiness of a bond issue. From a market discipline perspective, Financial Strength 
ratings are also appealing because they are supposed to represent the standalone 
default risk of a bank. In both specifications, the ratings are entered linearly (using 
cardinal numbers to represent each rating) and nonlinearly (where they are grouped 
into ratings buckets through the use of dummy variables) to see if this may have an 
impact on the findings. The linear variables are MOODYjt, SPit and STRENGTHit. 
The nonlinear variables are MOODY I T04it, MOODY5TO7jt, MOODY8+it, 
STRENGTHIT02jtý STRENGTH3TO5jt and STRENGTH6+it. 1 Table 7-1 below 
presents the ratings scales used in this study and tables 7-2 and 7-3 present some 
summary statistics on credit agency ratings over the sample time period. 
Table 7-1: Credit ratings scales 
Panel A: Issue credit ratings 
Cardinal Value 123456789 10 11 
Moody's Aaa, Aal Aa2 Aa3 AI A2 A3 Baal Baa2 Baa3 Bal 
S&P AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB+ BBB BBB- BB+ 
Rafing buckets rating I to 4 rating 5 to 7 rating 8+ 
Panel B: Financial Strength ratings 
Cardinal Value 123456789 10 
Moody's A A- B+ B B- C+ c c- D+ D 
Rafing buckets rating 6+ rating 1 to 2 rating 3 to 5 
The inclusion of an accounting-based specification (ACCRISK) is appealing because 
it can provide comparatives with the ratings-based specifications. The variable 
categories used in the accounting-based specification closely resemble those used 
in 
earlier studies (see table 3-3b in chapter three) and those recognised in the credit 
a'IOYsis literature (Moody's 1998 and 1999; Howe, 2001; and Grier, 2001). It 
is based 
01, the following simplified representation: 
ACCRISKit =f (CAPITAIt, ASSET QUALITYit, PROFITABILITyitý 
LEVERAGEit, LIQUIDit) 
)I 
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For model robustness purposes, a number of different calculations are attempted for 
some accounting variables. Also, given that the UK has two types of credit institution, 
the author has attempted to use accounting measures that may not be influenced 
significantly by the type of credit institution and therefore interact with the variable 
bank size. 
CAPITALit measures the capital adequacy of bank i at time t. Capital adequacy is 
important because it acts as a safety net in the case of unfortunate events. Higher 
capital indicates lower default risk. The different capital adequacy calculations used 
are: 
CAPITALlit = Adjusted total equity plus specific loan loss reserves/gross customer 
loanS2 ; and 
CAPITAL2it = Total equity/net loans. 
LEVERAGEit measures how highly levered credit institution i is at time t. 
LEVERAGE, t = Total equity/liabilities (less hybrid capital and SND) 
The leverage ratio used here is another way of looking at the equity funding of the 
balance sheet and, therefore, capital adequacy of the credit institution. In this instance, 
a higher leverage ratio indicates lower default risk. 
ASSET QUALITYit is probably the most important variable in analysing a credit 
institution as poor asset quality is the major cause of most bank failures. The study 
applies three measures of asset quality and focuses on bad and non-performing loans 
rather than loan loss reserves which can be difficult to interpret from a market 
discipline perspective .3 The three measures of asset quality used are: 
ASSET QUALITYlit = Non-performing loans/gross loans; 
ASSET QUALITY2it = Net-charge offs/average gross loans; and 
ASSET QUALITY3it = Net-charge offs/net income before loan loss provisions. 
J2 
in each instance the higher the value, the higher the credit institution risk. Therefore, 
the anticipated relationship with SPREAD is a positive one. 
pROFITABILITYit serves as a demonstration of management effectiveness and 
earnings provide capital to absorb loan losses. Therefore, higher profitability should 
represent lower institution risk. However, as chapter three discusses, the relationship 
betvveen profitability and credit institution risk is ambiguous, because excessive 
profitability could be a sign of high bank risk. Two measures of profitability are used: 
PROFITlit = Net profit before tax/average assets; and 
PROFIT2it = Net profit before tax plus loan loss provisions/average assets. 
LIQUIDit is a measure of credit institution i's liquidity at time t (i. e. ability to fund its 
short-term obligations). The measure used is: 
LIQUID lit = liquid assets/customer and short-term funds. 
This ratio looks at the percentage of short-term obligations that could be met if they 
were withdrawn suddenly. A higher percentage indicates lower credit institution risk. 
Both the market and accounting model specifications include CONTROLit variables 
to accommodate other factors influencing yield spreads. Chapter three discusses these 
variables and their significance in market discipline studies. CONTROL consists of 
the following variables: 
CONTROI, t =f (MATURITYit, LIQUIDITYit, SIZEit, 
CURRit, CALLABLEit, 
YEARit) 
MATURITYjt proxies for the maturity of issue i at time period t. 
The finance literature clearly states that there is a term structure to credit spreads and, 
therefore, the maturity of the bond must be included as an independent variable 
in the 
model. In line with the discussion in chapter three on previous empirical studies of 
"alket discipline, two possible measures of maturity are examined. 
First maturity is 
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considered as linearly affecting spreads (years remaining to maturity - 
yRSTOMATit); secondly, as a non-linear explanatory variable by creating four 
njawrity buckets as dummy variables (maturity 10 years and less - 
MAT I OANDLES Sit; maturity 10 to 20 years - MAT 1 OT020it; maturity 20 to 30 years 
- MAT20TO30it; and maturity thirty plus years - MATGREAT30i). The expectation 
is that maturity will positively affect spreads. 
LIQUIDITYit is a proxy for the liquidity risk attached to security i at time t and 
should not be confused with the accounting-based measure of bank risk LIQUIDit, 
which reflects the liquidity risk of the credit institution. In line with the discussion in 
chapter four, two measures are used. 
Elton et al. (2004) show that when comparing bonds with the same number of years to 
maturity, those that have been issued within the past year will have a lower spread. 
They ascribe this to a liquidity effect and so this will be accommodated into some of 
the model specifications through a dummy variable, PASTYEARit. This dummy 
variable is unlikely to be correlated with the other variable that will hopefully capture 
liquidity effects as well, ISSUESIZEit. Both variables are expected to negatively 
affect spreads. To reduce potential collinearity with the SIZE variable, the natural log 
of the ISSUESIZE is taken to transform this variable into LNISSUESIZEit- 4 
SIZEit accommodates the size of the credit institution i at time t. As chapter three 
discusses, it is sometimes difficult to ascertain whether this variable reflects a TBTF 
effect or a liquidity of bond issue effect. 
CURR, is currency of denomination of issue i. As the discussion in chapters three and 
four highlight, the high spread on sterling SND compared to European counterparts 
remains unexplained in previous studies. The thesis incorporates three currency 
dummy variables, STERLING, DOLLARi, and OTHERCURRi; the latter to capture 
Primarily Euro and Euro-predecessor currencies. 
CALLABLEI is a proxy for whether issue i is callable or not. 
ý40st empirical market discipline studies concentrate on non-perpetual, non- 
convertible, and non-callable 
SND. 5 Chapter six shows that the characteristics of sND 
issued by UK credit institutions are significantly different from the typical features of 
US and other European countries. They exhibit a high proportion of perpetual debt 
and debt with callable features. As a result, a study of market discipline in the LJK 
debt markets must consider these types of characteristics otherwise there would be an 
insufficient sample size. 
The three studies that have incorporated callable SND in their samples have treated 
this problem in one of two ways. Avery, Belton and Goldberg (1988) and Flannery 
and Sorescu (1996) altered the initial credit spreads for any embedded call features 
using a theoretical model. These option-adjusted spreads were then used as dependent 
variables alongside the spreads of non-callable debt. In contrast, Covitz, Hancock and 
Kwast (2004) use a dummy variable to identify callable debt issues and therefore 
capture the influence of callability on credit spreads. 
This paper has adopted the approach of Covitz, Hancock and Kwast (2004) and uses a 
dummy variable to identify callable debt issues. This approach is preferred because it 
avoids the potential uncertainty surrounding the adjustment of spreads for call 
features. The papers that have incorporated option-adjusted spreads as dependent 
variables are the only ones to have reported an unexpected negative relationship 
between spreads and bond maturity, which must bring into question the added 
complication of adjusting spreads. Since call options are always non-negative, it is 
expected that the sign on CALLABLEi would be positive. 
A concem is the treatment of perpetual SND- Chapter six illustrates that virtually all 
perpetual SND is callable and therefore including dummy variables for both callable 
SND and perpetual SND would raise multicollinearity problems. On the other hand, 
as Previously discussed, perpetual debt forms a substantial proportion of UK SND 
issues and therefore cannot be omitted from the sample. This study overcomes this 
Problem by assigning all perpetual debt a maturity of 40 years. Therefore, perpetual 
debt will fall in the maturity bucket, MATGREAT30- 
L, U capture year-specific effects on spreads. 
This J "'A is a year dummy variable to 
reduces the possibility of omitted variable problems. 
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The three model specifications are tested using panel data models for groups of years, 
and annual cross-section models for each year between 1995 and 2002. In line with 
existing studies, the panel data tests use pooled least squares estimations with a 
cornmon intercept; the panels are unbalanced .6 Both the cross-section and panel data 
specifications use White hetereoskedasticity-consistent standard errors as 
heteroskedasticity is identified as being a problem in some of the models. The 
econometrics package Eviews was used to perform the tests. 
Data sources and sample characteristics 
Chapter five explains that the key data source for this aspect of the research is the 
66master database" (the reader is referred to figure 5-3). This provides details on 399 
SND bond issues, which represent 74% of all UK credit institution-issued SND over 
the time period 1985-2002 (90% in value terms). As well as the information in the 
master database, year-end spreads and credit ratings data are required for each bond 
over the sample time period 1995-2002.7 These were sourced from Datastream and 
credit ratings agencies respectively. The resulting dataset reduces to 255 bond issues. 8 
These represent 47% of all bond issues over the period 1985-2002 and 61% in value 
terms. 9 The resulting dataset suffers from one potential sample bias. Restricting the 
dataset to bonds with regular year-end spreads and ratings could potentially overstate 
the existence of market discipline by SND holders. As a rough estimate, possibly 
around 30% of SND issues (in value terms) between 1985 and 2002 are/were not 
tradable in secondary markets and, therefore, do not provide a source of indirect 
market discipline. 
Tables 7-2 to 7-5 below provide some descriptive statistics on the variables used in 
the dataset for model testing. Table 7-2 summarises spreads and ratings characteristics 
by year. Spreads rise significantly during the middle of the sample period, 
in 
Particular 1998-2000. The high spreads of 1998 appear to contrast with the extremely 
IOW issuance spreads reported in table 6-14. However, this can be ascribed to the 
Russian debt crisis which occurred during mid-to-late 1998. The secondary market 
spreads reported in chapter seven are taken at the year-end and, therefore, reflect 
the 
inlPact on bond spreads from this crisis. In contrast, table 6-14 reports primary market 
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Table 7-2: Spread and credit ratings: sample summary characteristics (1995-2002) 
Panel A: Spreads (basis points) 
year N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
1995 77 85.12 80.80 -117.20 579.40 124.26 
1996 92 60.62 80.80 -101.80 590.80 107.60 
1997 103 104.98 96.90 -17.50 474.20 78.75 
1998 ill 167.65 163.90 -11.30 445.00 103.67 
1999 144 143.70 138.05 -172.30 502.80 119.32 
2000 174 170.10 160.90 -31.00 415.30 99.40 
2001 209 77.09 105.50 -350.50 483.40 178.28 
2002 234 85.28 102.20 -333.30 626.80 159.71 
Total 1144 112.18 117 -350.50 626.80 139.28 
Panel B: Credit Ratings 
The ISSUE and STRENGTH ratings are weighted averages of the ratings on all 
outstanding SND in that year based on the cardinal values assigned to each ranking. 
A higher credit quality corresponds to a lower cardinal number 
Moodv's Issue rating 
Year Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
1995 71 5.68 5.00 4.00 11.00 1.83 
1996 88 5.57 5.00 4.00 11.00 1.82 
1997 98 5.01 4.00 3.00 11.00 1.80 
1998 108 5.01 4.00 3.00 11.00 1.86 
1999 142 4.78 4.00 3.00 10.00 1.69 
2000 171 4.31 4.00 2.00 9.00 1.48 
2001 207 4.04 4.00 2.00 9.00 1.55 
2002 232 4.10 4.00 2.00 9.00 1.59 
Total 1117 4.59 4.00 2.00 11.00 1.74 
S&P Issue rating 
Year N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
1995 36 5.19 5.00 4.00 7.00 1.06 
1996 49 5.18 5.00 4.00 7.00 1.15 
1997 58 5.09 5.00 4.00 7.00 1.08 
1998 69 5.32 5.00 4.00 7.00 1.19 
1999 119 5.13 5.00 4.00 8.00 1.08 
2000 155 5.16 5.00 4.00 8.00 1.07 
2001 188 5.11 5.00 4.00 8.00 1.03 
2002 214 5.28 5.00 4.00 8.00 1.03 
Total 888 5.18 5.00 4.00 8.00 1.07 
Moody's Financial Strong rating 
Year N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
1995 76 3.95 4.00 
1996 91 3.88 4.00 
1997 102 3.48 3.00 
1998 ill 3.49 3.00 
1999 144 3.26 3.00 
2000 174 3.20 3.00 
2001 210 2.98 3.00 
2002 233 3.03 3.00 
Total 1141 3.29 3.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
9.00 
9.00 
9.00 
9.00 
9.00 
9.00 
9.00 
9.00 
9.00 
1.74 
1.69 
1.78 
1.82 
1.75 
1.66 
1.59 
1.65 
1.71 
issuance spreads and only one of the bonds in this sample was issued after the 
commencement of the Russian debt crisis. In addition to the variability of spreads 
over the sample period, the existence of several negative spreads is notable. 161 of the 
1144 data points had negative spreads, the majority of which were perpetual maturity 
SND. The existence of negative secondary spreads is not dissimilar to the findings of 
Pop (2004). The existence of negative spreads may be attributed to the large issuance 
of perpetual debt by credit institutions in contrast to governments and/or difficulty in 
determining an appropriate benchmark security to calculate spreads. Therefore, 
although Datastream records actual trade prices, the accuracy with which spreads are 
calculated may be a potential limitation to the findings of this research. 
The ratings trends in table 7-2 present some equally interesting evidence. Moody's 
issue and Financial Strength ratings show clear downward trends over the sample 
period. In contrast, S&P issue ratings remain reasonably consistent. Equally 
noticeable is the narrower range of ratings produced by S&P compared to Moody's 
over the whole sample period. It should be mentioned at this juncture that S&P rate 
fewer UK credit institutions compared to Moody's, hence the lower number of 
available ratings, and in particular smaller credit institutions are overlooked (see table 
7-4). This may explain the narrower range of S&P ratings compared to Moody's. As a 
result of this, the study only focuses on Moody's issue and Financial Strength ratings 
for the market-based specifications. However, the S&P issue ratings will be used later 
in the chapter in determining opacity of bank information through issue ratings 
disagreements between S&P and Moody's. 
Table 7-3 examines the distribution of the SPREAD variable across rating classes. For 
all three ratings types, the general trend is clearly that poorer credit ratings are 
associated with higher spreads. The slight exception is that Moody's issue and 
Financial Strength ratings show some deviation from this trend towards the middle- 
tO-high ratings brackets. However, these tables should be read with some caution 
because they incorporate both cross-sectional and time dimensions. As panel 
A in 
table 7-2 illustrates, spreads deviate quite significantly over the sample time period. 
Table 7-3 also illustrates that only four data points contain ratings of 
below 
investment grade (rating bracket "Bal'). Equally noticeable in table 7-3 is the 
higher 
average SPREAD for building societies compared to banks. In a similar vein, 
table 7- 
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Table 7-3: SPREAD distribution by rating classes and tfpe of Institution 
Panel A: Distribution of SPREAD by issue ratings (basis points) 
Moody's Issue ratina 
Rating N Mean Median 
- 
Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
Aaa 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Aal 67 47.2 82.9 -350.5 258.1 154.2 
Aa2 215 79.6 101.7 -344.3 373.8 147.0 
Aa3 422 114.0 47.0 -342.1 476.7 130.8 
Al 133 130.7 30.8 -252.4 626.8 132.4 
A2 100 130.6 67.4 -257.4 457.5 116.0 
A3 100 153.4 45.6 -187.6 402.8 90.6 
Baal 38 97.7 104.8 -345.8 354.0 216.1 
Baa2 25 36.2 69.8 -117.2 330.4 131.3 
Baa3 13 227.0 194.4 76.8 502.8 140.1 
Bal 4 161.5 151.6 129.0 213.8 37.0 
S&P Issue ratina 
Rating N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
ýAA to AA 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
AA- 288 86.5 51.3 -280.5 343.8 90.3 
A+ 280 104.3 84.6 -350.5 415.3 152.4 
A 204 113.2 40.1 -344.3 626.8 172.7 
A- 99 161.9 91.4 -187.6 416.4 130.4 
BBB+ 17 256.7 270.0 169.2 354.0 51.3 
Panel B: Distribution of SPREAD by Financial Strength ratings 
Rating N Mean Median Minimum 
A 181 92.0 45.3 -350.5 
A- 131 46.9 33.6 -344.3 
B+ 428 112.9 68.5 -342.1 
B 250 139.7 38.5 -257.4 
8- 0 N/A N/A N/A 
C+ 69 195.1 97.8 -23.4 
c 60 40.8 47.7 -345.8 
C- 3 194.1 194.8 181.0 
D+ 19 280.0 124.7 16.0 
Maximum Std. Dev. 
359.3 119.4 
373.8 175.0 
483.4 133.4 
626.8 111.4 
N/A N/A 
354.0 78.5 
324.5 171.7 
208.6 13.9 
590.8 177.4 
Panel C: Distribution of SPREAD by credit institution type (basis points) 
Type N Mean Median 
Bank 1016 104.4 68.5 
Building Society 128 175.1 92.7 
Minimurn Maximum Std. Dev. 
-350.5 590.8 
141.3 
-23.4 626.8 
102.0 
Table 7-3 
4 illustrates that credit ratings appear to have an element of bank size within them. For 
all three types of credit agency rating the mean and median rating are higher for 
building societies compared to banks, and so are the standard deviations. Table 6-18 
confirms that building societies are generally smaller institutions compared to banks. 
Table 7-4: Credit ratings distribution by type of institution 
Moody's Issue ratings 
Institution N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
Bank 1005 4.31 4.5 2 10 1.51 
BS 112 7.14 64 11 1.67 
S&P issue ratings 
Institution N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
Bank 855 5.14 5481.05 
BS 33 6.17 7471.15 
Moody's Financial Strength ratings 
Institution N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
Bank 1016 3.10 391.58 
BS 125 4.84 491.97 
Table 7-5 presents summary statistics for the accounting and control variables. 
All 
variables appear to provide a range of values and are generally widely available 
throughout the sample period. Please note that the total number of observations 
for 
accounting variables is lower than for SPREAD and credit agency ratings reported 
in 
earlier tables. This is due to data availability, and in order to ensure ratio calculation 
consistency for as wide a sample period as possible accounting model specifications 
do not include observations for 1995, whereas the market models 
do. 
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4 illustrates that credit ratings appear to have an element of bank size within them. For 
all three types of credit agency rating the mean and median rating are higher for 
building societies compared to banks, and so are the standard deviations. Table 6-18 
confinns that building societies are generally smaller institutions compared to banks. 
Table 7-4: Credit ratings distribution by type of institution 
Moody's Issue ratings 
Institution N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
Bank 1005 4.31 4.5 2 10 1.51 
BS 112 7.14 64 11 1.67 
S&P issue ratings 
Institution N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
Bank 855 5.14 5481.05 
BS 33 6.17 7471.15 
Moody's Financial Strength ratings 
Institution N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
Bank 1016 3.10 3191.58 
BS 125 4.84 4191.97 
Table 7-5 presents summary statistics for the accounting and control variables. All 
variables appear to provide a range of values and are generally widely available 
throughout the sample period. Please note that the total number of observations for 
accounting variables is lower than for SPREAD and credit agency ratings reported in 
earlier tables. This is due to data availability, and in order to ensure ratio calculation 
Consistency for as wide a sample period as possible accounting model specifications 
do not include observations for 1995, whereas the market models do. 
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Table 7-5: Sample summary statistics (Accounting and control variables) 
Variable 
Std. 
N Mean Median Minimum Maximum i Dev. 
ASSET 
QUALITY IN 927 2.19 2.03 0.02 8.73 1.28 
ASSET 
QUALITY2 1054 0.42 0.43 -0.06 1.83 0.28 
ASSET 
QUALITY3 1029 20.38 19.63 -2.86 135.36 12.01 
PROFIT1 (%) 1055 1.23 1.19 -1.03 2.55 0.45 
PROFIT2(%) 1057 1.47 1.46 -0.19 2.95 0.51 
CAPITALl (%) 1027 9.24 8.64 3.51 16.58 2.62 
CAPITAL2 (%) 1061 13.31 8.10 4.24 831.17 57.14 
LEVERAGE (%) 1062 9.71 5.19 3.66 779.4 49.69 
LIQUID (%) 1053 20.22 20.17 2.20 46.3 8.19 
LNISSUESIZE 1067 5.12 5.14 2.3 6.77 0.69 
SIZE 1062 179318 173875 982 478223 121872 
YRSTOMAT 1144 21.98 17.00 1 40 14.68 
MAT10ANDLESS 403 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
MAT10T020 198 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
MAT20TO30 118 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
MATGREAT30 425 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
CALLABLE 667 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Preliminaty model construction findings 
Prior to final model testing, there was an initial model construction phase. A general 
to specific model construction approach was undertaken, whereby one begins with a 
general unrestricted model and then simplifies it in light of the sample evidence. This 
sub-section presents some findings from the initial model construction phase and 
in 
that way explains why certain variables were removed from the final market 
discipline models tested in this chapter. 
SIZE variable 
The bank size variable, SIZE, regularly recorded high collinearity scores with a 
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number of other variables in the models. Particular examples were with the size of a 
bond issue, ISSUESIZE, the currency of denomination, STERLING and DOLLAR, 
the credit ratings variables, MOODY and STRENGTH, and the accounting variables, 
ASSETQUALITY1 and CAPITALL First, Logarithmic transformation of one and 
both of the variables ISSUESIZE and SIZE was unable to solve this particular 
problem. Use of the alternative liquidity variable, PASTYEAR, was equally 
unsuccessful because, as suggested in the discussion on the distribution of credit 
ratings above, the SIZE variable was highly collinear with the variables MOODY and 
STRENGTH. These multicollinearity interactions were evident through the initial 
models being very sensitive to small specification changes. The final problem was the 
currency dummy variables. Building societies are restricted to issuing Sterling 
denomination SND only. Therefore, a size of credit institution impact was partly 
being fed through the interaction of the currency dummy variables with the SIZE 
variable. 10 This was compounded during the period 1995 to 1998, where the data 
sample contained virtually no bonds that were either not sterling or dollar in 
denomination. As a result it was decided to drop the variable SIZE from the market 
model specification and for comparative purposes, from the accounting model 
specifications as well. This latter decision was supported during initial accounting 
model testing with redundant variable tests reporting that the SIZE variable did not 
add explanatory power. In addition, the SIZE variable was collinear on a number of 
occasions with the variables ASSETQUALITY1 and CAPITALL Furthermore, 
potential SIZE effects could be examined in more detail when the data set is split 
between large and small credit institutions (see section four). 
PASTYEAR variable 
The potential liquidity variable PASTYEAR was always statistically insignificant, 
and this is regardless of whether the variable ISSUESIZE, or its logarithmic 
transformation, was also present in the specification. Redundant variable tests 
COnfirmed that it was unnecessary. In contrast to the variable ISSUESIZE, and its 
logarithmic variant, the variable PASTYEAR frequently swapped sign. Subsequently, 
this variable was dropped from the final model. 
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CALLABLE and maturity variables 
The dummy variable CALLABLE was correlated highly with the linear maturity 
variable YRSTOMAT. This is most likely due to perpetual debt being assigned an 
arbitrary period of 40 years. Creating non-linearity in the maturity variable through 
the inclusion of maturity bucket dummy variables removed this problem. Non 
linearity was justified, because preliminary results consistently reported that during 
the grouped period 1995-1998 the maturity bucket coefficient MATGREAT30 was 
lower than MAT20TO30. This is likely to be ascribed to the frequent issuance of 
perpetual maturity debt in the UK, which is therefore more liquid compared to less 
frequent SND issues in the 20-year to 30-year maturity range. Like the variable 
LNISSUESIZE, the variable CALLABLE was relatively stable for both market-based 
and accounting-based models over the same sub-groups and was therefore retained. 
Accounting variables 
Correlation analysis highlighted a number of accounting variables that appeared to be 
related to one another and this was evident in the models through vast swings in the 
significance of variables. In particular, CAPITAL2 and LEVERAGE were highly 
correlated with one another, which is probably not too surprising given that 
LEVERAGE is another way of looking at the capital adequacy of a credit institution. 
The latter variable was dropped. CAPITALI appeared to be related to a number of 
variables, including LIQUID and ASSETQUALITYI in the period 1999 to 2002, and 
on a number of occasions with SIZE and both PROFIT variables. Therefore, the 
earlier observation that ASSETQUALITY1 is also regularly related to SIZE should 
not come as a surprise. As a result, CAPITAL1 and ASSETQUALITY1 were 
removed from the final model. 
Time periods and model specification 
Finally, initial model testing indicated that it would not be feasible to test for evidence 
Of market discipline across the whole sample period with one panel model. The 
creation of the Euro currency in 1999 marked a major change in UK credit institution 
SND issuance with the introduction of a third prominent currency. Prior to this 
date 
virtually all SND issues were either in sterling or dollars. Initial testing reported that 
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currency variables are consistently significant across the entire sample time period 
and sub-periods and therefore exclusion would create omitted variable problems. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to have all three currency dummy variables included 
in sample time periods both before and after the introduction of the Euro, because it 
would create a singular matrix pre-introduction of the Euro. As a result, the 
introduction of the Euro creates a forced time period split where model specifications 
differ between the two periods based on the number of currency dummy variables. 
Therefore, as well as reporting annual cross-sectional findings the test results will 
analyse panel data models that cover the sub-periods 1995-1998 and 1999-2002. 
The following three sections now provide the results to answer the seven research 
hypotheses proposed in chapter four. Each hypothesis is recreated in the relevant 
testing section below. 
Section 2- Are yield spreads on UK credit institution SND 
sensitive to market measures of credit institution risk? 
This section focuses on the market-based model specification to test whether market 
measures of bank risk can explain yield spreads. As discussed previously, only 
Moody's issue ratings and Financial Strength ratings are considered. In both 
instances, linear and non-linear relationships with spreads are examined. The two 
research hypotheses tested are: 
0 Hypothesis 7-1: UK credit institution SND spreads are insensitive to credit rating 
agencies " measures of bank risk. 
This is tested for both issue ratings andfinancial strength ratings. The following joint 
null hypothesis is also tested for both types of credit agency ratings. 
0 Hypothesis 7-2: Credit rating agenies' measures of bank risks arejointly 
insignificant in explaining UK credit institution SND spreads. 
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Table 7-6 below reminds the reader of the variables included in the model and their 
anficipated effect on credit spreads. 
Table 7-6: Market risk characteristics 
Variable 
LNISSUESIZE 
STERLING 
DOLLAR 
CALLABLE 
Maturity dummy variable 
MOODY 
Moody's dummy variables 
STRENGTH 
Strength dummy variables 
As variable Increases, 
Credit Spread 
Decreases 
Uncertain 
Uncertain 
Increases 
Increases* 
Increases 
Increases* 
Increases 
Increases* 
*As with the inclusion of any set of dummy variables one has to be dropped to avoid collinearity in the 
data. The dropped variable in each instance is MAT10ANDLESS, MOODYIT04, and 
STRENGTH I T02. Therefore, the dummy coefficient can be interpreted as the average spread between 
that maturity bucket (rating bucket) and the shortest maturity bucket (top notch rating bucket). In each 
instance, one would expect the spread to rise with longer maturity or deterioration in credit agency 
ratings. 
Issue ratings 
Tables 7-7 and 7-8 report estimates for each sample year when conventional issue 
ratings are used as proxies for RISK. The difference between the two tables is that 
table 7-7 treats ratings as a linear function of spreads, whereas in table 7-8 non-linear 
relationships are considered. The standard F-statistic as well as F statistics for whether 
rating buckets are jointly different from zero are reported at the bottom of the relevant 
tables. Adjusted R2values of typically between 0.3 and 0.5 indicate that the models 
explain some degree of SND spread variability. However, annual cross-section 
models can be subject to annual variability which panel data models can capture 
through year dummy variables. Looking more closely at the RISK variables, 
in table 
7-7 the MOODY variable is often of the correct sign, but is only regularly significant 
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during the later time periods. The non-linear specification in table 7-8 presents some 
interesting and unexplainable findings. Again, the risk variables are more significant 
in the period 2000 to 2002. However, despite the variable MOODY5TO7 generally 
reporting positive coefficients, indicating that average spreads are higher for bonds in 
the rating bracket 5 to 7 compared to in the bracket I to 4, this is not the case for those 
bonds rated 8 and above. The latter rating bracket is consistently negative, although 
rarely significant. " A deeper look at these data points reveals that they are primarily 
perpetual maturity debt, but that they contain an above average number of negative 
spreads compared to other ratings brackets. Dropping the variable, CALLABLE, has 
no impact on the findings. In addition, all of these data points have strength ratings 
that fall in the bracket 6+ and this variable consistently reports a positive coefficient 
(see table 7-1 0). 12 
Of additional note in these tables is the significant positive relationship between 
Sterling issues and spreads. It must be stressed that for the period 1995 to 1998 the 
sterling variable is assessed in relation to dollar denomination SND, whereas for the 
period 1999 to 2002 it is assessed in relation to the dummy variable OTHERCURR 
(in other words the Euro). Nevertheless, Sterling denomination issues regularly 
demand a higher spread compared to both Dollar and Euro counterparts. This theme 
continues throughout all market and accounting-based model specifications and it 
may be due to building societies being restricted to Sterling denomination issuance. 
This issue will be revisited in section four of this chapter. 
The maturity bucket variables record that there is a non-linear relationship between 
maturity and spreads. In other words, spreads do not rise monotonically with maturity. 
During the period 1995 to 1998, spreads on maturities greater than 30 years are lower 
than those for the maturity bracket 20 to 30 years. In contrast, this abruptly switches 
dufing the period 1999 to 2002 suggesting a shift in the credit spread curve. This 
theme is also consistent across all specifications. 
Financial Strength ratings 
Tables 7-9 and 7-10 report estimates for each sample year when Financial 
Strength 
rafings are used as proxies for RISK. The findings are quite similar to the 
issue ratings 
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niodel specification, perhaps because Moody's issue ratings and Financial Strength 
ratings are highly correlated. Therefore, like for the issue rating' specification, the 
linear STRENGTH rating is frequently of the correct sign but rarely significant. The 
rating buckets approach provides further detail that for each year in isolation ratings 
are not linearly related to spreads. SND investors do demand a higher spread from 
issuers whose strength ratings fall outside the top notch bracket, 13 but the lowest rated 
credit institutions do not necessarily pay more than those in the bracket 
STRENGTH3TO5. 
The imperfect linear relationship between both issue and strength ratings and spreads 
may reflect the fact that ratings do not change frequently whereas spreads do. Table 7- 
11 analyses this possibility through modelling the relationship between spreads and 
ratings over two four-year periods (1995-1998 and 1999-2002). The tables indicate 
that spreads do not reflect issue ratings over the period 1995-1998, but do so during 
the period 1999-2002, although the rating bracket MOODY8+ remains insignificant. 
In contrast, the relationship between spreads and Financial Strength ratings does 
provide strong evidence that SND investors are sensitive to default risk as measured 
through stand-alone ratings. All strength variables are significant at least at the 5% 
level and all with the correct sign. Comparing the evidence between issue and strength 
ratings suggests that SND investors may look beyond individual issue ratings to the 
underlying strength of the institution. The favourable bond market conditions of the 
mid-to-late 1990s and early 2000s, as well as a period of unprecedented profitability 
for credit institutions, may be the reason. Investors will not be so concerned with an 
institution's individual SND issues and their characteristics, because strong 
profitability enables debt in any form to be easily repaid. However, credit institutions 
with weaker stand-alone risk characteristics will be penalised, whatever the nature of 
their SND, because there is greater uncertainty as to whether debt obligations will be 
met. The importance of credit institution profitability as a measure of bank condition 
is readily apparent in the accounting model specifications discussed in section three 
below. There is the possibility that a bank size effect may be occurring because 
Financial Strength ratings are highly correlated with bank size. This is investigated 
in 
greater detail in section four. 
LOOking at the control variables in table 7-11, a number of themes, some of which 
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have been mentioned already, are apparent. First, the models accurately pick up year 
effects that are apparent from the spread summary characteristics presented in table 7- 
2. For example, the sharp rise in spreads during 1998 is captured in the variable 
yEAR1998. Secondly, a possible movement in the credit spread curve between the 
two sub-periods is reflected in the maturity dummy variables and their significance. 
Thirdly, Sterling denomination issues consistently require higher spreads, whereas 
Dollar issues pay below average spreads. Fourthly, the liquidity of an SND issue 
variable is predominantly of correct sign, but is usually insignificant suggesting that 
issue size is not of significance to SND investors. Given that this variable is 
commonly associated with a bank size effect this evidence suggests that bank size is 
possibly not important in the UK context. As previously mentioned, the issue of bank 
size and whether a TBTF policy exists is revisited in section four below. However, it 
must also be mentioned that the nature of the Bondware database, which underlies the 
data used in this chapter, has a potential bias in favour of public (compared to private 
placement) SND issues. As a result, most of the SND issues that forrn the database 
may be relatively liquid, hence the possibility of an insignificant variable coefficient. 
The final observation is the variable CALLABLE. This variable is of correct sign for 
the period 1995-1998, but switches to being negatively related to spreads (and often 
significantly so) during the period 1999-2002. This again is a generally consistent 
theme through the other model specifications discussed below. 
The conclusion to this section answers the hypotheses posed at the beginning of this 
discussion in relation to both market measures of bank risk: 
0 
0 
Hypothesis 7-1: UK credit institution SND spreads are insensitive to credit rating 
agencies'measures of bank risk 
Hypothesis 7-2: Credit rating agencies' measures of bank risks arejointly 
insignificant in explaining UK credit institution SND spreads. 
The evidence suggests that SND spreads are sensitive to market measures of 
bank risk 
in the form of Financial Strength ratings throughout the sample time period. 
This is 
true for both linear and nonlinear rating specifications and, therefore, 
both hypotheses 
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can be rejected. Therefore, investors do price stand-alone default risk of UK credit 
institutions in their spreads. Relating to the theory, this behaviour is evidence of 
muket discipline in the secondary market. In the case of Moody's issue ratings the 
evidence is less compelling. Neither hypotheses can be rejected for the period 1995- 
1998, but both can be rejected for the period 1999-2002. The linear issue rating 
specification is significant and of correct sign and in the rating buckets specification 
the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the subset of rating dummy variables are 
jointly equal to zero can be rejected. Therefore, it appears that investors are becoming 
more sensitive to issue ratings over time. The unusual sign for extremely-poorly rated 
SND issues is a caveat to the findings. The differing evidence between the two market 
measures suggests that investors are not so concerned with individual issue ratings as 
long as the institution is secure and operating profitably. 
Section 3 -Are yield spreads on UK credit institution SND 
sensitive to accounting measures of credit institution risk? 
This section focuses on the third model specification to test market discipline, 
whether accounting measures of bank risk can explain yield spreads. The specific 
hypotheses posed in chapter four attached to this section are: 
0 
0 
Hypothesis 7-3: UK credit institution SND spreads are insensitive to accounting 
measures of bank risk. 
Hypothesis 7-4: Accounting measures of bank risks arejointly insignificant in 
explaining UK credit institution SND spreads. 
Table 7-12 below presents the accounting measures of bank risk tested and their 
anticipated effect on credit spreads. 
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Table 7-12: Accounting risk characteristics 
Variable 
FN-ISS-U-ESIZE 
STERLING 
DOLLAR 
CALLABLE 
ASSETQUALITY3 
PROFITI 
CAPITAL2 
LIQUID 
As variable Increases, 
Credit Spread 
Decreases 
Uncertain 
Uncertain 
Increases 
Increases 
Uncertain 
Decreases 
Decreases 
Table 7-13 presents the findings for both annual cross-section models and panel data 
models in order to answer the two research hypotheses. Looking briefly outside the 
key accounting variables to the control variables, the model produces very similar 
findings to the market-based models in section two. Jh addition, the adjusted R2 
values for the accounting-based models are on a par with the market models. Both 
pieces of evidence suggest that substituting market measures of risk with accounting 
measures is not influencing the model structure. For example, LNISSUESIZE is 
frequently of correct sign and rarely significant. The CALLABLE dummy switches 
from being positive to negative between the two sub-time periods 1996-1998 and 
1999-2002. The maturity dummy variables produce the same significant variables in 
the same sub-time periods as the market specifications and the Sterling and Dollar 
denomination dummy variables are consistently significant. 
The accounting measures of market risk are consistently significant as joint 
explanatory variables of SND spreads. However, this hides marked differences in 
individual accounting explanatory variable significance and signage. Chapter three 
discusses the potential uncertainty in deciphering the relationship between 
profitability and SND spreads and whether higher profitability signals greater risk- 
taking (and therefore a positive relationship with spreads) or a stable institution (and 
therefore a negative relationship). Table 7-13 conclusively reports that higher 
PrOfitability reduces SND spreads and, therefore, it appears that SND investors are 
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treating profitability as a sign of bank strength rather than weakness. The sample time 
period covered in this chapter has been one of exceptional profits for UK credit 
institutions, easily enabling them to cover debt obligations as they arise. Therefore, 
SND investors are imposing market discipline by rewarding strongly-performing 
banks with lower spreads - 
The other three accounting variables are less conclusive. As anticipated, the greater 
liquidity of a credit institution results in lower bank spreads, but only during the 
period 1996 to 1998, because the signage changes during the period 1999-2002. The 
asset quality of a credit institution is generally insignificant in explaining spreads 
although it is regularly with the anticipated sign. Finally, the capital variable 
consistently reports positive coefficients (sometimes significantly so), which is not as 
anticipated. 
To substantiate the findings, robustness checks were carried out using alternative 
measures for ASSET QUALITY (namely ASSET QUALITY1 and 
ASSETQUALITY2) and PROFIT (namely PROFIT2). There is no significant 
difference to the findings presented here. 14 In addition, the accounting specifications 
were remodelled using SND spreads as at the end of January rather than the preceding 
year end, thus allowing a time lag of one month for preliminary year-end results to 
filter into market prices. Again, the semi-strong form of market efficiency results in 
no changes in the significance of individual accounting variables. 
In conclusion, Hypothesis 7-3 cannot be rejected for two of the four accounting 
variablesý ASSETQUALITY3 and CAPITAL2, because they produce coefficients that 
are either insignificant or significant with the wrong anticipated sign. The variable 
LIQUID partly explains SND spreads, but only for the time period 1996-1998. In 
contrast, credit institution profitability is strongly statistically significant in all time 
pefiods. Hypothesis 7-4, whether accounting variables jointly explain SND spreads or 
nOt, is firmly rejected. However, the overwhelming statistical significance of the 
Profitability variable may be driving the rejection of this null hypothesis. It appears 
that investors view the healthy returns of UK credit institutions over the sample 
Pefiod as a sign of bank strength and signal this through reduced bank spreads. The 
exceptional profitability of this period may explain some of the less conclusive 
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findings of other accounting variables. The strong domestic economic environment 
since 1994 coupled with rising property values could lead investors to be less 
concerned about the asset quality of credit institutions' balance sheets. In addition, a 
liquid credit institution may be viewed as inefficiently retaining short-term funds that 
could be invested more profitably elsewhere in the business. Finally, as the larger 
credit institutions produce increasing proportions of their returns from less traditional 
financial intermediary activities (for example, proprietary security trading) and use 
financial security innovations to reduce balance sheet risks, may be traditional 
measures of bank risk, such as asset quality, are viewed as less important. 
Section 4 -Are yield spreads on UK credit institution SND 
sensitive to credit institution size, transparency and currency 
of denomination? 
The final section of chapter seven explores four additional hypotheses that are raised 
in the market discipline literature and in this way contributes further empirical 
evidence to those debates. The first two are whether bank transparency and bank size 
present evidence of structural impediments in the UK banking environment that 
restrict market discipline behaviour. These two tests align with the two sub-phases of 
the recognition phase of the market discipline framework. The other two tests use the 
findings from all of the other results in chapter seven to explore the influence of 
currency of denomination on SND spreads. 
Credit institution transparency 
Morgan and Stiroh (2000) explore whether bank opacity may prevent investors from 
effectively imposing market discipline. They use issue rating disagreements between 
Moody's and S&P as the basis for creating a split sample of "transparent" and 
64 opaque" credit institutions. Then, for both datasets, accounting measures of bank risk 
are tested to see if theyjointly affect SND spreads. The findings are that accounting 
variables are not jointly significant in explaining SND spreads for the sample of 
(4 opaque" credit institutions, but they are for the -transparent" sample. This section 
is 
the spirit of Morgan and Stiroh's paper performing a similar task in the 
UK context. 
Therefore, the hypothesis under investigation in this section is: 
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. Hypothesis 7-8: UK credit institution SND spreads are insensitive to the 
transparency of bank condition information. 
Table 7-14 presents descriptive statistics on the extent of issue ratings disagreements 
over the sample time period. "Transparency" is determined as where both Moody's 
and S&P allocate the same equivalent issue rating to a bond and "opacity" as where 
the two rating agencies differ (known as a split rating). The table highlights the extent 
of ratings disagreements between 1996 and 2002 with 33% of all bond issues having 
split ratings of at least two notches. 15 Equally noticeable are the significantly-higher 
ratings released by S&P. 
Table 7-14: Credit ratings distribution by rating disagreements 
Year Same 
rating 
Split 
rating 
I 
Rating disagree by: The higher rating is released by: 
One Two Three : Moody's S&P 
notch notches notches 
1996 25 
1997 23 
1998 24 
1999 42 
2000 36 
2001 51 
2002 40 
Total 241 
23 
34 
41 
76 
118 
136 
173 
601 
I I 
16 7 19 
23 654 30 
58 12 5- 41 
54 22 -1 75 
74 36 87 
59 53 24 1 135 
75 72 26 - 173 
359 208 68 17 584 
Table 7-15 presents the results from these tests. For the period 1996-1998 bank 
opacity does affect the sensitivity of SND spreads to measures of bank risk. None of 
the accounting variables are individually significant and they are just jointly 
significant at the 10% significance level. In contrast, SND issues with the same 
ratings are jointly significant and the individual accounting variables, 
ASSETQUALITY3, PROFIT 1 and LIQUID, are explanatory variables with the 
allficipated sign. These findings should be read with an element of care, however, 
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because both models have a low number of data points and extremely high adjusted 
Rý values suggesting that there may be an element of over-fitting to the data. 
Notwithstanding this, there is a significant difference in the findings implying that 
bank opacity affected investors' risk-monitoring capabilities during the period 1996- 
1998. 
During the period 1999-2002, despite the overwhelming number of SND issues 
having split ratings, spreads are equally sensitive to measures of bank risk in both 
datasets. Furthermore, the models exhibit similar results to the general accounting- 
based specification in section three of this chapter. Therefore, the null hypothesis that 
SND spreads are insensitive to the transparency of bank condition information cannot 
be rejected for the period 1999-2002. There is no compelling reason why the findings 
differ between the two time periods, especially as the number of split ratings far 
exceeds the number of same ratings in the more recent time period. However, two 
observations to note are; firstly, the higher proportion of Moody's ratings exceeding 
S&P during the period 1996-1997 compared to other periods. This suggests that there 
was more disagreement between the two credit rating agencies at this time. Secondly, 
and connected to this point, it is evident during the later time periods (1998-2002) that 
nearly all the ratings disagreements resulted in S&P having more conservative ratings 
than Moody's. This suggests that the ratings disagreements may be a product of 
system-wide differences between the two ratings agencies concerning the safety of the 
UK banking system, rather than differing opinion concerning individual credit 
institutions. Nevertheless, in conclusion, the hypothesis that bank opacity affects 
investors' risk-monitoring capabilities cannot be conclusively rejected. 
Bank size 
The market discipline literature has discussed at length whether bank size affects 
effective market discipline through perceived conjectural guarantees that large banks 
are TBTF. Empirical studies typically examine the significance of the "bank size" 
variable as an indicator of TBTF policies. In chapter three this thesis raises concerns 
that the "bank size" variable may be interacting with other explanatory variables and 
thus bringing into question the validity of some studies' conclusions on the 
TBTF 
debate. This thesis study has found that the ISSUESIZE variable is highly correlated 
212 
with the "bank size" variable and therefore the latter variable has been dropped from 
the models. An alternative approach in investigating the TBTF theme is to split the 
sample based on bank size, which is undertaken here. As for the transparency tests, 
accounting measures of bank risk are tested on both bank size datasets to see if they 
jointly affect SND spreads, and comparisons are made. 
The large credit institutions dataset is compiled from the six largest credit institutions 
in the UK during the sample period, as listed in table 6-18. These are the same 
institutions that would qualify for inclusion in a MSNDP. Any large building societies 
are excluded, with the exception of the Halifax from 2001, when it merged with the 
Bank of Scotland. The final dataset contained Abbey National, Bank of Scotland (then 
HBOS), Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds, Natwest and the Royal Bank of Scotland. The 
results are presented in table 7-16. The small institutions model for 1996-1998 
excludes a currency dummy variable as virtually every issue is denominated in 
Sterling. The findings suggest that through the period 1996-2002 large banks have 
enjoyed no TBTF guarantees, because their SND spreads are jointly sensitive to 
accounting measures of bank risk at the same level of significance as small banks and 
building societies, 1%. 16 The only caveats to these findings would be that the small 
institutions dataset has more individually significant accounting measures of bank 
risk. Secondly, the coefficient signs are nearly all as anticipated for small institutions. 
For example, statistically significant, positive ASSETQUALITY and negative 
CAPITAL coefficients, are rare exceptions throughout all the accounting model 
specifications in this chapter. However, these caveats may be a product of two factors 
unrelated to the TBTF debate. First, smaller institutions, the majority of which are 
building societies, could be argued as being easier to analyse because the nature of 
their business is more straightforward. In contrast, banks undertake a vast array of 
alternative revenue-generating and off-balance sheet activities which are extremely 
difficult for outside investors to assess for risk purposes [Morgan and Stiroh, 2001 ]. 
Therefore, transparency may be influencing the significance of some variables. 
17 In 
conjunction with the previous point, the majority of smaller credit institutions' 
business can still be considered to be traditional financial intermediary activities. The 
cOllstruction of this (and most) empirical market discipline models is based on the 
more traditional operations of credit institutions. Therefore, it is possible that the 
Model used in this thesis is more aligned with the nature of smaller institutions' 
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business and is thus more likely to identify their predominant risk characteristics. 
Notwithstanding these arguments, this section has attempted to answer the hypothesis: 
* Hypothesis 7- 7: UK credit institution SND spreads are insensitive to bank size. 
The thesis model cannot reject this hypothesis. Sironi (2003) ascribes a statistically 
significant UK dummy variable in his model as evidence that British banks, compared 
to their continental European counterparts, do not benefit from TBTF conjectural 
guarantees. This thesis provides country specific evidence in support of this 
statement. The following section examines an area that has been a point of uncertainty 
in the market discipline literature for some time, namely the impact of currency on 
spreads. 
Currency of denomination 
As discussed in chapter four, previous market discipline studies of European banks 
have reported findings concerning UK credit institutions that have not been 
adequately reconciled. These are 'why do Sterling and Dollar denomination bonds 
have higher credit spreads? ' The author believes that the unusual findings may be due 
to UK credit institutions predominantly issuing SND in currencies which have very 
liquid government bond markets; i. e. sterling and US Dollars. Therefore, the 
following null hypotheses are tested: 
0 Hypothesis 7-5: UK credit institution SND spreads are insensitive to whether or 
not the currency ofdenomination is sterling. 
11 Hypothesis 7-6: UK credit institution SND spreads are insensitive to whether or 
not the currency of denomination is US dollars. 
The models tested in this chapter provide extensive evidence that Sterling 
denomination issues always include a significant premium that is on average around 
100 basis points compared to Dollar issues. The introduction of the Euro currency 
did 
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not alter these findings with Sterling issues continuing to require a statistically 
significant premium. Therefore,, Hypothesis 7-5 can be firmly rejected. In addition3 
despite the introduction of the Euro currency, Dollar denomination issues command a 
discount compared to Euro denomination issues. Although annual cross-section 
models all agree that the discount was not statistically significant until the period 
2001-2002, the panel models confirm that Hypothesis 7-6 can also be rejected. As a 
result, the country-specific focus of this thesis partially presents evidence that 
contrasts with the findings of Sironi (2003) who records both Sterling and Dollar 
denomination issues as paying a hefty premium compared to other European 
currencies. Sironi's study only covers 5 quarters of the introduction of the Euro 
currency, whereas this study covers four years and therefore this may partly explain 
the discrepancy. Nevertheless, from a market discipline perspective, this thesis 
presents contemporary evidence suggesting that Dollar denomination SND trade at a 
significant discount to Sterling and Euro currency SND. If this is the case, market 
participants, including the regulatory authorities, who may rely on indirect market 
discipline signals to assess bank condition., through monitoring secondary market 
spreads, should take into consideration the currency of issue. 
The restriction on building societies to issuing Sterling SND was initially conceived 
as the primary reason for the Sterling premium. However, table 7-16 illustrates that 
the premium also exists for large credit institutions during the whole sample period. 
An examination of the underlying data reveals that 75% of the 161 data points with 
negative spreads are Dollar denominations and 15% Sterling. Although Datastream 
uses actual SND trade prices, the author considers that there could be a technical 
reason concerning the calculation of spreads that may be causing the large proportion 
of Dollar issues to have negative spreads and Sterling issues to have positive spreads. 
This research aspect lies outside the bounds of this current study and presents itself as 
a future research opportunity. Therefore, at this juncture the quandary concerning 
Sterling denomination SND spreads remains unresolved. 
Section 5- Conclusions 
This chapter examines extensively the existence of recognition phase market 
discipline in the UK context. This section synthesises the key themes that can 
be 
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drawn from the preceding analysis and relates them to the implications for market 
discipline of UK credit institutions. 
First, credit rating agency measures of bank risk, and in particular Financial Strength 
ratings, are reflected in SND spreads. This suggests that investors are imposing 
market discipline through penalising credit institutions that are viewed as having poor 
stand-alone risk. This evidence supports the findings of Sironi (2003) and Pop (2004) 
who also witnessed a positive relationship between Financial Strength ratings and 
SND spreads. In contrast, the relationship between issue ratings and SND spreads is 
not as conclusive as previous studies. The author perceives this to be due to the thesis 
sample time period being one of unprecedented profits for UK credit institutions. As a 
result, SND investors will not be as concerned with individual debt ratings, for as long 
as the credit institution as a whole is profitable then all debt obligations will safely be 
met. 
Secondly, accounting measures of bank risk are also not wholly conclusive in 
explaining SND spreads. Jointly, the four accounting variables are significant 
explanatory variables, but the overwhelming significance of the profitability measure 
appears to influence these findings. Individually, only two of the four accounting 
variables, LIQUID and PROFIT, provide an element of consistency over the sample 
fime period, with the PROFIT variable clearly indicating that investors have been 
rewarding profitable credit institutions with lower spreads. Again, the exceptional 
profitability of UK credit institutions over the sample time period may explain why 
some of the other accounting variables' results are of less concern to investors. More 
widely, the highly significant profit variable does indicate that a period of stability in 
the banking environment should not prevent accounting-based market discipline 
models from identifying those accounting variables that are of importance to 
investors. This is in stark contrast to Hall et al. (2003) and Krishnan, Ritchken and 
Thomson (2005) who ascribe poor accounting-based models to benign banking 
environments. Equally, the sensitivity of SND spreads to some accounting variables 
in this study is in stark contrast to the other European studies [Sironi, 
2003 and Pop, 
2004]. In both cases, the essential element appears to be the construction of a suitable 
accounting-based model. As this chapter identifies, there are numerous 
interactions 
between different model variables that must be investigated prior to 
final model 
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testing. The use of both "bank size" and "liquidity of issue" variables and the 
collinearity between certain accounting measures are two cases in point. In addition, 
by focusing on one country this thesis may be producing an accounting-based model 
that is more reflection of reality than the existing pan-European market discipline 
studies. 
Finally, the chapter explores a number of other pertinent issues in the market 
discipline literature. The results highlight that bank size effects do not influence the 
sensitivity of SND spreads, therefore suggesting that investors did not perceive 
conjectural guarantees to exist for larger UK credit institutions over the sample time 
period. This evidence supports the findings of Sironi (2003), who found that UK 
credit institutions have larger spreads compared to their European counterparts due to 
differences in perceived TBTF policies across European countries. In addition, the 
thesis reports that lack of transparency of bank condition did prevent investors from 
reflecting bank risk in SND spreads during the period 1996-1998. However, this had 
disappeared during the period 1999-2002, suggesting that information transparency 
may not be a major concern in the UK context. The final observation is that the 
currency of issue is a significant explanatory variable throughout the sample time 
period. This raises serious doubts over the conclusions from those empirical studies 
that have omitted such variables from their analysis. The significant currency 
variables also have two further potential implications. First, reading signals from 
secondary market spreads may be clouded by currency denomination differences. 
Secondly, in relation to MSNDP proposals, certain currencies may be penalised if a 
spread cap was imposed. 
A caveat to the results reported in chapter seven is that the adjusted 
W for virtually all 
the model specifications rarely exceeds 0.500. This means that only about 50% of the 
variation in SND spreads is explained by the model. This suggests that there are 
several other factors beyond credit risk within bond spreads. Therefore, despite 
careful model creation, the thesis findings support the opinion that care must be taken 
in interpreting information from bond spreads as they reflect many dimensions of risk, 
[Feldman and Levonian, 2001 ]. 
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I As explained later in this section, the ratings buckets approach is not used for S&P ratings as the 
range of ratings over the sample period is extremely low. 
2 This formula is sourced directly from S&P. Equity is adjusted for large amounts of preference stock 
issues by a credit institution. 
3 Sironi (2003) measures asset quality as the ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans. He subsequently 
acknowledges the difficulty in interpreting this variable, stating "This variable should positively affect 
spread as higher reserves indicate, ceteris paribus, higher expected losses. However, a higher value 
might also be perceived by SND investors as a larger cushion against unexpected losses. A negative 
relationship between spread and asset quality would result in this case. " 
4 Prelinfinary model testing investigated the use of both ISSUESIZE and LNISSUESIZE (see pages 
199-202), but ultimately the logarithmic variant was used. 
5 This study also excludes convertible SND. 
6 Sironi (2003) also estimates fixed effects models and found both market-based and accounting-based 
specifications report statistically insignificant variables and generally with unexpected coefficient 
signs. The findings are attributed to the heterogeneous nature of the empirical sample of SND issues 
with several banks making very few SND issues. This is also a concern in the thesis study's sample for 
several smaller institutions and therefore fixed effects models are not estimated. 
7 The reader is reminded that data availability restricts the sample time period for this aspect of the 
research to between 1995 and 2002. 
8 Please note that only 12 additional bonds that were not in the "master database" could have provided 
sufficient spreads and credit ratings information to be included in the final sample. 
9 Obviously, some bonds issued in the period between 1985 and 1995 will have matured prior to the 
sample test period 1995-2002. 
10 Taking logarithmic transformations of ISSUESIZE removed any collinearity concerns with the 
currency dummy variables. 
" This observation is consistent with the descriptive statistics in table 7-3 which highlight a dip in 
mean spreads for SND in the ratings brackets Baal and Baa2, which correspond with the cardinal 
numbers 8 and 9 respectively. 
12 For some years during the period 1995 to 1998 the variables MOODY8+ and STRENGTH6+ 
have 
Perfect positive collinearity. 
13 Note the positive F-statistic rejecting the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the subset of 
Financial Strength rating dummy variables jointly equal zero for all years from 199 
8 to 1999. 
14 The only exception is the inclusion of ASSETQUALITY1 in the panel model for 
1999-2002. The 
CAPITAL2 variable became highly significant as did ASSETQUALITY1. Examining correlation 
data 
indicates that they are highly correlated during the time period 1999-2002 and, therefore, 
the inclusion 
of both variables raises serious multicollinearity concerns. 
15 Whether this is the case for non-financial institutions and therefore evidence of credit 
institution 
opacity is a future research opportunity. 
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16 please note that for every year tested there are credit institutions in the small institutions group that 
have Financial Strength ratings that are better or as good as institutions in the large institutions group. 
17 As part of the research design process, the author considered using the bank-building society 
distinction as the driver to test tile impact of transparency on the risk sensitivity of SND spreads. This 
idea was rejected because size issues could severely contaminate the outcomes. 
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Chapter 8- Conclusions 
Introduction 
This chapter synthesises the key findings from the preceding chapters and relates 
them to the higher level themes within the market discipline literature that were 
presented in chapter two. These include the extent to which market discipline exists in 
the context under investigation in the research, whether the UK has conditions and 
sub-phases that are conducive to market discipline and whether a MSNDP would be 
appropriate in the LTK context. The conceptual theoretical framework introduced in 
chapter two provides a tool around which to examine these themes. 
The layout of the chapter is as follows. Section one concludes on the two key facets of 
SND market discipline that this thesis has investigated - "Are SND spreads sensitive 
to measures of bank risk? " and "The appropriateness of introducing a MSNDP in the 
UK banking environment. " The wider implications of these findings to current market 
discipline and bank regulatory design debates are discussed. In this way, the 
contributions of this thesis to the market discipline literature are highlighted. In 
addition, this section recognises some limitations in the research and the potential 
implications thereof for the research conclusions are identified. Finally, in section 
two, future research opportunities that stem from the current study are presented. 
Section I- Key thesis findings and wider market discipline 
implications 
Chapter four explains the key motives for researching SND debt-holder market 
discipline and identifies two research objectives on SND market discipline that are of 
interest in the wider academic literature. First, do investors recognise measures of 
bank risk and reflect these in SND prices (a classic recognition phase market 
discipline test)? Secondly, a specific and topical SND market discipline policy is 
investigated, namely a MSNDP, for its potential in the UK context. These are 
assessed in chapters seven and six respectively. Chapter two presents the theoretical 
hterature on market discipline and the debates in support of a more incentive-based 
sYstem of bank regulatory design. This section summarises the key findings 
from the 
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two research questions, and in light of the thesis' evidence on SND debt holder 
market discipline in the UK revisits the debates on bank regulatory design to discuss 
the wider implications for incentive-based regulatory policies. 
Are UK credit institution SND spreads sensitive to measures of credit 
institution risk? 
Chapter seven concluded that market measures of bank risk, and in particular stand- 
alone Financial Strength ratings, do appear to influence the spreads on credit 
institution SND. In addition, in contrast to existing studies of European SND market 
discipline, some accounting measures of bank risk are also signalled through spreads. 
This is despite the thesis sample time period covering a relatively-benign banking 
period. As a result, it does appear that SND investors of LTK credit institutions are 
identifying certain measures of bank risk and signalling them through SND spreads. 
The literature review in chapters two and three identified TBTF policies as a 
potentially-important barrier to effective market discipline. The UK has experienced a 
banking regulatory environment of "constructive ambiguity" for some time, and at 
least for the period 1996-2002, which represents the testing phase for SND market 
discipline in this study. Therefore, as chapter four explains in justifying the chosen 
research context of the UK, in contrast to previous European studies on SND market 
discipline, this thesis explores a cleaner regulatory environment where TBTF policies 
are perceived not to exist. The thesis examines whether this is the case by splitting the 
dataset into two, based on bank size. The results suggest that bank size effects do not 
influence the sensitivity of SND spreads, because even large, profitable banks are 
rewarded with lower spreads compared to their peers. Therefore, it appears that 
investors do not perceive conjectural guarantees to exist for larger LTK credit 
institutions over the sample time period. This evidence supports the findings of Sironi 
(2003), who found that UK credit institutions have larger spreads compared to their 
European counterparts due to differences in perceived TBTF policies across European 
countries. Equally, the UK evidence supports the theoretical literature that eliminating 
TBTF can encourage effective incentive-based mechanisms. 
The literature review in chapter two also identifies that inadequate bank 
disclosure 
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can act as a barrier to effective market discipline. The thesis operationalises this 
concept by splitting the thesis dataset into two depending on whether Moody's and 
S&P's agree or disagree over a bond's issue rating. The findings are inconclusive, 
with lack of bank transparency certainly affecting investors' risk signalling 
capabilities during the period 1996-1998, but not during the period 1999-2002. There 
is no compelling reason to explain the contradictory findings apart from S&P's ratings 
appearing to be far more conservative with their issue ratings than Moody's 
(especially during the period 1998-2002), therefore, suggesting that an element of 
institutional bias may be the cause of ratings disagreements between the two ratings 
agencies. Alternatively, it may be the case that investors feel that information 
transparency may no longer be a concern in the UK context, although the author 
cannot determine any event that may have altered these opinions. As chapter seven 
intimates, maybe investors are looking beyond credit institutions' individual issue 
ratings to their stand-alone risk. Equally, as credit institutions engage in activities that 
are increasingly difficult to monitor, and accurately assess, investors may be using 
ratings agencies to substitute for their own monitoring activities of the whole credit 
institution; hence the strong relationship between stand-alone risk and SND spreads. 
From a theoretical market discipline perspective, the concern is that the delegated 
monitor may overlook vital information that should be reflected in current ratings, or 
information that is considered cyclical in nature. The implication would be that 
market signals to credit institutions would then not reflect current bank conditions. 
The annual cross-section model specifications, even for Financial Strength ratings, 
intimate that this may be the case. 
In conclusion, the thesis has presented European evidence arguing that SMD investors 
are signalling both market and some accounting measures of bank risk in spreads. The 
thesis explores the two key sub-phases in the recognition phase of the market 
discipline theoretical framework, namely, investors consider themselves at risk in the 
event of bank default and that investors can effectively observe bank default risk. It 
appears that the UK has at least one of the theoretical elements (and may be both) that 
are appropriate to induce incentive-based regulatory policies at the recognition phase, 
thereby encouraging investors to adequately signal credit institution risk in market 
Pfices. The thesis does present evidence to indicate that bank opacity does affect 
hivestors, ability to signal bank risk, thereby supporting the other sub-phase of the 
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theoretical framework. However, this evidence is not conclusive as the period 1999- 
2002 does not support the theory. Finally, despite SND spreads being sensitive to 
measures of bank risk, a concern raised in the thesis is being able to extract clean 
default risk signals from secondary market SND spreads for the regulatory authorities 
to monitor. Further research is required in interpreting spread risk components before 
it may become widely adopted in regulatory policy. 
The appropriateness of introducing a MSNDP in the UK banking 
environment 
The literature review chapter highlights the growing calls for a MSNDP as an 
appropriate incentive-based policy to enhance modem regulatory policy. The aim of 
such a policy would be to create a sizeable class of financially-sophisticated and 
uninsured investors (right participants) with the incentive to constantly monitor, 
signal and impose both direct and indirect discipline on banks. The market discipline 
literature contains numerous proposals for MSNDP (see table 2-1) which tackle both 
the recognition phase and controlphase of the conceptual framework. For example, it 
is widely acknowledged that the characteristics of what constitutes acceptable SND 
would require standardisation to induce appropriate risk signals. Chapter six analyses 
the issuance activity and characteristics of UK credit institution SND over the 
eighteen-year period between 1985 and 2002, and applies the general characteristics 
proposed in MSNDPs to the findings of the UK analysis to answer the research 
question. 
The analysis raises a number of themes, many of which are in stark contrast to US and 
European banks' SND issuance and characteristics. First, perpetual debt and callable 
debt constitute a significant proportion of UK credit institution issues and have done 
so consistently throughout the 18-year sample period. Secondly, and in line with the 
findings from the other research question, the issuance spreads on UK credit 
institution debt are consistently some of the highest in Europe, which has implications 
for any potential rate cap. Finally, the method of issuing SND suggests that structural 
differences exist across European countries raising the possibility that some countries' 
banks may be better placed to support price-based indirect market discipline than 
others. The thesis argues that a MSNDP would be feasible for the six-largest 
UK 
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banks Only, which also happen to be intemationally-active banks. This is consistent 
with theoretical arguments that a MSNDP would be inappropriate for smaller banks, 
because they issue SND with insufficient frequency. However, the typical 
characteristics of UK credit institution SND do not align with the theoretically- 
desirable SND features for a MSNDP. 
The theoretical literature review chapter highlights the importance of applying a cost- 
benefit analysis in evaluating any regulatory policy. The key benefits of a MSNDP are 
that it can: incentivise SND investors to signal changes in bank risk either through 
secondary market price-signalling (indirect discipline) or primary market direct 
discipline; create standardised mandatory SND that will enhance default risk signals 
in secondary market spreads; and force credit institutions to tap the markets for funds 
(and disclose current bank condition and prospects information) at potentially 
inopportune times. In the UK context, the fundamental cost is that a MSNDP would 
force banks to alter the characteristics of their SND debt significantly from current, 
unconstrained maturity structures. Given this and the previous discussion that UK 
credit institution SND holders already appear, to some extent, to be signalling bank 
risk in SND spreads, the thesis is arguing that a MSNDP should be restricted to direct 
discipline signals from SND investors (i. e. a credit institution's inability to issue 
qualifying SND or only at above average market rates identifies poor bank condition). 
Therefore, the regular issuance of mandatory SND should be the overriding policy 
tool to incentivise SND investors to control bank risk-taking and provide market 
signals of bank risk to the regulatory authorities. The policy would run alongside the 
regulatory authorities' existing supervisory activities. Simple controlphase conditions 
within the policy could include the regulatory authorities being able to examine a 
credit institution that is unable to issue mandatory SND. The empirical literature 
review chapter highlights evidence that the mandatory issuance component of a 
MSNDP would compel riskier credit institutions to raise funds during unfavourable 
market conditions [Covitz, Hancock and Kwast, 2001 and 2004] and, therefore, this is 
where SND investors can optimally signal market concerns over bank condition. 
Equally, this thesis study provides evidence in support of the opinion that credit 
illstitutions refrain from issuing SND during less favourable market conditions 
(although whether this is linked to bank risk is unable to be examined). Extending the 
PORCY to include indirect discipline through standardised mandatory SND would 
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impose substantial costs on UK credit institutions and therefore should not be 
implemented. 
Taking the cost-benefit analysis one step ftirther, in contrast to the existing literature 
the thesis raises significant concerns about the wide variation in credit institution SND 
across the most active SND issuance countries in Europe and further afield. As things 
stand, there are too many fundamental differences between countries' SND 
characteristics to apply an international MSNDP with harmonised mandatory SND. 
However, an extension of the regular issuance policy suggested for the UK could be 
applied in other major countries. This would enable SND features that are unique to 
particular countries to be retained, but at the same time force frequent SND issuance 
and the direct discipline signals that entail. 
A ftuther criticism of introducing a MSNDP which standardises the characteristics of 
qualifying SND taps into the debate in chapter two about rules and incentive-based 
regulatory designs. Such a MSNDP would require the regulatory authorities to devise 
a set of rules covering both phases to ensure that suitable participants (and hence 
appropriate information signals) are created and effective control mechanisms exist. 
Equally, the regulatory authorities are best placed, as specialised monitors, to enforce 
compliance with the rules. However, a concern is that in attempting to create the ideal 
market participant, and devise appropriate control mechanisms, the set of rules must 
be sufficiently detailed to prevent new "gaming" opportunities, but not so precise as 
to quash incentive structures. In other words, the rules must ensure that the 
characteristics of qualifying SND cannot be manipulated by issuers, but at the same 
time provide investors with an incentive to hold such debt. Therefore, resolving 
tensions between certainty and flexibility (Black, 1994) in bank regulatory rule- 
making continue with calls for market sector regulatory solutions. A poor balance 
MaY Prompt a formalistic approach to their interpretation and application, and a 
negative impact on compliance culture, thus encouraging criticisms concerning 
effectiveness and efficiency similar to those directed at previously-devised 
Prescriptive rules. In such circumstances, market discipline would not forward the 
debate on future bank regulatory design. These problems are likely to occur 
if a 
MSNDP is created that standardises in detail the characteristics that constitute 
acceptable SND. In contrast, the policy suggested in this thesis would allow credit 
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institutions to continue issuing tier two SND across the maturity spectrum so long as 
two basic characteristics are met (a minimum issue size and issue frequency) 
Therefore, in conclusion, the thesis is arguing that the social costs of introducing a 
MSNDP in the UK based on current proposals would be excessive (see page 8 in 
chapter two). The particular concern is that UK credit institutions would have to 
significantly alter their SND funding structures away from the current unconstrained 
preferences. In addition to being economically credible a regulatory policy must also 
be politically robust, if it is to be accepted. Market discipline can provide the financial 
markets with a significant degree of regulatory control at the expense of the 
regulatory authorities and this consideration has probably held back previous attempts 
to introduce such a policy. This thesis has argued that an appropriately-constructed 
and implemented incentive-based policy could benefit bank regulatory design. The 
real issue, however, may be whether the political climate is right to implement such a 
market discipline policy. A simplified version of MSNDP proposals, such as those 
outlined above, which can run alongside existing banking regulatory policies and 
which does not force banks to alter funding structures may be both, more 
economically, and politically credible. 
Further contributions to the market discipline literature 
A secondary objective of the thesis, outlined in chapter four, was to overcome some 
of the methodological failings in existing studies. The thesis has provided this on a 
number of levels. First, the benefits of a country-specific study, and in particular the 
shortcomings of a pan-European study, were discussed in the research objectives 
chapter. The thesis focus on the UK SND market has raised serious concerns in 
implementing an international MSNDP. On the positive side, a one-country study 
Provides a cleaner picture of market discipline behaviour. The study has represented 
this, as far as the author is aware, by providing the first European evidence of 
accounting-based measures of SND market discipline behaviour. Equally, the 
debate 
concerning significant Sterling and Dollar currency variables now takes on a 
further 
twist, because the UK evidence highlights a premium for Sterling denomination 
SND 
aiad a discount over both Sterling and Euro currencies, for Dollar denomination 
SND. 
The cOuntry-specific focus of the thesis also enabled a bank-level approach to 
be 
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undertaken in examining MSNDP proposals. As a result, the whole population of 
SND issues could be examined to provide a conclusive picture of SND issuance 
activity in the UK and the implications thereof for implementing a MSNDP in the 
UK. At the same time the second methodological contribution of the thesis study was 
identified; identification of limitations and bias in a secondary data source commonly 
used for market discipline research and the application of data triangulation 
techniques to overcome this. 
The third methodological contribution concerns the construction of the econometric 
model to test market discipline, thereby enhancing the validity of the findings. 
Chapter three identifies numerous potential pitfalls that must be overcome prior to 
final model testing. The use of both "bank size" and "liquidity of issue" variables and 
the collinearity between certain accounting measures are two cases in point from this 
thesis' evidence. Too often variables are inserted into models without necessarily 
considering the potential econometric and interpretive implications. Possible 
indications in favour of the model constructed in this thesis are that a country-specific 
focus has highlighted that it may be very important to eliminate cross-country 
accounting noise in data. In addition, the study has reported evidence of SND holder 
market signalling during a relatively-benign banking period. 
Finally, the market discipline theoretical framework in chapter two has contributed to 
the literature by providing a framework to direct and structure the future incorporation 
of market discipline in bank regulatory design. 
Notwithstanding the theoretical and methodological contributions to the literature that 
have been discussed above, the thesis does recognise that there are some limitations to 
the findings and these are identified and commented on in the following section. 
Limitations to the research findings 
Yield spread data - The consistent identification of a significant 
Sterling premium 
and significant Dollar discount does raise some concerns about the calculation of 
spreads in the secondary market data source. Through an examination of the 
data, the 
author identified a significant number of negative data points to be Dollar- 
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denornination SND. Therefore, the author considers that there could be a technical 
reason concerning the calculation of spreads that may be causing the large proportion 
of Dollar issues to have negative spreads and Sterling issues to have positive. If this 
were the case it could clearly have an impact on the research findings. One way to 
overcome this may be to obtain prices from an alternative data source, apply data 
triangulation techniques and replicate the study. 
Recognition phase testing - The study has restricted its focus and evidence to the 
recognition phase of the market discipline conceptual framework and therefore only 
comments on signalling aspects of SND investors; not whether credit institutions 
respond to any such signals. This is discussed in further detail in section two on future 
research opportunities. 
Bond liquidity - The author's suggestion for an improved bond liquidity variable was 
unsuccessful and the issue of appropriately incorporating a suitable liquidity variable 
remains unresolved in the literature. A possible alternative may be to operationalise 
volume of trades data from a secondary data source. 
Generalisability - The research findings are only generalisable as far as the study 
covers the period 1985-2002 and that the focus of the thesis study was the UK. 
Nevertheless, contributions to the market discipline literature are possible through 
comparisons with similar studies in other countries and the theoretical debates. Linked 
to the generalisability debate, the data triangulation approach adopted in this thesis 
has identified that around 30% of UK SND is not traded in secondary markets. 
Therefore, this and similar recognition phase market discipline research is likely to 
bias in favour of potential market discipline as illiquid securities are ignored. Studies 
should at least recognise that they are unlikely to be covering the whole population of 
SND and, therefore, the overall market may not be as liquid as they are 
unintentionally implying. 
Section 2- Avenues for further research 
This section discusses a number of research opportunities that arise 
from this thesis to 
ellhance academic understanding of market discipline and/or contribute 
to future bank 
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regulatory policy designs. 
Control phase testing 
As the last section identified, this thesis has not tested market discipline in the control 
phase and given existing research in this area this represents a potential avenue for 
future research. This has proved a particularly difficult area to examine in the 
literature, because the ability to link the cause (change in debt yields or equity prices) 
to the effect (bank management response) is far from direct. Some papers have 
attempted to investigate this relationship [Bliss and Flannery, 2001 ], but the quality of 
their directional relationships are very tenuous and therefore one can easily question 
the validity of their research findings. One such approach that has not been 
investigated may be to examine changes in the make-up of bank portfolios as a result 
of changes in equity prices or SND yields, especially if there has been a recent spike 
in yields, a major withdrawal in deposit funds or a major event in the banking 
industry, such as the collapse of Barings. 
Market microstructure 
The use of econometric models limits the ability to analyse frictions in the markets for 
instruments that could serve as appropriate for market discipline and, therefore, limits 
the ability to explain why empirical findings may be as they are. For example, Kahn, 
Pennacchi and Sopranzetti (1999) suggest that Jumbo-CD rates cluster around 
integers and even fractions making rates less responsive to changes in bank risk. 
Sitnilarly, Jumbo-CD holders may receive other services - mortgage loans and 
checking accounts, for example - from their banks and price the whole relationship 
rather than simple CDs [Hall et al., 2003]. An example from the SND market is that 
many investors may simply be "Buy and Hold" investors and therefore the 
relationship between bank risk and bond yields weakens. These factors are very 
difficult to incorporate into econometric models and, therefore, potentially weaken the 
findings of prior empirical research on market discipline. 
Therefore, understanding the market structure of potential market discipline 
financial 
instruments may provide an opportunity to delve into these markets and 
highlight 
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issues relevant to the market discipline debate. This alternative research methodology 
could be conducted through interviews with relevant market participants, such as 
issuers, investors, the regulatory authorities, price providers, and credit rating 
agencies. For example, these interviews could examine participant interactions in 
these markets and whether there are institutional/political obstacles to effective 
investor discipline. As a result, detailed investigations into the structure and 
operations of financial markets could ascertain whether forces are at play that can 
explain the efficacy of the market disciplinary process and, therefore, provide another 
facet in the advancement of knowledge on market discipline. Equally, such a 
methodology can examine issues such as why do UK credit institutions have a 
particular preference for perpetual SND compared to credit institutions in other major 
SND issuing countries? 
Transparency of bank information 
A paper in the mould of Morgan (2002), comparing evidence of rating splits between 
financial and non-financial firms in the UK and therefore examining whether credit 
institutions are more opaque is, as far as the author is aware, a feasible research 
project. The author has a detailed database of UK credit institutions issue ratings and 
is aware of where to obtain the same information for industrial companies. Therefore 
this presents itself as a more imminent research opportunity. 
Subordinated spreads as predictive indicators of bank-specific risk 
andlor banking systemic risk 
Finally, chapter three highlights that one of the more recent avenues of research in 
market discipline is testing the predictive nature of different market indicators in 
signalling both individual (microprudential) and system-wide (macroprudential) bank 
risks. These papers focus on the informational qualities of bank SND spreads from 
secondary market trading and whether they can be used by the supervisory authorities 
and other market participants as indicators of increasing bank risk and, therefore, to 
recognise and discipline bank risk taking. Some supervisory authorities are already 
making use of such information [Persson and BlAvarg, 2003]. This research area 
includes attempting to extract clean default risk information from credit spreads. 
As a 
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whole, this theme presents numerous market discipline research opportunities. The 
author is currently liaising with an academic in France to devise a joint research 
project in this area. 
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Appendix 5-1 
List of bond characteristic data fields initially 
requested from Bondware 
* Issuer 
0 Maturity date 
0 Currency, m 
0 Currency Amount original, m 
0 US$ equivalent nominal amount, m 
0 Final coupon 
0 Benchmark 
0 Spread at launch (basis points) 
0 Anniversary date 
0 ISIN number 
0 Moodys Issue rating (launch) 
0 S&P Issue rating (launch) 
0 Market Type 
0 Denomination (000s) 
0 Listings 
0 First call date 
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Appendix 5-2 
SND issues removed from Bondware 
The following SND issues were removed from the Bondware data set, because the 
author was unable to reliably determine whether they were guaranteed by a LTK bank 
and, thus, truly represent UK credit institution SND issues. 
HSBC Bank 
HongkongBank of Australia Ltd 
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp 
HSBC Bank Australia Ltd 
HSBC Banco Roberts SA 
HSBC Bank Argentina SA 
HSBC Bank Brasil SA - Banco Multiplo 
Marine Midland Bank 
Lloyds Bank 
Lloyds Bank NZA Ltd 
Midland Bank 
Midland International Australia Ltd 
Trinkhaus, & Burkhardt KgaA 
Natwest Bank 
Handelsbank Natwest 
3 issues (1999,2000 and 2001) 
4 issues (1985,1986,1988 and 1993) 
1 issue (2002) 
2 issues (both 2001) 
1 issue (1999) 
1 issue (2000) 
2 issues (1985 and 1987) 
1 issue (1986) 
2 issues (both 1985) 
1 issue (199 1) 
1 issue (1989) 
A- 
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Appendix 5-4 
Moody's Financial Strength Ratings details 
Credit Institution 
Financial 
Strength Rating 
available? 
Date 
assigned 
Abbey National PLC w/ Aug 1995 
Abbey National Capital Trust 1 -- N/A - N/A 
Abbey National First Capital BV N/A N/A 
-ling Capital PLC N/A N/A 
Alliance & Leicester PLC / BS Aug 1995 
Bank of Scotland Aug 1995 
Scotland International Finance BV N/A N/A 
Scotland International Finance No. 2 N/A N/A 
Barclays Bank PLC I/ Aug 1995 
Barclays Overseas Capital Corp N/A N/A 
Barclays Overseas Investment Co BV_ N/A N/A 
Barclays North American Capital N/A N/A 
Barings N/A N/A 
Birmingham Midshires BS Aug 1995 
Bradford & Bingley PLC / BS Aug 1995 
Bradford & Bingley Capital Funding N/A N/A 
Bristol & West BS / PLC V/ Aug 1995 
Britannia Building Society Aug 1995 
Chelsea Building Society Dec 1997 
Cheltenham & Gloucester V/ Aug 1995 
Cheshire Building Society Jul 1998 
Co-Operative Bank PLC Aug 1996 
Coventry Building Society V Jan 1998 
Derbyshire Building Society V/ Jul 1998 
Dunfermline Building Society Jul 1998 
Apr 2001 
P N/A N/A 
Robert Fleming & Co. Feb 1998 
Robert Fleming Capital N/A N/A 
Robert Fleming Intl. N/A N/A 
Robert Fleming Neth BV N/A N/A 
Halifax PLC / Building Society V00, Aug 17.95 
Ha N/A N/A 
Halifax Group Sterling Finance 
Jerse LP 
N/A N/A 
Halifax Group Euro, Finance (Jersey) 
LP 
N/A N/A 
Hambros Bank Ltd Jan 1996 
Hambros International Finance BV N/A 
_ _N/A HBOS PLC N/A N/A 
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Credit Institution 
Financial 
Strength Rating 
available? 
Date 
assigned 
HBoS Capital Funding LP N/A N/A 
Hill Samuel N/A N/A 
JISBC Holdings PLC N/A N/A 
Midland/HSBC Bank PLC _ VO/ _ Aug 1995 
HSBC Capital Funding (Sterling 1) 
LP 
N/A N/A 
HSBC Capital Funding (Dollar 1) LP N/A N/A 
H N/A N/A 
HSBC Capital Funding (Sterling 2) 
LP 
N/A N/A 
HSBC Capital Funding (Dollar 2) LP N/A N/A 
HSBC Capital Funding (Euro, 2) LP N/A N/A 
HSBC Capital Funding (Euro, 3) LP N/A N/A 
HSBC Finance Nederland BV N/A N/A 
Midland International Fin Services N/A N/A 
Kleinwort Benson Aug 1995 
Leeds & Holbeck Building Society Oct 1998 
Leeds Permanent Building Society N/A N/A 
Lloyds Bank / Lloyds TSB Bank V1, Aug 1995 
Lloyds TSB Group N/A N/A 
Lloyds TSB Capital 2 N/A N/A 
Lloyds TSB Capital I N/A N/A 
Lloyds Bank plc (Brazil) N/A N/A 
Lloyds Eurofinance NV N/A N/A 
Manchester Building Society N/A N/A 
National & Provincial BS Aug 1995 
National Westminster Bank PLC Aug 1995 
National Westminster Bancorp Inc N/A N/A 
National Westminster Finance BV N/A N/A 
Nationwide Building Society Aug 1995 
Newcastle Building Society Nov 1998 
North of England BS N/A N/A 
Northern Rock PLC / BS v Aug 1995 
Norwich & Peterborough BS V Jul 1998 
No N/A N/A 
Portinan Building Society v Dec 1997 
Principality Building Society V/ Dec 1997 
NM Rothschild & Sons Jan 1996 
Rothschilds Continuation Finance BV N/A N/A 
Ro ontinuation Financ N/A N/A 
Royal Bank of Scotland PLC IV/ Aug 1995 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group N/A N/A 
WS Capital Trust A N/A N/A 
R13S C ital Trust B N/A N/A 
RBSG Capital Corp N/A N/A 
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Credit Institution 
Financial 
Strength Rating 
available? 
Date 
assigned 
Scarborough Building Society N/A N/A 
SG Warburg N/A N/A 
Skipton Building Society Jul 1998 
standard Chartered PLC N/A N/A 
Standard Chartered Bank /_ Aug 1995 
Standard Chartered Capital Trust I N/A _ N/A 
Standard Chartered Finance (Jersey) N/A N/A 
TSB Bank Aug 1995 
TSB Group PLC N/A N/A 
West Bromwich Building Society V/ 2004 
Woolwich PLC Aug 1995 
Yorkshire Building Society Aug 1995 
Source: Moody's 
Key 
I/ Yes 
N/A Not applicable or not produced. 
I 
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